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OCTOBER 1969

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW



FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted without permission. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author and the Naval War College.

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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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Cover: *Bon Homme Richard* (1779), reproduced from a chromolithograph print which was one of four recently retrieved from an antique shop near Newton, Kansas by Captain Beatrice M. Truitt, USN.

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CHALLENGE!

The requirements for military education have undergone radical change in the years since World War II. The continuing revolution in military technology, the disintegration of the colonial empires, and the worldwide challenge of Russian expansionism have all created problems that have enlarged the area of military affairs far beyond the traditional concerns.

As a result, civilians have entered those areas of military affairs and strategy once thought to be the exclusive concern of the military, and military officers have found themselves increasingly concerned with economic, political, and social considerations which were once outside their province. The mission of the Naval War College is "to provide . . . advanced education in the science of naval warfare and related subjects in order to improve their professional competence for higher responsibilities." Now this combination of naval science and "related subjects" is assuming a more and more complex nature. The distinctions between matters of essentially military concern and essentially civilian concern are no longer as clear as they once were. At the same time that the complexities of new military technology are demanding increased expertise on the part of the military officer, the changing nature and increased destructive potential of war require that he become more knowledgeable in nonmilitary fields. This is a large order, and the demands it places upon military education must be weighed carefully.

While we must recognize the necessity for military officers to be well educated in those nonmilitary subjects which have an ever-increasing impact on military affairs, nevertheless it seems to me that it would be a serious mistake to emphasize these facets of education to the detriment of specialized military knowledge. The Naval War College has been a leader among senior service educational institutions in the establishment of civilian academic chairs, and these play an integral and vital part in the curriculum. But with many attractive topics competing for attention, it is not necessary for the military officer to feel that he must compete with civilian experts in all aspects of international relations and national security policy. There are specifically *military* areas of expertise, and these must be explored and developed in concert with an understanding of the impact of nonmilitary factors.

In the February issue of the *Review*, Rear Admiral Eccles, U.S. Navy (Ret.), noted:

> We have been preoccupied by exploding technology itself and thus distracted from the central and more fundamental elements of the military profession. We have failed to adjust the long established military concepts to

the implications of the technological potential.

To the extent that this is true, I think that we have to reexamine the tasks of military education. There may have been a time when military educational institutions could properly perform their function by teaching only knowledge that had been learned at sea or in the field. If there ever was such a time, it is now past. Military technology is changing too swiftly, and the consequences of failure are too great, to permit us to rely on the lessons of experience.

Every new weapon is a challenge to accepted doctrine, yet weapons are changing faster than doctrine can be tested in war, and some kinds—long-range ballistic missiles and thermonuclear weapons—are unlikely to be employed in any situation short of a world catastrophe. Therefore, trial and error in developing doctrine is no longer so feasible as it once was, but must be replaced wherever possible by techniques such as war games, system analysis, and the full range of analytical tools of modern science. To quote Henry Eccles again:

> Since the cost of idea research is infinitesimal in relation to the operational cost of military hardware, and since the ideas, be they sound or faulty, govern the choice, the support, and the employment of hardware, this cost must be paid. Idea research and high-level military education are inseparable.

Throughout the military establishment—in fact throughout all the government—the day-to-day demands of putting out fires and meeting deadlines necessarily take precedence over research or reflective thought. This puts a particular responsibility on military educational institutions, for if the kind of research and creative thinking necessary to sound military knowledge is not done there, there is danger that it will not be done at all.

These circumstances have for some time been under careful scrutiny at the highest echelons of Government. Not long ago, the Secretary of Defense took action which deals directly with the question of military research and which has immediate implications for the Naval War College. In a memorandum to the Service Secretaries and General Wheeler dated 27 June, Secretary Laird expressed his apprehension concerning the middle level and senior service schools that, "the full potential of their activities is not, in my judgment, being realized," He went on to observe that each year some of the most incisive minds in the military are engaged at the service schools in careful analysis and original treatment of pressing problems of national and strategic relevance. He therefore called upon the addressees for "your proposals on how we can better use the resources and output of our school system." It is my belief that this development offers all uf us a unique opportunity. For the students, it provides a direct line of communication to the makers of broadest policy. For the War College in general, it is a requirement for the keenest judgment as to the nature and quality of professional service education.

There is a serious danger that the new complexities of the study of war have outdistanced the state of our knowledge. It is the challenge of military education to catch up.



R. G. COLBERT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

THE AGE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE

The student of insurgency, as well as the casual reader, will find Mr. Sanger's treatment of social change and insurgency as interesting as it is unique. His experience as an "infiltrator" of the Soviet fellow traveler apparatus in the 1930's and his experience in the U.S. State Department provide a realistic perspective of our world in change and its vulnerability to subversion. The author's lecture is enriched by his historical analysis and personal observations of sociopolitical change.

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Mr. Richard H. Sanger

Gentlemen, I am very appreciative of being asked back to talk on this platform. As violence and chaos spread through every continent, and international tensions rise, the importance of the U.S. Naval War College increases each year.

The captain mentioned the fact that I took the lecture course at the Lenin School of the University of Moscow which is often called the University of World Revolution. Do not worry, I do not think the FBI will break down the door during my remarks today; they knew I was going as did Naval Intelligence, the State Department, and various other official and nonofficial groups.

My interest in communism goes back to the time of the great depression in the early 1930's. I knew I was going to be working in the field of foreign affairs, and I felt confused because we were getting such contradictory reports out of Russia. Some people said, "It is a workers' paradise; it is the answer." Others said, "It is a police state, and there is a terrible famine going on." I felt that the only way to get the answer to the question was to go and find out. So I checked with the powers that be, resigned from the Government, and through friends was put in touch with Socialists who, in turn introduced me to Communists. I was passed on to the top of the Communist pyramid here, and they put me on what I now know was the Fellow Traveler Conveyer Belt. This is an operation which was running then, and is still in operation, to make it fairly easy for persons the far left think they can influence to get into Russia, get jobs, and move around in the country. Through it my wife and I were able to enter the U.S.S.R. before recognition, get jobs on a farm, in a factory, and in an office.

The office where I worked for 6 months was in Moscow, the Communist line *Moscow Daily News*, published in English. It was particularly interesting because the editor-in-chief was Michael Borodin who, you may remember, was for many years the top Communist

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agent in the Far East until Chiang Kai-shek threw him out. I got rather fond of him, for I think he was one of the few honest murderers I ever knew. It was he who suggested that I take the short lecture course at Moscow University.

Then, as now, (I was back last summer and saw the old classroom) there were three "tracks." It is considered poor form to talk about school tracks in most of America these days, but in Moscow you can do so. There is a 4-year course for Russian Communists, a 1-year course for Communists from other countries, and a 10-week lecture course conducted in different languages for persons they want to influence or who might become fellow travelers. It was the latter that I attended in the spring of 1934, and it was the first time I heard about *Wars* of *National Liberation,* the first time I learned about the Communist emphasis on *grievances,* and the first time I realized how much attention they gave to *minorities,* to *know-how,* and to *propaganda.*

I think the most interesting lecture was the last, given by a retired bomb-thrower. He said, "There are three stabilizing factors in the non-Communist world, the glue which holds it together. Once we can crack those, we are 'in.' There are sure to be troubles in countries with a big middle class like America where there probably will be fascism; but in general we are over the hump." And he wrote up on the blackboard that afternoon in the spring of 1934 the factors he felt must be removed. What he wrote was: "the *British Navy, Roman Catholic Church,* and the savings of the *American people.*" Now that is Communist jargon for a great deal. By the British Navy he meant colonialism. In those days, from Dakar around Korea, more than half of mankind had as its policeman and as its schoolteacher, representatives of the great European Empires.

By the Roman Catholic Church he meant all religion: Islam, Buddhism, but particularly the Roman Catholic Church and its shortcomings in Latin America. And by the savings of the American people he meant both the strength of the heartland of capitalism and its ability to help developing nations.

Well, a generation has passed since then. I think, in general, religion is stronger than in 1934. The dollar is a little chipped by inflation. What happens to it will be affected by the actions of Congress over the next few months.

But one thing is clear: the British Navy has gone home. And the French and the Belgium and the Dutch and the other colonial navies have also gone, and some 65 countries are out in the big bad world of independence—some of them well equipped such as India; some of them looking strong, say Nigeria, but now showing cracks; and some of them quite unprepared for independence. It is the last two groups which the Communists are working on particularly.

I would like this morning to bear down particularly on some aspects of the history and practice of insurgency and the factors which bring it about. I think what we're dealing with is a *new* aspect of a very old phenomenon. The *old* phenomenon is that since earliest times of Cain and Abel there have always been two or three people out of every thousand who were willing to risk their careers, their families, their lives to take over a country and run it. A simple example was Julius Caesar. When he crossed the Rubicon he gambled everything. He had to make a few deals, but what he was interested in was power. He didn't want to strengthen the middle class or help the peasants, or even the aristocrats, he just wanted power. And throughout the ages that is still the most typical kind of insurgency. I like to call it "one colonel out, one colonel in, and they both went to the same school."

Secondly, there have always been independence rebellions. Somebody wanted to get free from Egypt or

Greece or Rome or England or Belgium. Since World War II we've seen an unusual number of those because we have been living through the period of the breakup of the great European Empires.

But in the last 300 years, and more frequently since World War II, there has been a new type of insurgency, situations in which people want power because they want to change the structure of a country. The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Cuban Revolution are examples of this. And when such revolutions are aided by the backing of communism, we find ourselves in a situation that is unprecedented in the history of mankind. If we look at history since World War II, we find there has been a revolution, revolt, or rebellion every month. And in the last 12 years there has been political violence somewhere every 2 weeks. I think future historians may well call this the Age of Insurgency.

There was very little change in the way society was organized for about three and a half thousand years. If somebody from the court of Tutankhamen had turned up in the court of Louis the XIV, once he got used to the language, the food, and the hairdos, he would have felt perfectly at home, because the pattern of society he had come to was the pattern he had left. At the top was a ruler, supposedly ruling by divine right, a God-King-Pharaoh. Around him was a priesthood with a virtual monopoly on reading, writing, and arithmetic. The real power was held by the nobles, partly because they were great swordsmen, but mostly because they had a monopoly on land and often land and slaves. In a traditional society most of the wealth came from the land, so the class that controlled the land had the wealth and the power. There was only a small middle class; and at the bottom were the peasants—timeless, uneducated—producing the wealth that all this rested on. This is roughly the way it was in 1750 B.C. and the way it remained down to A.D. 1750; in fact, this is only dying out in our lifetimes. There were a few exceptions such as the Greek city-states, but this was the general pattern. It lasted so long people thought that you could not have any other political organization; and cliches grew up that we still meet when we have contacts with a developing, underdeveloped, or, frankly, a backward country.

One of these was that you cannot change things, you must leave that up to God. In 1946 I was on our first U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Yemen, the little country down at the southern end of the Red Sea. We were, incidentally, very grateful to the U.S. Navy for supplying us with a destroyer to take us down there; it was the biggest destoyer I had ever seen up to then; in fact, I thought it was a cruiser. Anyway, one day we were north of the capital city of San'a in an area where we were told no Europeans had been for several hundred years. After lunch the good Sheik said, "What would you Westerners do with this valley if you had it?"

And we said, "Well, the people are hungry; they need more food."

He replied, "But there is no water."

And we said,

> Yes, but black rain clouds come off the Red Sea, hit the high mountains of Yemen, and drop their water up there. You should make canals, or tunnels, you should dry ice the clouds and get that moisture down here so that you can grow crops. Then you will have to move the food around. That will mean making roads, getting trucks and jeeps, and they in turn will need diesel fuel or gasoline. With them you can light up the night and read the Koran and other good books or cool some of your palaces on the hot coast, down by the Red Sea, or your hospitals or even your

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harems if you think they need cooling.

At this he exclaimed,

> Stop, you have told me all I want to know about the mixed-up way you of the West feel—because only God can think that way and keep his balance. As soon as a man begins to think he can change the rainfall or the climate, he'll want to change everything. He'll want to be taller or shorter; he'll want a different wife or wives, different children, a different job; he will be restless and unhappy; he will have lost his inner peace.

The Shiek concluded, "I knew you of the West were mixed up, but I didn't know how bad it was."

Secondly, during this period of about three and a half thousand years, the idea was prevalent that leaders ruled by the divine right of kings. When I was in Libya early in the 1950's, I remember talking to an American Air Force captain who had been teaching the Libyans to run a control tower, not the big one at Wheelus, and I said, "Captain, how is it going?"

He replied,

> I graduated my first class, and last Monday I went up to see how my boys were doing. There were two of my students running the tower, one of them talking in a microphone 'Ceiling unlimited, land immediately,' and all the jargon you use to bring down a plane. I looked out the window, and there was a howling sandstorm going on; you couldn't even see the ground from the tower. So I seized the microphone and turned the plane around; then I said to this young officer, 'What are you talking that way for?'

And he answered, "I'm sorry to have to speak that way, but our Royal Family is on that plane, and I can't tell them anything's wrong with their airport."

But perhaps more basic was the fact that, during most of those stagnant three and a half thousand years, leaders were promoted on the basis of birth and not of merit. In the fat, well-fed days of Farouk—and they were fat and well fed for the top 15 percent in Egypt—I went one spring to the graduation exercises of what amounted to their West Point. A young cadet gave an excellent valedictory speech in English. When it was over I spoke to the commandant of the school, congratulated him, and said, "There's a brilliant young officer. I imagine he'll be a general fairly soon."

He just burst out laughing and replied:

> General! Why he'll never be a major. Do you realize that his father is a barber? His mother is a great and good friend of the Minister of War and that's why he's in this school? I'll tell you who'll be the generals. There at the end of the front row is Farouk's cousin; he'll be a general in 4 years. Next to him is the son of the richest landlord in the delta; he already has $10 million. He'll be a general in 7 or 8 years. What's this other fellow got? Just brains.

Well, the pattern worked if everybody played the game that way, and most everybody did till down around 1750. Then a lot of changes occurred, and people began to be jolted out of their old ways. The Egyptians, incidently, were jolted only recently, and that because they were adjacent to little Israel where they don't promote by birth.

What were some of the basic factors that brought this change about? We might start with much more travel, particularly movement by sea; the discovery, which you all know so well, that

the oceans are highways and not barriers. People went to North America or around Africa to India or China, and they began to see what other people did and thought. Next was greater communication of thoughts and new permanence for them, largely through the printing press. Only a few thousand people ever heard Thomas Jefferson give one of his great orations; but thanks to the printing press, tens of thousands could read and keep his stimulating words.

Also, new weapons made it possible for the average man to shoot down those nobles who had the power. A yeoman could dismount a great knight with one or two arrows from his longbow. But more basic than any of these was the invention and use of new sources of power which produced wealth, usually not from the land. These included the steam engine, the internal combustion engine, electricity, nuclear power, and all sorts of machinery which, on top of the Renaissance and the Reformation, produced revolutions in industry and transport and communications, farm to city living, education, and even the role of women.

I'd like to mention little Yemen again because it's a handy sized microcosm. On the first day we were there in 1946, we looked out the window of the palace in San'a and saw three women and a donkey tied together pulling water out of a well. I turned to Saif Al Islam Abdullah, one of the Iman's sons (who incidentally, was killed 3 years later for being too modern) and said, "How about that?"

He looked at the scene with medieval eyes and replied, "That's all right. The women will work hard, they won't tire the donkey." Well, it's one way of getting water out of a well, if you don't mind a lot of wear and tear on your women and if you don't expect to get much water.

The next time I was back in San'a the donkey and women had gone to their rewards, and in their place was a rickety old gasoline motor. But it was producing 10 times as much water, I'm sure, leading to 10 times as much irrigated land and 10 times as much wealth. The last time I was back they had a diesel, producing at least 100 times as much water and 100 times as much wealth. And it was not only the royal family that had diesels. The new middle class (if you can use such a phrase about Yemen) was starting little textile factories, bicycle shops, and new farms. Thus new wealth was being created and going to new hands.

When we came down the Red Sea on the destroyer *Ernest G. Small* that spring of 1946, I think we were naive, but we reflected a lot of thinking in Washington of that period. Most of us thought of ourselves as missionaries of the 20th century. We'd give the Yemenis a good harbor, a railroad, and some roads. We'd help them with schools and hospitals, with radios and all sorts of modern things, and they would move into the 20th century and live happily ever after. We found them drowsing in the late 13th century. I think that by now they have moved to the beginning of the 19th century. But there have been 23 years of violence in Yemen. There have been three civil wars, four royal assassinations, plus one foreign war. In fact, it's been chaos. This is because travel in time is upsetting; and the faster you travel in time the more upsetting it is. It's hard enough for us who are moving a year every 365 days. But many of these developing countries are trying to cross 5 years or even 10 years in one—and that is extremely upsetting. Yemen is only one example.

On top of this is the fact that once you get the idea that change is possible, it becomes irresistible. Back in about 1850 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "Patiently endured as long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. The

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mere fact that certain abuses have been remedied draws attention to the others, and they appear more galling and action is sure to result." That's what is happening everywhere in this modernization process. It first showed up in the Western World about 1648 when the British had a revolution and cut off the head of their king. It was done by commoners, by the way, not by other nobles and pretty well put an end to the idea of the "divine right of kings." Then in Russia in 1698 Peter the Great came back from working in the shipyard in Holland and really churned up Russian society. This ended the idea that you have to "wait for God to do it." It was clear that man, if he wanted to, could make basic social changes.

The American Revolution of 1776 was the classical anticolonial revolt, one much admired and still copied. And the French Revolution of 1789 was the prototype of an antiroyalist, antiaristocratic revolt in which they cut off the heads of so many nobles that, when things settled down again, the new elite under Napoleon had to begin promoting people on the basis of merit and not on who were their grandfathers.

Then in the 19th century we saw another wave of revolts, largely inside Europe, including the Decembrist troubles in Russia of 1895, and uprisings in other parts of Europe in 1830 and 1848, plus the French Commune of 1871. These were largely unsuccessful, but they showed the political and economic steam—in a sense it really was the steam—building up under the factories of the New Industrial Revolution.

Two shock waves went out from Europe during those years. One went across the Atlantic to colonies in Latin America causing most of the Spanish or Portuguese possessions there to break loose from their metropoles. Now these were not deep "societal revolutions," for they left aristocrats running the big estates and small and usually powerless middle classes and Indians or peasants at the bottom of the pyramid. But they were a start. And then, going eastward, was a sort of antishock wave that led to the Sepoy Muting of 1857 in India, the T'ai P'ing Rebellion in China, and some of the changes that took place in Japan after Commodore Perry had been there.

There was still another wave of revolutions, most of them basic and societal, in the early days of the 20th century, largely, but not entirely, connected with World War I. They included upsets in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey plus the momentous two-stage, and don't forget it was two-stage, revolution in Russia. On a smaller scale there were the Irish Independence Rebellion, the Arab Revolt, and a series of others.

With the 1930's came a wave of Fascist revolts. When they started they appeared to be a way of adapting to the machine, doing it quickly and on a non-Communist basis. At first, some people thought it had considerable merit. Actually, it turned out to be economically unsound and racially unthinkable. So, thank God, it foundered. In many ways, the most interesting upheaval of that period was the Spanish Civil War because it was a preview of a lot of the revolts we are seeing now.

But if you were up with one of our astronauts and took a look at the countries hit by the seven waves of revolt that I've mentioned so far, you would notice that they were very limited in area. Essentially, they took place in parts of Europe and North America or involved Europeans living overseas. We might say they were the White Christian cousins using new ideas to adjust to the Industrial Revolution. That's the way it was down to the coming of World War II. And then suddenly these ideas burst their bounds. In Bolivia, the Congo, and Yemen, in Afghanistan, India, or Vietnam, in fact, any place you want to mention, people began to accept the thoughts which had triggered the revolts in Europe and America before that time.

What were some of those thoughts that first circulated around the green baize tables in Philadelphia and Paris and now have reached the mountains of South America, the rain forests of Africa, and the deserts of the Middle East? First of all, the idea that *all men are equal.* This is a very upsetting concept if you have grown up in a traditional society. There you expect to give your allegiance to the man above you, be he king or a nobleman, and if you are in trouble, you know you can call on him to help you. And the same way down the line. You push around a lot of people under you, but if they're in trouble they expect you to help them, and you must do so.

Secondly, an idea that still presents some problems is that *men and women are equal.* Thirdly, and more basic, the thought that the organization of many states and societies is *unjust* and out of date. Now, states have been unjust and out of date since earliest times. The rich have been too rich, the poor too poor, and some laws were unjust; but there wasn't any thought of changing this pattern. Then, fourthly, the idea spread that *change is possible.* And that is really the key to our political-economic-social revolts of today. Since World War II men and women everywhere have realized that they can reshape their countries and their lives.

Fifthly, they have learned that such change can be brought about by a *small group* in the population. The Communists showed us this. Lenin took over all of Russia with only about 30,000 supporters; Trotsky really did the job when he took St. Petersburg one night in October 1917 with about a thousand. Sixthly, *the average person,* the little man, can do it. Student leaders, obscure lawyers, middle-level officers, middle-level bureaucrats are leading many of these revolts and revolutions. It used to be that it took the son of the king or a group of great nobles to make a revolt; now they're largely done by very average men and women.

And lastly, if we take the something like 350 cases of major political violence that have occurred since World War II, omit the limited wars, and throw out the ones that are still going on, we find that a little *more than half have been successful.* That is heady wine. Think of the impact on the developing and underdeveloped countries of the world where often up to very recently, and even now in some cases, half the people are ill fed, ill housed, ill clothed, physically ill, ill educated, ill governed at times and, up to very recently, governed by people of different races, religions, and civilizations from their own. I think it's not surprising that we are seeing a revolution, rebellion, or revolt somewhere in the world about every 2 weeks.

When you study a revolutionary situation, look for the *grievances,* because discontent lies behind most of them. The grievances are varied; in fact, there are as many as there are countries on the map. But the basic causes fall into a few major categories.

First of all, there is nationalism or the desire for *independence.* The Indian Rebellion which ended in 1947 is an example. It is hard to think of a country more divided racially, religiously, economically, and culturally than India. And yet Gandhi and Nehru could rally practically everybody in India to fight or die to get rid of the British rule. Independence is the goal behind which you can gather the most people most easily.

Then there is *political injustice*—revolt against tyranny, repression, and corruption. The bitterness in Cuba against Batista was an example, but we have seen it in many other cases.

Allied to political injustice is *economic maladjustment;* cases in which the rich are too rich and the poor too poor; countries where there is unfair land distribution, too high interest rates, widespread unemployment, bad hous-

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ing, and inflation. The blowup comes when people realize their government does not care. Egypt under Farouk was an example. Such situations are made worse if there is a large foreign involvement. You cannot blame the people of Iran for being unhappy in the days when the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was getting 90 percent of their oil royalties.

Then look for a *military imbalance.* Perhaps the military feel they are not getting their just share of arms or pay. Perhaps they realize they're being penetrated the way they were in Cuba in the days when Castro had come to power but not yet announced he was a Communist.

Or look for *religious differences.* We saw how violent they can be when fighting broke out after independence between Hindus and Moslems in India. All multireligious countries are in danger of this.

Also trouble may come from *racial differences.* Zanzibar, for instance, after the British left, became a vacuum. (I think actually we thought the British were watching it, and they thought we were.) So few people off the island realized the black Zanzibari were getting so mad at the lighter skinned Arab-Moslem and Indian Zanzibari they were ready to revolt. Before it was over there were bloody riots and purges during what amounted to a racial revolution.

All of these causes add up to the stresses of modernization; a rising tide of expectations that are not met, the frustrations of unemployment, the population explosion, a little but not enough education, and long-standing class and economic grievances. From them come a feeling "things should not be this way." If you couple that with the idea that "change is possible," some sort of explosion is certain.

This brings us to a point that I mentioned earlier; these political-economic changes are usually violent. We are lulled to sleep here in America by the wonderful job the founding fathers did in giving us a built-in mechanism for change. Sometimes it works slowly, sometimes groups that have grievances feel that they are not getting action fast enough, but we at least have that built-in mechanism. I believe I am older than anyone in this room, but I remember so well the terrible winter of 1931-32 with 13 million Americans unemployed. College graduates and their wives were standing on street corners trying to sell red apples, not as a gimmick to call attention to some cause, but because what their children ate that night depended upon how many red apples they sold. At that time half the factories were shut, most farmers were sunk by debt, banks were failing every day. It was a revolutionary situation. In most countries of the world there would have been bloodshed before the snow fell in November of 1932.

We had a revolution all right. But the mechanism worked, and the changes took a democratic form—the elections of November of 1932. Hoover, God rest his soul, went out; FDR came in; and he changed the balance of political-economic-social power in this country. He took the "slice of the pie," the wealth and power going to the farmers, and greatly increased it; the "slice of the pie" going to labor was greatly increased also. FDR ended weaknesses in the banks; he cut out many abuses in Wall Street; and he solved certain frustrations by putting the Government into new fields in a way that had previously been considered socialist and, therefore, unthinkable, ways such as bringing electric power to the back country of Tennessee. Thus he got rid of many just grievances, he cut through many roadblocks to progress, and we were off to the greatest period of prosperity the world has ever seen.

But let's not fool ourselves. Only about one man, woman, or child out of seven throughout the world can expect

that kind of major societal change through the ballot. The normal way of looking at it was made plain to me in Syria during our 1956 elections. One day I was lunching with a member of their Chamber of Deputies, and he asked, "Tell me about your American elections." So I explained about the Republicans and the Democrats and their platforms and candidates.

"Never mind all that stuff," he said, "who controls the *tanks* in America?"

When I replied, "I don't know," he said, "That's very funny, as an official you should know. Is the Commander an officer?"

"Yes."

"Who is he loyal to?"

"His chief."

"Who is that?"

"Why, it's Eisenhower."

"But you said Eisenhower is running in this election."

"Yes, Eisenhower is running."

"Then, Eisenhower will win." And later he wrote me a bread and butter letter—quite delayed—saying, "Thanks for the lunch, and I notice we analyzed the American scene correctly."

Now you smile, and I smile, and more or less from Israel across Northern Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and a *few* other places on the map, they smile at that exchange. But in much of Bolivia, the Congo, Yemen, Afghanistan, even Vietnam, to mention a few examples, they don't smile. This is because they know that you can plan a "one colonel out, one colonel in, and they both went to the same school" revolt around the head table at the Officers Club before breakfast Saturday morning and have your coup over by Monday. But if you're going to shakeup the power structure, move people out from the seats of the mighty, and move in "others of less degree," the people on top are not going to like it. They're going to fight back and, being on top, they control a lot. The result is that there is going to be fighting. That's why so many of these upheavals take a violent form.

Another reason is that most of the world is moving too fast through time. I have talked about the modernization process being unsettling. The faster you modernize the more unsettling it is. When I was at my last assignment in the United Nations, I dealt, among others, with a West African Delegation. I think it is correct to say that only two of those men had grandfathers who had ever seen a *stone building*, a *wheel*, a *watch*, or a *piece of paper*. And yet my job was to ask them whether they wanted direct or indirect primaries in their new constitution. How fast can you move in time? Those grandparents would have been amazed at George Washington's Mount Vernon. They would have been bowled over by Julius Caesar's Rome. They'd have been flattened by Tutankhamen's Egypt with its chariots, ships, and pyramids. And yet there they were at the United Nations, doing remarkably well. We cannot blame people who have traveled from about 3000 B.C. down, more or less, to the present century in about two generations for being confused.

Along with the problem of overrapid time travel goes the fact that they don't have the background in democracy that is built in to the European-North American world. You may have heard the story of when the Sudan in Africa first got independence. In their Parliament they had a debate as to whether traffic should pass on the right or the left side of roads and rivers. There was talk about the "British way" and the "American way" and so on, until finally one of the members got up and said, "Gentlemen, the only democratic way is to leave it up to the man driving the car or the captain of the ship to decide each time which side he wants to pass on."

The developing countries just don't have trained personnel. One can't blame them, but it's a fact. For instance, the last time I was down in a certain African

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country they told a story of their efforts to promote their best major. First they gave him a written exam, and he missed every question. They gave him an easier oral exam, and he missed almost every question, so they didn't know what to do. Then they noticed that in a corner of the room there was a refrigerator, and they knew that in it was a bottle of Napoleon brandy. So they said to him, "Major, who was the greatest French general of all time? A man who conquered Europe, was driven back by the snows in Moscow, and died on St. Helena."

He replied, "I have no idea."

So they suggested, "Take a look at that refrigerator and you may get some idea about that general."

The good major studied the refrigerator, came back and said, "Thank you, gentlemen, I know the answer, *General Electric.*"

I don't tell that story to cast aspersions on our African friends and certainly not on majors. The man had been a sergeant 18 months beforehand, and a colonial sergeant had less real authority than a corporal would have in most Western armies. I don't know how fast promotion is with you; I hope it's very fast; but it seems to me that to go from a sergeant to a major in 18 months is putting a strain on any individual or on any society which tries it.

Very briefly now, some quick *definitions.* You may remember that a *revolution* is an effort to overturn a central government. A *rebellion* is breaking off a piece of territory from a central government. And an *insurrection* is the use of violence to bring about changes in policy within a government or organization without overthrowing it. We are fairly deep in an insurrection in the United States right now, particularly in our colleges. *Revolt* and *insurgency* are umbrella words to cover the above situations.

War is exciting and very important, but essentially it is not insurgency. However, it may well lead to it. It was the weakening of Russia through the 1905 war against Japan and then in the First World War that made it a pushover for Lenin and his small group of Communists.

Banditry may kill a lot of people, but is not insurgency in its pure form. Colombia in the last generation has lost 200,000 lives through bandits—but at first that was a "Hatfields and McCoys" situation. Only later did the Communists get into the act and make it political.

Pure *religious strife* such as often arises between the Shiah Moslems and the Sunni Moslems, based on differences of doctrine, is just ecclesiastical controversy. But if the strife involves the Catholics versus the Buddhists as in South Vietnam, then we get into political insurgency.

This applies also to *racial differences.* Many people are still so unhappy about the color of people's skins, they start fighting. But when, as on the island of Zanzibar, this involves a struggle between people of different colored skins for control, then we have insurgency.

An interesting borderline case is that of *political assassination.* In the course that I took in Moscow in 1934, they gave us half a lecture on how you carry out a political assassination and make it look nonpolitical. The easiest way is in a country where there is legal dueling, like Spain or Southern France. Say you want to liquidate the Minister of Defense. You frame him in a card game and get him into a duel with a professional shot or swordsman. As a result he is killed; and everyone says, "Poor fellow, he was killed in a duel." But not many places allow dueling any more. Another way is to drag a lady, or perhaps I should say a woman, into the case. Then everyone can say, "Well, we know that the Minister of War was going around with the wife of the Minister of Interior. It's not surprising he got shot."

But the professional way of doing it,

the Communist way of doing it, is as follows. First of all you locate somebody who is really excited about the cause; perhaps because he believes in it very strongly, perhaps because he's a little crazy, perhaps because he is drugged or hypnotized. You get him to pull the trigger. Then you get a "paid snuff-out" who is willing to keep his mouth shut and go to jail for 10 years because he knows that half a million dollars is waiting for him in a bank in Switzerland. Lastly, you finance a long series of investigations and reports; in them all sorts of things are written about the case until people get so confused that they don't know what happened.

I imagine some of you may be thinking about the death of our late great President. I'm sure I don't know who killed President Kennedy. A lot of people wanted to. Khruschev was mad at him after being cut down in the missile crisis; Castro and company were mad at him after their beating in that affair. Even the anti-Castro people were mad because Kennedy didn't give them air cover and other aid at the Bay of Pigs. There were also some Americans who were mad at him. All I know is that his assassination exactly followed the Communist textbook way of carrying out a political assassination and making it look nonpolitical.

Putting these exceptions or borderline cases aside, what are we talking about when we discuss political insurgency? Essentially about conditions of revolution, rebellion, revolt, or insurrection in which the goal is to produce political, economic, social, religious, or racial change from within by violence or unconstitutional means. It may or may not be successful, though more and more often it is becoming so. It may or may not have outside assistance, though more and more this is becoming the case—particularly as the Russians discover the airways and sealanes.

Insurgencies may last a day, a week, a month, a year, or a decade; and a rough rule of thumb is that the further east you go, the longer they last. Very generally, you can say they last a week in Latin America, a month in Africa, a year in the Near East, and a decade out in Southeast Asia. Why? Because somebody's keeping them going. Who? The Communists. Of course, the Communists like to win overnight through a coup or a quick revolution. But if they can't, they fall back on the gambit of protracted conflict. I think you'll agree that the French in Indochina were not defeated at Dien Bien Phu; it *was* a serious loss; but they could have rallied. The fact was that the will to carry on the war had gone out of the French people back in Paris. That's the gambit they are trying to play on us here in the United States over Vietnam. Thank God, so far it has been unsuccessful.

Just because the Communists are mixed up with a revolt, don't assume right off that it is bad. There is such a thing as a *Good Revolution.* I mentioned that only about one out of seven countries in the world has a built-in mechanism through which it can really progress and move from the 17th, 18th, or 19th centuries into the 20th century. And so it may well be that a violent revolution is the only way a country can make such a move. Our revolution here was a "good revolution." The French Revolution was another. In it a few thousand aristocrats got killed, but millions benefited. I think that most Iranians gained by throwing Mossadegh out. In fact, you can cite quite a number of good revolutions.

This is one of the hardest evaluations to make, whether you are assigned to a Washington desk or to an overseas mission. You see tanks in the street; you see ships moving, and you know there are Communists mixed up with the revolt. It's a very difficult decision to figure if this is or is not a good revolution. But our top officials must know, and the country team in the Embassy must take a position.

Another type of uprising that we are apt to see more of is the *interrupted revolution.* I think Hungary is a good example there. Many people there had grievances; they tried to have them remedied; and they failed. There is still a lot of bitterness left. I was in Hungary again last summer, and they were surprisingly open in talking about how the grievances must be ended. I have not been in Czechoslovakia since the trouble there, but I would call that another case of an interrupted revolution.

There are those who feel that the revolt of December 1961 in Ethiopia was an interrupted revolution. There were grievances, and a lot of people from the palace guard to the new middle class felt Ethiopia was not moving forward fast enough. With the Emperor out of the country, they staged a revolution, but they failed, and most of them were liquidated. I sat in at a small gathering where Haile Selassie was asked about this, and he talked of the progress he was making. Ethiopia has a big American mission and other aid groups as well. It is being modernized. But some observers question whether the middle class in Ethiopia feels it is going ahead fast enough. They give the new Crown Prince about 6 months after the Emperor dies to "move into higher gear." If he does not do so, they think we may see the second half of an interrupted revolution in Ethiopia.

Then there is the *multistep revolution.* The Communists like to come to power overnight—but they often cannot. I was a spectator to a multistep revolution when I was Deputy Chief of Mission in Jordan. A lot of people wanted to change things there. Nasser, the Syrians, the Ba'aths, the Liberals, the Communists, and others, they found they couldn't do it overnight, so they drew up a 12-step schedule. They sent away Glubb Pasha who had created the Arab Legion. They got rid of his 57 British officers who ran the legion. They throttled the British Aid Mission. There were 17 attacks in 21 days on our Point Four Mission. We held on, but we couldn't do much. Then the party of revolt began liquidating, both politically and physically, the King's friends in the military, in Parliament, in the Government. They achieved six or seven of their goals. Then they tipped their hand through troop "maneuvers," and the revolt was smashed. But it was interesting to note how near it came to succeeding. If the party of revolt had gotten one or two more steps, it would have won.

But the type of revolution which I think the Communists like the most is what we might call the revolution betrayed. The prize example of this was Cuba. Those of you who remember that country under Batista know it was a mixed bag of tricks. It was the third or fourth most advanced country in Latin America, an excellent place in which to own sugar mills, hotels, gambling casinos, and certain other moneymakers. But it was crying out for reforms of every kind: land reform, labor reform, hospital reform, and so on. A lot of people tried to bring about these changes. The army tried, but had been so penetrated by Batista's sergeants that the officers could not get going. The navy officers tried and, in most unnaval fashion, got their dates mixed up and were squashed. The air force considered a coup and decided they didn't have enough planes or personnel, so they gave up.

Later the students tried, and a sad thing happened. They had formed a small commando force to hit the palace at dawn, break in, and kill Batista. Its members were given maps of the palace to help them spot his bedroom. They broke in, took heavy casualties, rushed up the stairs, looked at their charts, and turned left. But when they had been reprinted, the maps had been reversed. Batista lived in the right wing of the palace and got away; the students were shot down almost to a man.

Another person who tried a coup was a golden tongued orator, an unsuccessful lawyer named Castro. He thought he could become President through the ballot, but found he could not. He then tried a miserable coup, and it failed, after which he was put in prison on the Isle of Pines. There he was undoubtedly exposed to communism. As you may or may not know, the Communists make a point of keeping some of their best agitators in the political jails where they can talk to discontented intellectuals and would-be leaders; they have had pretty good success. When and where Castro got his communism is debated by the Cuban experts, but he was exposed to it on the Isle of Pines and learned much about guerrillas there. Unfortunately, after 18 months he was "sprung" and went to Florida and got some money. Then he moved to Central America, rented several plantations, and hired some officers who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. With them he began training guerrillas for a Cuban campaign. He was given a leaky yacht called the *Gramma*. Finally, with less than a hundred followers, he sailed for the south coast of Cuba, watched all the way by Batista's air force.

From Castro's point of view, they made a disastrous landing; only 12 of them lived to get through the swamps and up into the Sierra Maestra Mountains. But once they were ashore and dug in, did they talk communism? No! They talked of the grievances of the Cuban people—the real grievances. "When we come to power, there will be land reform, labor reform, educational reform," and so on. It sounded good. It sounded so good that Herbert Mathews of *The New York Times*, who was smuggled into the rebel camp and talked to Castro, wrote, in essence, that this was a progressive reformist movement; it was not communism. And that's the way most Cubans felt.

Finally, when he had some 5,000 or more follwers, Castro came out of the mountains. He had to fight some, but not as much as he said. He was willing to pay up to $200,000 a garrison, which is pretty good money in that part of Cuba, or anywhere else for that matter. But mostly the people, soldiers, police, or citizens said, "This man has the answers to our grievances." Up in Havana, Batista took a hard look at what was happening and fled in the middle of the New Year's Eve party with three planeloads of his relatives, friends, gold, and the proper assortment of hangers-on. Castro was in.

But did he talk communism? No. He said, "We will prepare for fair elections. We will organize land reform." And what did he do? He devoted his main energy to penetration. He put *his* followers into the secret police, the regular police; into the army, the navy, the air force; into the student organizations, the press, the women's organizations, the peasant organizations, and so on, until he had control of the real centers of power. Then, and only then, did he get up and tell the truth. In a 5-hour speech, Castro declared, "I am a Marxist-Leninist. I will be one until I die. This is the only solution to the Cuban problem."

Che Guevara said, and I think all the Cuban experts agree, if Castro had begun talking communism the day he reached Havana, the day he dug in on the Sierra Maestra, even the day they started training in Central America, he would never have taken the island because the people of Cuba, by and large, did not want communism. What they did want was to have their grievances redressed.

When I was in Moscow that first time in 1933 and 1934, there was a certain mystique about this new political-economic-social concept of communism. Many liberals felt it was a wonderful thing to die on the barricades or in jail to make the world "free." There are few people around the world today who are willing to die for dear old Marx,

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Engels, Lenin, Khrushchev, or Kosygin. But there are a lot of people who, if they have to, will die to end grievances, to get land reforms, to have their sons better educated, and their wives receive proper medical care, or to gain independence.

If in most countries of the world today, a newly trained Communist out of Moscow, Peking, or Havana got up in a meeting and said, "We will now start to organize a Communist revolution," he would be shot; not by the local police or the army, but by other Communists, because that is not the way revolutionary movements are now built. You do not talk communism anymore, you talk *grievances;* there are a lot of them in every country, and the Communists are selecting and using them very effectively. I think this technique of the *revolution betrayed* is the one we are apt to see most frequently.

This is particularly so because it coincides with both the growth of communism and of Russian imperialism—for the two of them must be viewed together. The Communists, as I said, have discovered the seas. Every empire does this—the Egyptians, the Romans, the Greeks, the Chinese, the Arabs, the British, ourselves— discovers the seas at some point. And the Russians, as you know well, are in this phase. furthermore, as a country develops seapower it becomes aware of the value of islands—and the Russians are no exception. I do not think it was an accident that they moved into Cuba, that they almost took over the Dutch East Indies, that they are so strong in Zanzibar, that there was serious trouble in Madagascar, that Ceylon is often under pressure from them. Having discovered the sealanes and the value of islands as bases for later moves into hinterlands, the Russians are now in a position to step up wars of national liberation and push insurgencies everywhere.

I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks that in 1934 the Communists placed the British Navy as one of their top objectives for disintegration; and I noted that the British, the French, the Dutch, and other colonial navies have largely "gone home." Thank God, the American Navy has not. I am quite sure that, over the next few years, at least half of you will be involved in some type of insurgency. I hope that some of the things I have said today may be useful to you then. Good luck and thank you.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Mr. Richard H. Sanger is a Foreign Service Officer, (Ret.), with broad experience in foreign affairs. During the course of some 25 years with the Department of State, he has been a firsthand observer of insurgency and revolt in Algeria, Jordan, Kenya, Angola, and the Congo. He acted as an Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations during the conflicts in Lebanon and Cuba.

Mr. Sanger received the first Superior Honor Award given by the Department of State for his research and lectures at the Foreign Service Institute. He is the author of many articles and three books: *The Arabian Peninsula,* 1954; *Where the Jordan Flows,* 1963; and *Insurgent Era,* 1967.

Mr. Sanger, who graduated from Harvard College in 1928 and the Harvard Business School in 1931, now lives in Washington, D.C. He lectures extensively and has been serving as a consultant to the Departments of Defense and State.

Ψ

OFFSHORE GUERRILLA WAR

In its current preoccupation with guerrilla warfare on land, the United States has overlooked or underrated the possibilities of a similar strategy in coastal waters. Even before the development of the torpedo, the weaker maritime powers sought to defend their coastlines against large enemy units by means of a "mosquito fleet." Today the advent of the Styx missile and the Osa-class patrol boat increase the threat from such small craft, and the employment of these weapons against U.S. naval forces in the future must be considered a distinct possibility.

An article by

Mr. Howard R. Simpson

The low-lying fog muffles the sound of secondary explosions, and the tropical night reduces the gun flashes to glowworm points of orange light. The thump of quick-firing guns bounces between the many islands, echoes over the water, and slowly dies.

An aircraft carrier passes through the mouth of the straits and limps toward the open sea, great gouts of flame belching from its flight deck. A supply ship rolls over with a slow, grinding sigh, its shifting cargo rips through its bulwarks, and its settles onto the shallow bottom. A beached cruiser shakes like a stricken whale as explosions rip through its magazines. An untouched destroyer speeds back and forth through the channel searching for the enemy but finds only the shattered superstructure of a sinking patrol boat of the *Osa* class. Cutting its speed, the destroyer swings back toward the survivors of the supply ship and prepares to bring them aboard.

A naval officer's nightmare? Definitely. But nightmares often have a solid link with reality. The reality in this instance is the threat of offshore guerrilla war, a threat greatly enhanced by the ability of the Soviet Union and its allies to produce, maintain, and utilize SSM-equipped patrol boats of high quality performance and deadly striking power.

In this era of limited war, insurrection, and subversion, it is highly likely that future actions will find the Navy involved in the offshore support of ground operations, coastal patrol, surveillance, and escort activities. Large-scale surface and air operations on the high seas, while not a thing of the past, are likely only in the event of a full-scale war.

A close look at the map of the world will show many areas where offshore guerrilla war could become an unpleasant reality. Foremost among these would be the Indonesian Archipelago with its thousands of jungled islands, inlets, and important maritime passages. The same can be said for areas of the Malayan coast, the Chonos Archipelago of Chile, certain areas of the West

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African coast, the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Crete, and other international coastal zones. The bland, single line of a cartographer's pen marking a coastline on a large-scale chart often becomes an inferno of flyspeck islands, habitable reefs, and hidden passages on a more detailed example of his art.

Unsettling parallels can be drawn between guerrilla operations on land and those offshore. For the sake of comparison, a major fleet unit, carrier, cruiser, or destroyer would equate to a division, regiment, or battalion. The heavily armed, fast SSM patrol craft of the enemy would equal a guerrilla band or small unit.

The same advantages and disadvantages experienced in guerrilla war ashore would apply to offshore guerrilla war. The fleet units would have overwhelming firepower and inherent strength—particularly suited for conventional actions.

They would be vulnerable, however, to quick, unexpected attacks (SSM or torpedo) from atrol craft operating from well-camouflaged island bases or coastal inlets and from shore-based SSM sites operating in coordination with the seaborne units.

This would be particularly true if U.S. Naval Forces were supporting land operations close inshore. While the threat of SSM attack on combat units of the fleet is considerable, that of such attacks on supply and support ships in anchorages or off beach supply points is even greater. An enemy willing to risk the loss of several patrol craft might well inflict serious damage on both combat and noncombat surface units, delaying and seriously hampering the support of ground operations.

A task force or individual fleet unit moving through island waters can be compared to an armored column moving along a highway. The high risk of ambush is there. Surface-to-surface missiles make the risk even deadlier. One must add to this danger the psychological conditioning of the enemy. The individual guerrilla ashore, with his satchel charge, coming on in the face of heavy fire as an obvious sacrifice would, at sea, find his counterpart in the fast patrol boat roaring out of its cover on a probable one-way mission.

In a special article on the Soviet Navy in its June 1968 issue, the *Revue Maritime* states that most of the early *Komar*-class patrol boats of the Soviet Fleet have been transferred to "friendly and allied navies" and that the U.S.S.R. is now supplying 200-ton craft of the *Osa* class to "its friends."

Raymond V.B. Blackman, editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, had this to say in a recent edition of the British Navy League's publication *Navy*: "The *Osa* and the *Komar* classes . . . in the Soviet Navy represent just about the most economical maritime striking weapon it is possible to build and operate when compared with larger, and less effective warships in terms of size, cost and manpower."

In a recent *New York Times'* article, Blackman emphasized the international swing away from the construction of big, conventional craft and the tendency toward producing submarines, missile ships, and "mosquito craft with a cruiser punch."

Patrol craft and torpedo boats have long been popular with small and developing nations interested in protecting their coastlines while keeping a tight hold on their purse strings. The advent and development of the SSM has suddenly provided the maritime midget with the fist of a giant. This prospect has made the fast patrol boat even more attractive to the smaller navies of the world.

The increase in Soviet naval presence on the high seas makes it more likely that arms deliveries and training assistance previously concentrated on the ground forces of their allies will now emphasize the delivery of SSM-equipped

patrol boats and the technicians needed to train local crews.

Soviet fishing trawlers, known to rendezvous on occasion with Soviet submarines and used for a number of noncommercial tasks, could act as unobtrusive mother ships for a group of SSM patrol craft. The trawlers could supply technicians, parts, missile replenishment, and repair facilities for short periods of time prior to sailing off again on their "innocent" occupation.

The Soviet Navy has pushed out from its home waters into the Mediterranean, the North and Mid-Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, the Bering Sea, the Sea of Japan, the China Sea, the Philippine Sea and, more recently, the Indian Ocean. Its expertise, experience, and tradition still lie to a great extent, however, in the realm of offshore operations.

One could speculate that Soviet naval strategists see the high seas primarily as routes to be used freely for the delivery of a force to the scene of offshore action rather than as a setting for blue water naval engagements.

Our amphibious forces, the expert seaborne, helicopter-delivered British Commandos, and France's elite Brigade d'Intervention are now challenged by Soviet marine infantry whose training is said to parallel that of our Special Forces.

It is not difficult to imagine how reassuring it would be to a small Communist nation or ally of the Soviet Union to know that its coastline was screened by a hard-hitting SSM patrol force backed by the promise of direct intervention by Soviet Marines. Nor would it be hard to visualize the fear and pressures such a situation could exert on an underarmed non-Communist neighbor.

Naval officers must guard against traditional attitudes in regard to the threat of offshore guerrilla war. Underestimation and varying degrees of contempt for a small and underequipped foe have often brought disaster to the counterguerrilla fighting ashore. This lesson should not be ignored by those afloat.

Some officers, with understandable pride in the fighting qualities of their ships or aircraft, tend to minimize the danger of the "mosquito craft with a cruiser punch." The pilots feel they will blow attacking craft out of the water before they come within striking distance. The surface specialists feel they could do the same with gunfire. If the attack and its timing come under the specific situation favoring successful counteraction on the part of a conventional defending force, this feeling of confidence may be justified.

But guerrilla actions ashore or afloat are designed to come at the wrong time, in the wrong circumstances—for the defender. Moonless nights, bad weather, the lack of clear fields of fire, and high-quality camouflage linked with up-to-date intelligence on the probable behavior of a task force and its weaknesses could provide important advantages to fast-striking SSM patrol boats.

The recurrent statement of some commanders, who have never understood the true nature of their guerrilla enemy, that the foe would be crushed if "he would only stand and fight" has an even more hollow ring if applied to offshore guerrilla war.

An attack by SSM patrol boats would be quick and deadly with the enemy trained to break off the action as soon as possible to minimize defending air and surface retaliation. Some writers have suggested that attacks by craft of the *Osa* type would be closely coordinated with torpedo assaults by fast boats of the *Shershen* class to increase the overall damage and provide the *Osas* with a cleanup force to deliver the coup de grace to ships damaged by hits from the *Styx* missile.

Flexibility is one of the prime rules of counterguerrilla fighting. Readjustments in thinking and equipment may

be needed to provide this flexibility to a fleet operating close to a hostile shore. Successful counterguerrilla campaigns have often made good use of small units trained and equipped to meet their enemy on his own terms. Translated into a naval context this would mean fast, heavily gunned patrol craft specifically designed to track and liquidate their "guerrilla" foe.

A fully loaded LHA would present a tempting target to an SSM raiding party. It might be both practical and desirable to provide each LHA with a detachment of its own patrol craft to act as an aggressive defense force and provide pickets or scouts for an offshore operation. The same craft could also provide protection to command and support ships involved in riverine operations. Nor should such a detachment be oriented purely to offshore action. A guerrilla's bases are his life's blood. The destruction of a fuel or supply dump hidden along the shore could cut his prime operational artery and force his patrol craft to expose themselves in search of sustenance or become useless hulls lacking the tools for their job.

To carry out such raids on enemy-supporting facilities, each counter-guerrilla squadron should have its own landing force: a small, well-trained Commando group skilled in demolition and expert in hit-and-run tactics. Personnel for such a force could be drawn from Marine reconaissance units and SEAL teams.

Serious consideration should be given to developing the capabilities of our allies for such seagoing counterguerrilla action. Four hunter-killer patrol boats adequately armed to destroy SSM raiders would certainly be worth more to some of our allies than a hand-me-down destroyer suffering the inevitable shortcomings of old age.

In today's world, political stability and conditions of noninsurgency are no guarantees for the future. Few predicted the civil war in Nigeria or imagined the number of nations that would be involved in supplying arms and equipment to the belligerents. Nor should we look only toward Communist shorelines in gauging the threat of offshore guerrilla war. The international arena is subtle and quick changing. Equipment and techniques pass from hand to hand. No one, including the planners, can predict the role our Navy may be called upon to play in future outbreaks of international tension or violence.

Offshore guerilla war is a strong probability, and probabilities are the raw material of readiness. It is the Navy's responsibility to be ready for it, when and if it comes.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Mr. Howard R. Simpson holds a bachelor's degree from San Francisco College and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College. He has had considerable experience as an observer of guerrilla action. In the French-Indochina conflict he served as a war correspondent for the U.S. Information Agency covering seven major campaigns in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos, including Nason and Dien Bien Phu. He accompanied Thai partisans on operations near Lai Chan, observed the work of Commando, d'Indochine in the Tonkin Delta, and was with the Catholic Militia during heavy Vietminh attacks on Phat Diem in November 1952. He closely observed the Algerian insurgency and subsequent French withdrawal when acting as Director of the USIA office in Marseilles from 1959 to 1961. In 1964 he returned to Vietnam as an adviser to the Prime Minister and to the Political Warfare Section of the Vietnamese Army. Mr. Simpson, during the 1968-1969 academic year, was a Faculty Adviser and Consultant (USIA) to the President, Naval War College, and is currently serving with the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.

In the last two decades the Latin American military has undergone dramatic changes in its social and economic outlook. It has been transformed by an influx of young and reform-minded officers from a rigid defender of the social and economic status quo to a significant vehicle of social progress and national feeling. It no longer has a monolithic political outlook, but is divided by differing factions holding differing economic and political sympathies.

SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander Thomas M. Bader, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

"Cactus, chaos and caudillos:" this awkwardly alliterative phrase unfortunately characterizes the views of many North Americans towards their neighbors south of the Rio Grande. With the simplicity born of limited study and restricted experience, many good and earnest citizens of the United States regard the vast continent and one-half of Latin America as symbolized by the resting peon, as plagued by unremitting political and economic uncertainty, and as perverted by local military bosses who hold power through the brutality of armed gangs of irregular militia. Equally simplistic and inaccurate are those government leaders who look at Latin America only as an area to be protected from international communism and who aver that such protection can be assured easily through the sale of arms and the extension of professional training to a staunchly conservative stabilizing force of the Latin American military.

The general line officer of the armed services of the United States often shares such biases and misconceptions. Recalling past conflicts and present strife, joining in NATO exercises and SEATO study groups, that officer-in-abstract ignores the diversity of the Latin American military establishment and fails to recognize that parts of that military actually are in the vanguard of those who call for broad-based social and economic reform. Contrary to common opinion, the armed forces of Latin America often act as catalysts for change which might "bleed off" pressures for revolution and thus serve to check effectively the spread of international communism even while improving the life of the general man of Latin America. The purpose of this essay is to discuss broadly the changing patterns of the Latin American military, to interpret certain themes developing within those armed forces, and to suggest some questions about the future role of our Latin American peers.

A prime characteristic of the Latin American military is that it plays a more significant domestic role than it does on

the stage of international relations. Indeed, those armed forces have proven so active in national functions that their role as the defenders of the national territory has been of only secondary importance. The military often intervenes directly in domestic politics or dominates local patterns as the ultimate arbiter of disputes. That military could be expected to exert little influence in a world conflict should the cold war suddenly heat up, but a clear domestic focus does not detract from the importance of those forces: on the contrary, it enhances it.

Until World War II the Latin American military were singularly unimportant in shaping the direction of the evolution of their societies. Although personalistic armies could insure political success, conservative generals dedicated the military to the preservation of the economic and social status quo. Thus, militarily occasioned change meant no mutation in the basic nature of the society. Only with the years of the Second World War did the armed forces of Latin America alter their concept of responsibility to their particular nations. Some middle-grade officers came to view the military as a sociorevolutionary force, and a pattern evolved anticipating the route to be followed by later Nassers and Kassems throughout the world.[1] Components of the armed forces thus extended support to Col. Juan Domingo Perón (Argentina, 1943), Maj. Gualberto Villaroel (Bolivia, 1943), Juan Arévalo (Guatamala, 1944), José María Velasco Ibarra (Ecuador, 1944), and many of the other social reform governments which arose during those exciting and confusing years.[2]

Despite such support, the combination of a postwar depression, limited administrative experience, and the profound dislocations always attendant upon efforts to remake society combined to spell the doom of the too early revolutionary movements. During the later forties and the fifties, the political pendulum swung back to mark a resurgence of conservative leadership and a reaffirmation, by the senior officers of the military, of their support for the older ruling elites.[3]

The restored harmony between the senior military and the political-economic leadership may be explained in terms of historic patterns and familial relations. Often the officers were relatives of administrative elite and thus tended to cooperate closely with the government of the status quo.[4] Such cooperation led some analysts to the view that the armed forces returned en masse to the position as a monolithic power impeding social change and supporting a ruling clique. Other scholars, more perceptive, noted that a significant part of the military "is made up of young officers hiding their time to identify themselves with the social revolution."[5] The swing of the leadership of the armed forces back to general support of the conservative right must not obscure the fact that the character of the Latin American military had changed markedly over the previous two or three decades. The military had moved from a basicly monolithic ideological past to evolve into a force composed of differing factions holding conflicting social views and political sympathies. Today some of the officer corps favor a "hard line" *(linea dura)* approach, averring that the role of the military is to keep order and to suppress social and political change which might overthrow the ruling elite and allow for the spread of communism; others call for sweeping reforms so as to remake their societies, and they will romance even with international communism if they see that such an "affair" could catalyze desired reforms.

The military factionalism now present in Latin America is important in at least two primary senses. First; such conflicting views can negate U.S. military aid programs to Latin America as

the conflict suggests the possibility of intramilitary strife. The disparate role interpretation by those armed forces thus might serve as a specific threat to the security interests of the United States within Latin America.[6] Second; the last several decades have seen the marked increase of military importance in the countries of Latin America. As the people of the particualr nations to our south become more aware of their national identity and as the officers of the armed forces are being drawn increasingly from the middle and the lower classes, the Latin American military—almost by default—has become the depository of xenophobic nationalism and the focal point of a "national image."[7] The more militant reformist officers encouraged such identification by creating nationally oriented clubs such as Los Dragones Verdes (Argentina), RADEPA (Razón de Patria—Bolivia), and PUMAS (Por un mañana auspicioso—Chile).

Underlying the patina of generally conservative senior military, there are a rising number of militant, well-trained, reform-minded junior officers. As a young woman, a professor of history at a University in Rio de Janeiro, commented: "Today the younger officers understand the problems of the masses from having experienced them."[8] A student of the Latin American military added: "The younger officers, the decisionmakers of the coming decade, . . . will be far more sympathetic than the present generation of senior officers to the demands of the historically oppressed masses."[9] The broadened base of the Latin American military also encourages social mobility, dominates regionalism, and stimulates a profound metamorphosis of the specific nations within which they work. Lt. Gen. Alva R. Fitch understood this when, as Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, he reported to a Committee of Congress in 1965:

> The change in the composition and attitudes of the Latin American armed forces, often manifested publicly by beneficent civic action projects, have in turn created increased public support and respect for the military in most countries.[10]

Lieutenant General Fitch's comment reminds us that the Latin American military bear both swords and plowshares. Military components are building roads, setting up hospitals, and fulfilling many other similar civic functions. Until his recent death, Gen. Rene Barrientos, the President of landlocked Bolivia, saw his army constructing bridges, maintaining roads, and running small service industries such as sawmills. In Peru, six army battalions are pushing penetration

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. Thomas M. Bader, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve, has exceptional qualifications for writing an article dealing with Latin America. He has been awarded an M.A. and a Ph.D. degree from UCLA in Latin American history and has taught for 5 years at the college and university level. He is also a graduate of the Centro de Estudios Americanos de la Universidad de Chile and has traveled extensively in Latin America. This travel and professional preparation have given Lieutenant Commander Bader an excellent opportunity to observe the changing social and economic currents of Latin America and the effects that these have had upon the military establishments of the various Latin American states. As his article reveals, it is vital that we understand these currents and their significance.

Lieutenant Commander Bader is currently the chairman of the Department of History at San Fernando State College, Calif., is the Executive Officer of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Augmentation Unit at Santa Monica, Calif., and is a recent graduate of the Naval War College correspondence course, National and International Security Organization.

roads across the rugged Andes to the rich fecundity of that country's interior, while other military groups teach in trade schools which train the generally unskilled recruits of Peru's army. The Brazilian military is considered by many to be without peer in the extent and diversity of its civic programs. Four full battalions are at work currently in the arid and parlous Northeast; an equal number labor in the South; while even the dank Amazonian waterways carry military boats bringing medicine and supplies to the jungle Indians of the interior.[11]

Further listing of the many social and economic programs of the Latin American military would be of little value here. Yet at least one additional aspect of such programs must be noted: the Government of the United States, through its military representatives in the area, often provides both direct and indirect aid to such work. The U.S. Navy, as an example, has two training groups, Mobile Construction Battalions (MCB's) assisted by Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STAT's), at work within Latin America. Such groups have provided aid for projects as diverse as:

(1) The construction of a naval academy at Salinas, Ecuador;
(2) The building of floating bridges in flooded areas of Haiti;
(3) The completion of a long-delayed pier facility at Port-au-Prince;
(4) The restructuring of breakwaters and waterfront supports at Talcahuano, Chile; and,
(5) The building of a school for auto mechanics in the Dominican Republic.[12]

Specifically, therefore, a review of the many roles filled by the military man of Latin America can prove of great value to the line officer of the Armed Forces of the United States. Assignment to a MAP (the Sword) or to a MCB (the Plowshare) would prove either profoundly exasperating or professionally rewarding; preparatory reading and study can increase the probability of the latter.

Broadly, an understanding of the views of the officer rising within the ranks of the Latin American military can explain the actions of military governments such as that which recently has taken control of the Republic of Peru.[13] That officer often is a super-patriot, disassociated from the old-line elites, favoring state or military intervention in industrial economy and programs of social welfare. He is a man strongly motivated professionally and ideologically, and his fervent loyalty to his nation may result in disloyalty to particular incumbent governments which he regards as either incompetent or dangerous to the nation's future. Such themes and motivations help to explain the rise to power and authority of the military officer in countries as important and diverse as: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. They illustrate also the reasons behind his continued importance in Ecuador, Panama, and the majority of the countries of Central America. This officer, thus, is a complex and important figure who looms increasingly large on the horizon of Latin America. In part a peer, he merits our respect; in part unique, he demands our attention!

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert A. Potash, "The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* October 1961, p. 574; L.N. McAlister, "Civil Military Relations in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* July 1961, p. 345. Any sweeping generalities about the Latin American military invites exceptions. For a study of one of the few early social-military movements see Herbert S. Klein, "David Toro and the Establishment of Military Socialism in Bolivia." *Hispanic American Historical Review,* February 1965, p. 25-52.

2. Cf. Edwin Lieuwen, "The Military: a Revolutionary Force," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* March 1961, p. 31-33. See also Olive Holmes, "Army Challenges in Latin America," *Foreign Policy Reports,* 1 December 1949, p. 166-175.

3. As an example of this "restoration," see Felipe Cossio del Pomar, "Oligarquía y militarismo en el Peru," *Cuadernos,* February 1962, p. 27-31.

4. In 1962 the Navy of Venezuela had six admirals; three of these either were of the Larrazabal family or had married into that family. The Tahernilla family dominated the military which supported the Batista government in Cuba. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 111-121.

5. Edwin Lieuwen, "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* October 1961, p. 566.

6. Edwin Lieuwen, *The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 70.

7. Johnson, p. 142.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 235.

9. *Ibid.,* p. 243. See also K.H. Silvert, "Political Universes in Latin America," *American Universities Field Staff Reports,* December 1961, p. 10.

10. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965), p. 9; Victor Alba, *Nationalists without Nations: the Oligarchy versus the People in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 209, supports this view and argues further that early social revolutionaries, disillusioned by the failures of the forties and the fifties, are turning to the military technocrats to effect changes within their societies.

11. Williard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 69, 190, 195. For a general overview of the civic action programs see also *ibid.,* p. 119-134. Alba, p. 98, disagrees with the positive descriptions of the Brazilian military. He avers that that country's armed force achieves egotistic ends and gains "copious purchases of the playthings of war" by forcing the government to acquiesce to all of the military demands. Alba's dissent, however, reaffirms the central thesis of this essay: that of great diversity existing with the Latin American military.

12. Barber, p. 160.

13. A particularly fine study of the historic roots and recent developments of the diplomatic-economic strife currently darkening relations between the United States and the Republic of Peru is that by Richard N. Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," *The New Yorker,* 17 May 1969, p. 41-109.



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ALGERIAN TERRORISM

A research paper prepared by

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In the past 20 years guerrilla warfare and its concomitants have received considerable attention and study. However, one aspect of the problem—terrorism—has not been adequately investigated and this can partially be attributed to the fact that the concept is alien and odious to most people holding Western values. It is nevertheless an integral part of wars of national liberation.

This article examines the use of terrorism as a political weapon in Algeria. In that operation the use of terror by the rebel forces was at first highly successful. The French Army finally resorted to torture to control terrorist activity, but in doing so they alienated the electorate in continental France. Thus the use of counterterror by the French produced a military success but a political defeat.

I—SPOKESMEN

> Terror is a psychological weapon of unbelievable power. Before the bodies of those whose throats have been cut and the grimacing faces of the mutilated, all capacity for resistance lapses: the spring is broken.[1]

These are the words of M. Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of French Algeria in 1955. He had just returned from viewing the bodies of dozens of massacred European settlers, who had looked to him for the protection of their lives and property. This description of fatalism and despair dramatically portrays, all that those who would apply terror hope to achieve.

The theory and application of terror is not new. It can be found in the history of all cultures. Clausewitz, in his oft quoted book, defined war as an act of violence aand further stated that violence is therefore the means to compel an opponent to fulfill our will. He also points out that in war, errors that proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. He felt that to introduce into the philosophy of war a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.[2] He was, of course, speaking of the classical setpiece war as he new it, not the wars of national liberation and terror tactics as we know them today. His thoughts remain valid in this new context, nonetheless.

Nechayev, a Russian nihilist, wrote in 1869 a startling document entitled

Revolutionary Catechism and in it specifically addressed the use of terror in a people's revolution. He felt that whenever a man is murdered, one's only concern should be with the question—In what way has his death profited the revolution? He indicated that one must first destroy those people whose existence is most inimical to the revolutionary organization; then violent and sudden death will put fear into the hearts of the government, break its will, and deprive it of its most energetic and intelligent agents.[3]

Trotsky proposed that the revolution requires the revolutionary class to attain its ends by all the methods at its disposal—if necessary by armed rising and by terrorism. Terror, he felt, could be very effective against a reactionary class enemy and intimidation could be a powerful weapon of policy. A victorious war, he suggested, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. He compares this with revolution which likewise kills individuals and intimidates thousands. Most significant, though, is his complete acceptance of terror. "The State of Terror of a revolutionary class can be condemned morally only by a man who as a principle rejects every form of violence whatsoever."[4] Lenin echos, "We have never rejected terror in principle nor can we do so."[5]

More specific, however, was the advice given the Algerian rebels by the Tunisian underground weekly *Ez-Zitouna,* in the issue of 26 August 1956.[6] "My brothers, do not kill only . . . but mutilate your adversaries on the public highway . . .. Pierce their eyes . . . cut off their arms . . . and hang them. Be certain that they will take to their heels like rats."[7]

For the purpose of this study, terror will be defined as a weapon of war directed at the individual. In this sense it is separate from sabotage, commando and guerrilla raids; words often used synonomously in the press for terror. It is separate from these acts by the fact that these tactics are directed at economic and military targets, while terror, as defined above, is directed at the unarmed and unprotected individuals within a target population. Terror is a personal thing, a state of mind, and a versatile weapon of unconventional warfare.

II—THE PARTICIPANTS

A study of the Algerian Revolution and the use of terror and counterterror is revealing—revealing in the sense that this form of warfare was not only widely used in Algeria but in European France as well. It occurred at a time in history when the hard lessons of guerrilla warfare and the use of terror were well known, particularly to the French, who had just completed almost 9 years of fighting in Indochina and who had experienced limited terrorism in Tunisia and Morocco. It also reveals the diverse source from which terror may spring and the varied reactions of segments of the civilian, military, and government communities.

The Beginning. The nationalist movement in Algeria had been growing steadily since the end of World War II. The progress of the Allied forces across the northern coast of Africa had nourished the hopes of nationalists throughout the country. Not only did the liberation free them from the harsh control of Vichy France, but it encouraged them to be more active in their quest for self-government.

Overt demonstrations of this desire became apparent in what is generally considered to be the birth of Algerian nationalism during a celebration in Setif in 1945. A mass rally, organized to celebrate the signing of the German surrender, turned into a massacre that proved to be the first step on a long road of strife and, eventually, revolution.

The celebration, reviewed and approved by the Prefect, brought thousands of Moslems to the city. A holiday atmosphere prevailed as the crowds thronged through the streets to listen to speeches and watch the ceremonies. Some of the participants carried the red, white, and green Algerian Tricolor. Across them were written inscriptions such as: "Long Live Independent Algeria" and "Down with colonialism."[1]

The police, always alert to trouble from the Moslems, attempted to remove these banners from the demonstrators. Shots were fired, and a riot ensued; a riot of such magnitude that accurate casualty figures have never been fully established. More sensational reports listed 30,000 casualties. *Stars and Stripes* reported 10,000, and the official French Government report listed approximately 4,000.[2] Whatever the actual figures, the French police and military moved in with unrestrained force. The air force flew more than 300 sorties a day for 10 days, and a French cruiser shelled the medina of Bougie and created tremendous damage and loss of life. This massive suppression of the Moslems bought the French 9 years of time but did not quench the Moslem yearning for independence.

The Algerian Revolution erupted with full force on 1 November 1954. It was heralded by a series of raids and sabotage throughout the country and a proclamation by the newly formed Front de Liberation National, or FLN, declaring its purpose to establish an independent Algeria completely free from French rule.[3]

The Nationalists. The primary combatants in the revolution were the FLN, their military arm, the ALN (Armee de Liberation Nationale), and the French Army. The FLN was born of the dissension between the two nationalistic parties existing just prior to the outbreak of hostilities on 1 November 1954. It attracted those who were tired of factional political bickering and favored direct action. This hard core of professional revolutionaries included former NCO's from Algerian regiments of the French Army of whom Ben Bella and Krim Belhacem are perhaps the best known. It included few recognized intellectuals or politicians and no religious fanatics. Although an important unifying factor, Islam had little to do with their motives. In addition, none of the revolutionaries were well educated or had any kind of experience which would fit them for the task of governing and administering a country of 10 million people. They were essentially fighters, with a limited political outlook. Complete independence was their aim, and they were unwilling to accept any intermediate phases of gradual integration or assimilation. They would not tolerate any form of collaboration with the French or any negotiation that did not start with the acceptance by France of the principles of full independence.[4] They came from the great mass of able-bodied Algerian men whose contact with France had been through military service or through migrant work in French industrial cities. They had seen the benefits and fruits of a modern society, but had been unable to share in these rewards.

While the FLN/ALN was the dominant nationalist party, they did have a serious and troublesome rival in the MNA (Mouvement Nationale Algerien). This group represented the followers of longtime nationalist Messali Hadj, who had actively sought an independent Algeria for many years and felt himself heir apparent to the leadership of any nationalistic movement.[5]

The Army. The French Army was, at the time, certainly one of the world's most experienced forces in active counterguerrilla warfare, having just concluded 9 years of hostilities in Indochina. In November of 1954 there were approximately 40,000 regular troops

stationed in Algeria, most of whom had seen duty in the Far East and had experienced guerrilla warfare firsthand.

The regulars were the backbone of the forces which were to grow to over 400,000 before the end of the crisis. They had been welded through years of hardship and neglect into a "Band of Brothers" whose banner was the honor of France.[6] They were convinced their heritage of defeat for the past two decades was the work of the French politicians. They believed that the army epitomized all the best national virtues and simultaneously believed that the army represented the French people.[7]

Isolated from Paris and the other forces, they had watched France's colonial empire crumble first in Madagascar, then Tunis, Morocco, and finally in French Indochina. As one colonel was reported to have said, "I'm fed up with hauling down the flag."[8]

Essentially, the army was dedicated to doing what was "best" for France, regardless of what the government might say. It distrusted the politicians and was committed to retaining Algeria as a part of France.

The Europeans. Deeply involved in the struggle, as in any war of national revolution, were the civilian population of Europeans and Moslems. The great majority of European settlers in algeria were city dwellers. These included a substantial middle class of teachers, lawyers, physicians, and civil servants plus a small top-level community of large landowners, businessmen, and senior civil officials. But by far, the majority of the Europeans were comprised of semiskilled workers, shopowners, taxi drivers, and retail help.[9]

To use the word "European" is somewhat misleading. Only 11 percent of these Europeans had been born in Europe; the remainder had been born in Algeria of families who, while of European stock, had been firmly settled in Algeria for four of five generations.[10] Algeria was their country, and they were fiercely resentful of any claim of equal treatment by or on behalf of the Moslem population. They had for the last century suppressed every move to provide even a semblance of equal justice to the Moslem community.[11] They were, quite naturally, opposed to any nationalist movement which challenged their privileged position. They were staunchly pro-French Algeria and pro-army, and were violently opposed to the FLN, the MNA, or any change in Paris policy which might be interpreted as a softening toward the insurgents.

The Moslems. Ten million Moslems, by sheer numbers, should have played a major role in the revolution, but they were more involved in a struggle for survival than for political independence. They were caught in the middle ground between the opposing forces of the colonials and the active nationalists. As a result, they became the primary target of the terrorist campaigns that were waged to secure their support.

They were predominantly Berbers, a tribe that was unrelated to the Arabs of the countries further to the east. They were descendants of the Numids, who once had ruled all of North Africa. Theirs was an entirely spoken tradition, as their language had no alphabet and no written history. They were a tough, austere, individualistic race that was intensely resentful of imposed authority and had no real concept of nor interest in politics.[12] They shared a long, sad history of conquerors which culminated with the arrival of the French in 1830.

Survival had become the Moslems' most urgent problem. Fertile land was almost nonexistent, having been largely appropriated by the French. The population, on the other hand, was growing at a phenomenal rate, and the per capita income was only one-third that of the European community. In order to survive, great numbers of Moslem men migrated to the industrial cities of

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France to seek work or even unemployment compensation which was, in some instances, comparable to wages paid in Algeria. In Paris, Metz, and Lyons they lived in squalor to save enough to send a small sum home every month. It is significant that the mountain area of Algeria which provided most of these migrant workers was also a primary source for the revolutionary movement promoted by the FLN.[1 3]

There was also a small middle class society made up of Moslems who had adopted French tastes and customs and attended French Schools and who relied on French dominance for their well-being.

The situation in Algeria then was highly volatile, with major segments of the population determined to enforce their will on the remainder. The nationalists were committed to the elimination of French rule. The army and European settlers were just as determined to smash the nationalists without regard to the fluctuating policy of Paris. In the middle stood the vast bulk of the oppressed Moslem population being pressured from both sides to provide support for both movements.

III—ORGANIZATION

Terror played a major role in each of these camps. Each group employed terror tactics in different ways to achieve its objectives.

Terrorist organizations are not known for their complete files and orderly records, but in Algeria captured documents and firsthand reports reveal the structure of the FLN terrorist organization in Algiers. They allow a greater appreciation of the size and complexity of a fully developed terrorist group.

The FLN's Council for the Zone of Algiers had complete authority within the party for all activities in Algiers. It consisted of a political-military leader who had a political assistant, military assistant, and an assistant for external liaison and intelligence. The bomb-throwing network was responsible directly to the zonal council. This group was carefully kept apart from other elements of the political-military structure. It was subdivided into a number of distinct and compartmented three-man cells. They communicated to superiors and subordinates through an intricate network of message drops. In the city of Algiers in 1956 this group alone comprised approximately 4,500 unarmed persons and 1,200 armed agents.[1] This number excludes a special police force of the ALN designed to carry out the specific executions required by the judiciary of the FLN.[2]

This highly organized group was fully operational 18 months after the commencement of open warfare. It was self-sustaining in that it provided its own explosive manufacturing facilities and recruitment. In the early phases of the war, recruits were found readily among politically active Moslems. Later, an active program was established which intimidated the uncommitted into making financial contributions and eventually taking part in direct terrorist activities.[3] Once a recruit became directly involved in a terrorist murder or mutilation, he had little choice but to cooperate.

The Terrorist. Contrary to what is generally assumed, the terrorist does not look upon his actions as criminal. Rather he considers himself a soldier and therefore not morally responsible for his actions. He looks upon his assignments as a duty to be performed and carries out his responsibilities without personal involvement within the framework of his organization.[4]

One member of the ALN, when asked by a correspondent what he did before becoming active in the field forces of the ALN, replied frankly, "I was a bombthrower." When the correspondent challenged that grenades had killed and maimed hundreds of innocent

people, the soldier replied, "I threw grenades under orders, and always in places where there were soldiers and men who had hurt our people."[5]

Yassif Saadi, the FLN's chief of the Algerian sector, commented after his capture on the bombings that had occurred under his direction. He said, "I had bombs planted in the cities because I didn't have planes to transport them. They caused fewer victims than the artillery and air bombardments of our mountain villages. I'm in a war, you cannot blame me."[6]

IV—METHODS OF OPERATION

The goal of the Algerian terrorists of the FLN was the eventual control of the government, and they employed a variety of tools in their efforts to achieve this goal. Rebellion is an expensive undertaking, and the most obvious immediate FLN need was funds to purchase arms and other supplies. They were able to gain these monies by taxing the inhabitants of areas under their control. The tribes in the hills and the Moslems of the cities were forced to contribute through the use of threats and occasional acts of reprisal.[1] The FLN's organization extended to continental France, where Algerian immigrants were similarly taxed. One French estimate placed the contribution of Algerian immigrants in France at 500 million francs a month during 1957.[2]

Extortion was also widely used by the FLN, and in the later stages of the war the Secret Army Organization also obtained funds in both Algeria and France by this method.[3] A good illustration of its use is to be found in a note received by a Jewish shopkeeper in Algiers.

> Sir:
>
> If on Wednesday you do not hand us the sum of two million francs, which will be deposited in the hall of the building situated at 1, Rue D'Isly, before 1745 hours near the staircase at the end near the cupboard, your daughter will be abducted and serve as a mattress for the Army of Liberation.[4]

One of the major objectives of the FLN was destroying the confidence of the people in police protection. Only when the populace felt that they had no effective protection would they either flee or accede to the demands of the FLN. Such an atmosphere would also lead to the flight of business capital from the country and the undermining of the Algerian economy.[5] This was partly accomplished by a large number of murders and public bombings, neither of which the police were able to prevent.

The FLN also attempted briefly to cripple the Algerian economy by eliminating the consumption of tobacco. An individual regional leader decreed that any person caught smoking would have his nose cut off by the terrorists of the FLN, but the policy proved to be unworkable and damaging to the FLN cause.[6]

The FLN also used terror as a political weapon. They attacked the rival nationalist leaders of the MNA who still took part in the colonial administration. The victims were first warned by letters bearing the FLN letterhead and crest and ordered to cease all political activity not in conformity with FLN objectives. Those who persisted were assassinated, and the execution order with an FLN letterhead and crest was left on the victim.[7] In Algeria the FLN was successful in its battle with the MNA and all but eliminated it, but in France the struggle continued. It was estimated that from October 1956 until October 1957 over 550 Algerian Moslems were killed and over 2,200 wounded by the rival terrorist organizations. On the average, two Algerians a day were killed in Paris alone. Moslem racketeers and

gangsters stepped into the conflict, practicing extortion under the guise of nationalism.[8]

The struggle for control of the nationalist movement reached a climax when over 300 villagers of the small village of Kabylia, accused of supporting the MNA, were herded together in the village of Kasba Mechta and knifed or shot to death by the FLN.[9] Similar incidents occurred on other occasions, and it has been claimed that, while not successful in its battle with the FLN, for several months the MNA caused more casualties to the FLN than did the French Army.[10]

A good example of the FLN's use of political terror occurred prior to an election scheduled in 1956. Several weeks preceding the election the FLN published the following proclamation:

> ELECTION FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
>
> Algerian People!
>
> The FLN, assuming once again the responsibilites before God, before men, and before history, has decreed:
>
> 1. Active abstention . . .
>
> 2. The execution of all candidates, to whatever party they may belong.
>
> 3. The abduction and the slitting of the throats of all electoral agents.
>
> 4. The resignation of all representatives in office. These, from deputy to simple djemma member, are required to resign before January 1, 1956. All representatives without any exception who refuse to resign will be considered traitors to the fatherland and killed without judgment. . . . The FLN requests all its militants and sympathizers to procure a weapon and to proceed with direct action. Each patriot will consider it his duty to kill a traitor.[11]

On 8 December, the day following the proclamation, the Algerian Assembly voted to postpone the election, and the FLN saluted the "cascade of resignations."[12]

The FLN also used terror to provide vital support for their insurgent units. The populace was forced to provide recruits, intelligence, and sanctuary to the FLN and to deny these to the French. Occasionally the insurgents would relieve the pressure on one of their field units by a terror campaign designed to draw enemy forces away from the area of operations.

To unnerve the European colonials, the FLN used in conjunction with terror a very effective psychological device—a simple slogan written on a piece of paper was inserted in the morning newspaper or slipped under a door. The slogan said, "The suitcase of the coffin," and it brought home to the colonial that he had not escaped the notice of the rebels.[13]

Indiscriminate bombings were also used by the FLN to drive uncommitted Moslems into active participation on the side of the FLN. These bombings were carried out against the colonials and provoked reprisals upon the Moslem population. These reprisals alienated the French from the Moslems and created public support for the FLN.[14]

The FLN also used bold and daring assassinations as a tool of propaganda. It conducted a widely reported raid on a beach 50 miles west of Algiers in 1960, machineguuning some 50 bathers, killing 14. The generally accepted motive was to counter the army propaganda being issued at the time that the FLN was no longer an effective force.[15]

In conducting their terror campaign and in employing the tools described

above, the FLN was careful to apply terror with selectivity. Although the Moslem population was one of the objects of terrorist activity, it was never harassed to the point where its hatred of the insurgents overcame its primal instinct of self-preservation. The FLN was not so discriminating against the French, but its campaign nevertheless had dramatic emotional implications in Paris, where the ultimate decisions would be made concerning the outcome of the war. ". . . once the primal instinct of self-preservation has been aroused, the psychological battle was won by the rebels. The French had another occasion to measure the inefficiency of their promises to reform, justice and greater well being."[16]

The settlers in Algeria were thoroughly unnerved by the terrorist offensive of 1956-1957, but they were never on the point of surrendering. In itself, the dramatic nature of the terrorist challenge insured dramatic response to the call for counteraction.

V—RESPONSE

Faced with an insurrection and a well-organized and determined terror campaign, how did France respond?

The immediate reaction of French politicians was varied and somewhat confused. There was an initial attempt to minimize the seriousness of the events by referring to the rebels as outlaws or criminals acting on their own. When reports stated that the rebels were receiving local support from the population, this was blamed on intimidation.

High-level attention was shortly brought to bear on the Algerian problem. Paris commissioned a new Governor General, M. Jacques Soustelle, to handle Algerian affairs. He arrived a month after the commencement of hostilities, bearing an increased appropriation for economic development.[1]

Shortly after the Soustelle takeover, in January 1955, a State of Emergency bill was enacted in the Assembly which permitted stringent controls to be enforced on the population. The bill included provisions for government control of the movement of all persons within designated areas. Also, protection and security zones could be created in which special regulations could be imposed on the inhabitants. Authorities were given the right to expel troublemakers from the area. Forced residence and authorized night searches became part of the final version of the law.[2]

In May, at a plenary session of the Algerian Federation of Mayors, a resolution was voted that called for "an unequivocal reassertion" of French authority plus a measure asking the "supreme penalty" for all persons convicted of terrorist activities.[3] Before adjourning for the summer, the National Assembly extended the State of Emergency Act until mid-1956. Ultimately, the Governor General gave complete power to the army for the suppression of terror and the reassertion of law and order in Algiers.[4]

The military forces garrisoned in Algeria were also caught off guard by the sudden onset of widespread attacks and violence. Initial feeling was that they were faced with another tribal uprising that could have serious implications if allowed to proceed unchecked. To counter these activities, immediate steps were taken to augment the 40,000 regulars already in Algeria with an additional three battalions of paratroopers from France. Regular operations were mounted in the Aures and Kabylia Mountains, the focal points of the initial disturbances. These were generally standard movements and followed the political guidance of "firm sanctions but no reprisals."[5] They paralleled the police efforts of arresting known political agitators and extremists. The bulk of the forces was deployed in the field engaging the guerrilla forces of the ALN.

In the fall of 1955 terrorist and

guerrilla activity had increased despite efforts to suppress it, and the military became increasingly frustrated. This made it painfully obvious that the uprising had grown to revolutionary proportions, and a call was placed for more troops until eventually 400,000 were involved.

The year 1956 saw a hardening of political guidance which resulted in increased and less restrained military actions. It had become increasingly apparent that pure military efforts were not enough, and the Army responded with the introduction of a civic action program. This effort located officers in remote villages in an attempt to improve their image and personify the government's concern for the people's well-being. Such officers on occasion had sole responsibility for up to 10,000 people, and some had to resort to their own personal funds to finance projects for their districts.

Supplementing these individual officers were special civic action teams of various skills and talents ranging from farmers to physicians. These groups traveled through the countryside, instructing and assisting the local inhabitants.

Psychological warfare was also introduced by the Army. Convinced as a result of their experiences in Indochina that a strong program of this nature was essential, they formed the 5th Bureau which instituted "brainwashing" and other techniques and did enjoy some success in reorienting captured insurgents to the government's side.

By early 1957 the situation had deteriorated badly and was beyond the ability of even the military-assisted civic authorities to control. In Algeria alone, over 13,000 civilians had lost their lives to terrorist activities since the outbreak of hostilities in late 1954. This caused the Governor General, M. Robert Lacoste, to give the army full administrative and political control of Algiers by administrative decree.[6]

The army commited itself totally to the elimination of terrorist activities in Algiers. Four regiments of paratroopers were recalled from normal operations and placed under the command of General Massu, a favorite of the colonials. He began his no-holds-barred campaign to clean up Algiers in March and finished it in November 1957 with the arrest of the last sectional leader.[7]

Normal police methods had obviously been inadequate. General Massu adopted a combination of military and police methods and applied them in massive quantities. All citizens were registered and issued work, food, and travel permits. An intelligence network was established. It included an informer in every house, on every block, and in every place of employment. With this information base, the army could put its hands on anyone it wanted within a matter of minutes. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews limited all but essential intercourse between sectors of the city.

The "paras" could and did arrest anyone on unnamed offenses and imprison them for unlimited periods of time.[8] It was widely reported, and there is little doubt, that they used third degree and torture to extract intelligence from uncooperative suspects.[9]

Quick response squads were on duty continuously to immediately prosecute any leads or intelligence gained by the brutal interrogation methods. Instances were recorded where couriers, having been caught on their way to a rendezvous, revealed their information and were replaced by disguised police to complete the meeting and arrest and interrogate another link in the organization.

Support of the population and the intelligence they provided, speed, surprise, and sudden concentration of forces were the weapons General Massu used to smash the terrorists of Algiers.

In the remainder of Algeria, intermittent terror and guerrilla warfare were

carried out by the ALN and opposed by the army, but most observers agree that the military situation was well in the hands of the French by May 1958.[10]

In the civilian community, hatred and distrust between the Moslems and Europeans increased. As terror tactics expanded, more and more persons began to carry sidearms.

In April of 1955 a group of European farmers in the Redj, a district near Mila, banded together and formed a small group of crop watchers for their mutual self-protection. M. Soustelle, the Governor General, lashed out at this assumption of state power with the statement, "Under no circumstances will illegal or semi-legal groups destined, in the view of their sponsors, to fight terrorism be tolerated. Terrorism cannot be eliminated by methods tending to supplant the public powers . . .."[11] He feared, that should some turn of events transform this group of undisciplined civilians into a mob, they could cause more problems than already existed. In spite of his warnings, by the summer of 1956 several clashes of Europeans and Moslems had occurred, and the recruitment of a local militia was authorized, a force known as the Groupes Militaire de Protection Rurale.

Many European civilians packed up their belongings and left Algeria to start life elsewhere. The ultimatum, "The suitcase or the coffin," left little alternative for the average colonial citizen. If he could, he left.[12]

The extremists in the European community formed a small clandestine self-defense force romantically called the Red Hand. This group, according to one author, operated with the collusion of the French Secret Service.[13] It was originally a loose association of desperate colonists with a common purpose; to preserve French rule in the territories of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. It was active as early as 1952.

Its area of operations extended into two continents, both Africa and Europe. Its gunmen stalked and eliminated North African rebels and Europeans who sympathized with the nationalists. They had a degree of success, applying terror directly to European arms suppliers who were providing arms for the rebel forces of the nationalists. They were able to convince some that business with the nationalists was not in their long-range best interests. The French Government was also conducting work in a parallel vein, so the exact effect of the Red Hand cannot be accurately assessed.

Toward the latter part of the war in the early 1960's, the Red Hand directed its efforts toward the overthrow of De Gaulle's Fifth Republic which had, by then, committed itself to the establishment of an independent Algeria and in doing so "betrayed the colonists." In this latter endeavor it joined hands with the newly formed terrorist group, the Secret Army Organization, or the famed OAS.

The goal of the OAS was to impose the will of the colonists on Paris and to leave the army free to finish its war with the FLN.[14] They portrayed themselves as loyal Frenchmen, working to preserve Algeria for France even though the Fifth Republic refused to do so. They sought to give the nationalist movement the complexion of a Communist conspiracy and thus profit from the emotional response this would produce. This, they hoped, would force De Gaulle to change his policy, suppress the nationalists, and preclude any agreement with the FLN.

OAS tactics were solidly based on terror. OAS strategy was founded on psychological and subversive warfare principles hammered out by a group of ex-military men, several of whom had considerable experience in the field in Indochina and Algeria. The OAS leaders believed that a revolutionary movement, given enough popular support, could dislocate established authority and gain its overthrow by terrorism, sabotage,

and mass demonstrations. Accordingly, the OAS formed its own terrorist, psychological, and political sections modeled largely on the FLN pattern.[15] Its method was to make normal government impossible for De Gaulle's Governor General in Algeria.

OAS terrorism was directed mainly against government supporters and members of the police and armed forces. Starting with an average of 14 terrorist acts a day, this figure rose to about 41 daily by the end of 1961. In the month of May 1961, for instance, in Algeria and France there were 222 plastic bomb attacks, while in June there were 229.[16]

The continuing aim of the OAS was to provoke communal riots on such a scale that the French Army would have to intervene on the side of the Europeans. This they thought, would make the proposed cease-fire impossible.[17] The FLN—not so much from humanitarian reasons, as in its own best interests—saw through this effort and kept a firm grip on the Moslem community, avoiding massive retaliation. This campaign by the OAS brought about a change of attitude in the army which was now prepared to shoot Frenchmen, if necessary.[18]

Frustrated in its efforts, the OAS adopted even more extreme measures, a policy of scorched earth, so that when the Moslems took over they would have little of value left. Many schools and buildings, sorely needed in an emerging country, were burned in this campaign.[19]

The French Government was not unresponsive to these violent challenges to its authority. One of the reported responses had a sinister character beyond that normally found in a democratic government's reaction to a threat. This took the form of a group of assassins called the Barbouzes, the bearded ones. They were, according to one author, "a special force loyal to the person of Charles de Gaulle."[20] Their origin, he feels, dated back to the days of 1940. This group reportedly was augmented in Algeria by a large number of Vietnamese, among them killers from the Bande Noire, specialists in torturing Vietnamese prisoners. Their mission in Algeria was to eliminate the OAS.[21]

At the trial of General Salan, a figurehead of the OAS, the subject of the Barbouzes was addressed. The Governor General, M. Morin, denied their existence, and no one in authority ever confirmed it. Yet, to quote Roland Gaucher, author of *Les Terroristes*, "Today, the role of the Barbouzes is no longer contested by anyone."[22]

Their entry into the Algerian scene was a major psychological error; the mere existence of such an organization, sponsored by a head of state, produced a severe shock for those who held an image of France as the birthplace of Western virtues. As a result, they were hunted by the civilian population as well as the OAS and received no sanctuary. Their contingent of Bande Noire Vietnamese caused them to be easily identified, and they were relentlessly pursued. They eventually withdrew after suffering many serious losses.[23]

A democratic society, regardless of its motives or provocations, must be able to face the scrutiny of its people concerning the methods it adopts to achieve its goals. When the antiterrorist methods used by the army in the battle of Algeria began to seep into France in 1957, rumors and allegations flew, charging the army with indulging in torture and deliberate brutality to intimidate prisoners.[24]

Two major opinion-making groups were formed in France. They placed increasing attention on the excesses allegedly used by the army and, by implication, the government. These groups were the intellectuals and the clergy, both of whom launched an eloquent and united attack on the army's ideology, sense of mission, and the moral justification for its actions in

Algeria. The intellectuals denounced the army's explanation for its actions in Algeria in a manifesto entitled "Declaration of the Rights of Refusing to Serve in the Algerian War."[25] This declaration was signed by 121 writers, artists, and teachers. It was widely circulated and gave the army reason to be concerned of the intellectuals' influence, and it put increasing pressure on De Gaulle to end the war.

The clergy, acting on a letter sent by Catholic priests serving in Algeria, protested the torture of Moslem suspects by young, susceptible conscripts, warning that the war was corrupting the souls of young French recruits. The College of Bishops, Archbishops, and Cardinals then condemned these practices and actively encouraged disobedience on the part of those ordered to perform such inhuman outrages. A Congress of Protestant Clergymen announced support of conscientious objectors.[26]

The government suppressed a book written by several Moslems who had been subjected to torture and by its suppression stirred the world press. The *Manchester Guardian* said, "The confiscation of the book can only confirm the allegations it contains. The French Government has only itself to blame if these allegations are believed abroad. It is acting as though it were true and more discreditable still, as though it wished to hush them up."[27] The *London Observer* said, "Only a few days ago M. Debre, the French Prime Minister, was appealing to his Western Allies to understand and support French Policy in Algeria. If he is asking us to support a policy which requires the use of torture to enforce it, can he really be surprised when we refuse?"[28]

Mme. Simone De Beauvoir, the noted author, took up the torch and rushed into print the vivid story of a young and attractive Moslem girl of 22 who had been captured and tortured by the "paras." It explained in detail the excruciating and degenerate tortures she had endured.[29]

This combined effort did much to cause the Fifth Republic to decide that the sooner the war was ended the better. What was accomplished by all this terror? Was it worth the effort and the terrible cost in human life and property? A few brief figures may give an indication of the suffering over the 7½ years of the war. Its magnitude can often be overlooked, with the small daily totals in the newspapers and periodicals. There were 42,090 acts of terrorism recorded during the course of the war. As a result, there were 10,704 Europeans and 43,248 Moslems either killed or wounded. It was also estimated that approximately 4,300 Algerian Moslems were killed in France and an additional 9,000 wounded.[30]

Most observers agree that the use of terror did serve the purposes of the insurgents and provided them the support of the people upon whom the success of their cause depended. On the other hand, counterterror used by the forces of authority did not, and in the long run it was actually counterproductive. Algiers best illustrates this point. Although the terrorist activity was virtually eliminated there, the methods employed drew such heavy condemnation from the world that they caused serious damage to the government and alienation of the neutral population in Algeria.

VI—SUMMARY

An attempt has been made to investigate the terror campaign in Algeria and to review the response of France to this facet of unconventional warfare.

The initial decision to employ terrorism is the deliberate choice of the insurgent's political and military leadership. It can be commenced or discontinued on command. The FLN's choice of terrorism was dictated by the advantages such a campaign would and did yield.

From the FLN standpoint, terror was most certainly efficient. With a small number of dedicated personnel, the FLN succeeded in intimidating an entire population and disrupting the political scene to the point where normal government was impossible.

Terror also suited the FLN's purposes by its versatility. The application of terror swelled its own ranks, then protected and provided them with intelligence. It filled their coffers and eliminated their opposition, all the while creating a psychological climate conducive to their operations. Brian Crozier, author of *The Rebels*, put it most succinctly when he said, "Terror is the natural weapon of determined men with small resources, fighting against a superior force."[1]

The French response was one of initial bewilderment and refusal to face reality. The politicians made statements and resolutions and eventually enacted a bill authorizing special measures to be taken in areas designated as being in a state of emergency. When it became obvious that this bill was unenforceable with the small number of police available, they eventually turned over full control of the government to the army. The army responded by pursuing an elusive and fleeting enemy in the mountains, leaving the population without protection.

To combat terror, France resorted to counterterror and allowed the army to make its own decisions in Algeria. While this method is the natural one and was without question most effective in the short-run battle of Algiers, it was self-defeating. Once the army's methods became known, an outraged public demanded such methods cease. France was no longer able to point to Nazi atrocities with impunity. It was negative public opinion that contributed in the long run to the political decision to end the conflict on the insurgents' terms.

The leaders of public opinion against the counterterror program were the intellectuals. They very effectively challenged the right of the French Government to violate human freedoms even in a struggle for its own existence. This dialogue made sensational press material as has been demonstrated in the United States brutalities allegedly committed by U.S. or Allied forces usually receive expanded and outraged coverage where as the same methods by insurgents receive minor notice. Geoffrey Bocca, author of *The Secret Army*, put this problem very well when he stated, "When violence answers violence in a growing frenzy that makes the simple language of reason impossible, the role of the intellectuals cannot be, as we read every day, to excuse from a distance one of the violences and condemn the other."[2] The responsible press is not immune from this criticism and must exercise similar judgment.

Terror was also the weapon chosen by a limited number of the civilian and military communities when they formed the Red Hand and the OAS. Whatever they contributed to the maintenance of a French Algeria was offset by the countereffects on the Moslem community. The Moslems, witnessing their methods, were repelled and joined the nationalists to fight against such repression.

It might appear that terror is profitable if used only by the insurgents and self-defeating if used by the forces of order. What then can a democratic society do to preserve its principles and still engage in a battle for its very existence?

VII—CONCLUSIONS

In a democracy such as France, the government derives its authority from the people. Its whole purpose is to serve the people under the guidelines of its constitution. To violate the constitution and its guarantees of individual freedom, if only for one person, is to violate the freedom of all men living under that

government and invalidates the right of that body to govern.

Therefore, a democratic government cannot authorize, nor even tacitly permit, the use of torture, unlawful arrest or imprisonment to combat terror as Colonel Trinquier proposes in his book. Colonel Trinquier was a leader in the army's struggle to suppress terrorism during the battle of Algiers. In his book relating this experience, he states that following the capture of a terrorist he must be interrogated immediately with"... no lawyer present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier he must face the suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid."[1]

It is hopelessly optimistic to consider a movement so dedicated to their cause that they will resort to armed force and yet prohibit terrorism as a method of achieving their objectives, particularly after seeing the success terrorism has achieved in other wars of national liberation. Therefore, a democracy must be prepared to combat terrorism rationally and effectively.

The events in Algeria dramatically displayed the power of a well-organized terror campaign. It also illustrated the extensive measures necessary to combat and suppress terrorism, once it has gained a foothold. The cornerstone of terrorism is intimidation and will work equally well for the schoolyard bully or a nation building a war machine in the balance of power race.

Terrorism is a natural, efficient, and versatile weapon in the hands of insurgents. Its efficiency lies in the fact that it requires no buildup of weapons, material, and manpower as do more conventional methods of waging war. It can start with one determined man equipped with a razor and end with the intimidation of hundreds. Algeria illustrated this clearly. A relatively small organization eventually intimidated an entire population and made the orderly business of government impossible. Terror's versatility is grounded in its power over people; people who control all facets of the revolutionaries' objectives.

Unlike conventional warfare, which pits armed forces openly against one another in the field, terrorism operates totally submerged within its target population. It brings the war directly to an individual's doorstep where he must fight his own battle for survival against an unseen, omnipresent enemy. The victim has only two choices; he can refuse to cooperate and face the dire consequences virtually alone or surrender and no longer oppose the objectives of the terrorists. The fact that Algiers was indeed a battleground was not recognized by the French authorities until the terrorists had unquestionably gained the upper hand.

As effective as it is, the insurgent cannot use terror recklessly. It is not an all-powerful, unbeatable weapon, as the FLN found out. A most critical aspect of successful terrorism appears to be tight, rational control. It was the sharp rise of terrorist acts in Algiers that caused the government to declare martial law and for the first time directly confront the terrorist with adequate force on his own grounds.

For the insurgent, this avoidance of excess must carry over in the size of his organization. Large size, of necessity, complicates command and control, increases the financial and material needs for its operations, and thus makes it increasingly vulnerable to excesses, infiltration, and compromise. A small, properly structured terrorist organization, opposed by established police methods, can achieve its objectives by a tightly controlled, centrally directed campaign against influential and strategically located individuals within the established government, business, and military elites. Maintained at this level,

the insurgent can exercise his control for an unlimited amount of time.

Massive executions and bombings of public places often dilute the advantageous effects of special group intimidation and create a strong demand for massive countermeasures from the peripheral citizens who had previously been relatively unthreatened as mere observers of selected terrorism. Such a response works counter to the terrorists objectives and is damaging in the long run to the insurgents' cause if it provokes an increased application of force as was the case in Algiers.

When permitted, the army waged an effective and, with one exception, sound and defensible campaign against the terrorists. They recognized Algiers for what it was, a battleground. They then methodically applied all the accepted principles of warfare to the unusual environment, and they won. This placed a heavy burden on the population but resulted in no major outcry except against the use of torture.

Although such brutal methods were used by the army on a small scale, they soon created a worldwide negative reaction, resulting in international condemnation of French methods. The proponents of torture argue that if such methods remain limited and clandestine they will be of unlimited value. It is also argued that the structure of the FLN would not have been so readily detected and destroyed without such action and that the time gained saved many hundreds of innocent lives. The use of torture, nonetheless, cannot be authorized. This will undoubtedly slow but not stop the apprehension and destruction of the terrorist network, but it is a price that must be paid.

Once a terrorist campaign has commenced, it tends to spawn terrorist opposition groups such as the Red Hand and the OAS. These fringe group activists will feel perfectly justified in using terror as a weapon, using the "eye for an eye" philosophy. Their methods will be similar, if not identical, to those of the original terrorists and their motive sometimes difficult to distinguish from those of prior terrorist activities. Bombings are a case in point. The FLN had utilized public bombings to destroy business confidence and discourage communications between the Moslems and Europeans. The OAS, on the other hand, used the same method to incite reprisals between the same groups and hopefully commit the army on the side of the colonials. The forces of authority will have to be particularly alert to detect these subtle changes and identify the entry of another terrorist organization into the battle.

The events of Algeria demonstrated that terrorism is a virulent virus able, in the appropriate environment, to infect any host, friend or foe. The virus cannot be totally eliminated, as it lies dormant in all men, but it can be countered and suppressed, once active. Algeria has shown us that.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. George E. Wales holds a bachelor's degree in geophysics from the Colorado School of Mining and a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. As an attack aviator he has served as a test pilot and engineer at the Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River and in Vietnam where, in two separate tours, he served as Operations Officer in Attack Squadron 113 and subsequently in the same position in Air Wing 19. Lieutenant Commander Wales is a 1969 graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Command and Staff, and is currently assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

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3. Clark, p. 155.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
5. Serge Bromberger quoted in Crozier, p. 203.
6. David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 62.
7. O'Ballance, p. 96.
8. Serge Bromberger, quoted in Crozier, p. 203.
9. "Algerian Terror on the Rise." *The New York Times*, 6 August 1964, p. 6:4.; also Carey Williams, "Algerian Terrorism." *The Nation*, 12 November 1960, p. 4-5.
10. Goutor, p. 52.
11. Clark, p. 153.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
13. Joachim Joesten, *The Red Hand*, (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1962), p. 17.
14. Geoffrey Bocca, *The Secret Army* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 118.
15. O'Ballance, p. 187.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Bocca, p. 153.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Roland Gaucher, *Les Terroristes* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1965), p. 296.
23. Bocca, p. 157.
24. O'Ballance, p. 98.
25. Stupak, p. 582-604.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June 1958 quoted in Ronald N. Murdock, "The Hitler Heritage of Paris," *The Nation*, 18 July 1959, p. 23-27.
28. *London Observer*, 28 July 1958, quoted in Murdock.
29. Bocca, p. 38-39.
30. O'Ballance, p. 200.

VI—SUMMARY

1. Crozier, p. 127.
2. Bocca, p. 141.

VII—CONCLUSIONS

1. Trinquier, p. 21.

SET AND DRIFT

New Chief of Staff Assigned to Naval War College

Rear Admiral Fred Groch Bennett, U.S. Navy, reporting from a Navy Department post as Director, Navy Program Planning, assumed duties as Chief of Staff, Naval War College in August 1969.

Admiral Bennett was born in 1915 and was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1936 and from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1944 with the degree of Master of Science. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1955.

His duty assignments afloat include the USS *Maryland* on which ship he was serving at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. He has also served as Gunnery Officer, USS *Topeka;* Staff Gunnery Officer, Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet; Commanding Officer, USS *Harwood;* Staff, Commander Destroyer Division Eighty Two; Commanding Officer, USS *Grand Canyon;* Commanding Officer, USS *Newport News;* and Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Eight.

Admiral Bennett's shore assignments have included duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Engineering Officer, Naval Gun Factory, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Director of Budget and Reports, Office of the Navy Comptroller and in 1963 in the rank of Rear Admiral, he was awarded the Legion of Merit for "exceptionally meritorious service" in the post of Director of Budget and Reports. Admiral Bennett has also served as Director of the General Planning and Programming Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In 1968 the President of the United States appointed him Vice Admiral and Director, Navy Program Planning. For service in that capacity he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal this past July.

Correspondence Courses. In the latter pages of this issue there is description of the Naval War College correspondence courses followed by a subscription tear-out card—a convenient method for enrolling in one of these challenging studies.

The value of these courses rests largely on the professional needs of the individual. Quoted below are comments made by students who have completed the International Relations course, and

readers contemplating enrollment should find them of interest.

* * * * *

This course have given me an insight into a field or area of study that I feel is vital to the naval officer in command today. I do not mean to imply that I have a deep understanding of international relations. I mean that I have an appreciation for the many sides to problems in international relations; and further, that naval officers need to appreciate and be knowledgeable in international relations so as to fully understand far-reaching consequences individual ship actions can have on national policies and actions. I feel that I am now better prepared to appreciate the problems involving our national policies, in the decision-making process aboard ships in situations such as encounters with Soviet ships involving near collisions, et cetera.

* * * * *

I have acquired knowledge and understanding that I could not have acquired without the assistance of the Naval War College and its dedicated staff. Studying this course is far more effective than random reading. Preparation of the written assignments is especially valuable. Only when the student begins to write his thoughts does he discover the true extent of his knowledge and understanding. The review comments by the staff are very helpful to the student. Without these, the student would have no way of evaluating his effort. I have learned a great deal by reading these comments and reflecting on them as I continued my study. This course provides an excellent method for enhancing an officer's professional development and should be considered mandatory for all senior officers. Junior officers should be encouraged and permitted to study this course.

Senior Officer Executive Management Course. From 28 July to 8 August 1969, some 30 newly selected Navy rear admirals, Marine corps brigadier generals, and other selectees participated in the second annual Senior Officer Executive Management Course conducted by the Naval War College.

The 3-week, course designed to provide these senior officer students with a foundation in modern concepts and theories of management, covered the areas of behavioral sciences, managerial planning and control, national and labor economics, planning, programming, budgeting, and systems analysis.

The major portion of the instruction was provided by professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Sloan School of Management, who lent their assistance in setting up the course 18 months ago. Leading specialists from the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other governmental agencies participated as lecturers during the management course.

Professor Zenon S. Zannetos of the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management was chairman of the advisory group charged with the development of the course. He was assisted by Professor Edward B. Roberts, who holds the Naval War College's James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management, and by Professor Charles O. Myers, the MIT Sloan Fellows Professor of Management.

Comdr. Ian E.M. Donovan, USN, was the military director of the course. He is on the staff of the War College's School of Naval Command and Staff.

Ψ

Tactical planning for the Imperial Japanese Navy evolved during the interwar period from a concept of decisive battle with dreadnoughts to one of carrier airstrikes at ranges far exceeding those of naval gunnery. The story of this evolution is aptly told by Gen. Minoru Genda, who was one of the early proponents of carrier aviation.

TACTICAL PLANNING IN THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

General Minoru Genda, JSDF (Ret.)

on 7 March 1969

The tactical concepts of the Imperial Japanese Navy went through many changes and transitions during the 20 years which immediately preceded the outbreak of the Pacific War in December of 1941. Beginning with the traditional concept of decisive battle, the Imperial Navy altered its planning to include the "diminution Operation." Carrier striking forces played an increasing role in this operation until, finally, they became central in tactical planning. Lessons can be learned and many reflections can be made by examining the evolution of these tactical concepts.

Until shorly after World War I, the Japanese Navy ascribed to the "Principles of Naval Warfare," of which "Decisive Battle" was most important. Admiral Togo and his success in the battle of Tsushima can be considered as exemplary in this regard. Ideas such as "Be sure to fight wherever you meet an enemy" are derived from this concept, a concept which formed the basis for the tactical bible of the Imperial Navy at this time.

In the year in which I entered the Naval Academy, some events occurred which altered this conception. As a result of the Washington Conference in 1921, Japan accepted a ratio of capital ships which allotted her 60 percent of the tonnage of Britain and the United States. The London Conference of 1930 confirmed this ratio, and Japan was forced to modify her planning to allow for this new factor. In our review of naval history we could hardly find an example in which a navy with 60 percent of the tonnage of its opponents had emerged victorious in decisive battle. Therefore, our navy modified its strategic policy from one of the "decisive battle" to one of the "diminution operation."

This operation involved the adoption of a policy of "offensive defense." Our major units were to remain on the defensive strategically, making every effort to improve their spiritual and material war potentials. Meanwhile, our forces of submarines, destroyers, and aircraft were to go into action and

inflict such damage upon the enemy as to bring about parity between the two main forces. At this point the "decisive battle" would be fought. The force of battleships, however, was still expected to play the major part in the decisive battle.

In this "diminution operation" the main features were surprise attacks by submarines, night attacks by destroyers, and air attacks by land and carrier-based planes. To accomplish their part in the operation, the Japanese aircraft were to operate mainly with torpedo planes and dive bombers. Only a few fighters were required. The carrier was thus assigned a subsidiary role.

The continued increase of air technology brought with it the idea that mastery of the air would be crucial to the outcome of any naval battle. This increasing appreciation of the potency of the air arm suggested that the destruction of enemy aircraft carriers should have first priority with our own carrier-based aircraft. Beginning around 1935 our naval air force trained extensively with this conception in mind. The importance of the carrier relative to the battleship increased in the thinking of the Imperial Navy until both occupied an approximately equal position.

Despite the fact that Japanese strategic planning was predicated upon reducing the American Fleet to parity by a process of attrition, the yearly exercises of the combined fleet and the innumerable war games held at the War College were still based on the assumption that an inferior Japanese Fleet would meet a superior American Fleet in a decisive "fleet versus fleet battle." In these games and exercises the forces would be divided into elements of similar composition but of varying size, and each one would be commanded by a Japanese naval officer schooled in current tactical policies. Various elaborate plans were tried, but the results generally proved that in forces of similar composition, superior numbers gained the victory. While the Japanese Navy was dissatisfied with these unfavorable results, it at first could propose only an effort to outmatch the Americans qualitatively in firing technique and skill, torpedo attack, bombing, and the proper tactical use of the various elements.

These studies and exercises provided much useful information for the combined fleet on fleet formations, deployment, and attack methods. They failed, however, to provide sufficient training in the areas of offensive and defensive operations and the protection of vital sea communications. These were considered to be secondary problems, and this failure to explore them later brought many disadvantages upon the Japanese Navy when the tide of war turned against us in the Pacific.

The results of these exercises caused the postulation of a new tactical theory. Since superior numbers won the day in forces of similar composition, it was suggested that the Imperial Fleet be given a characteristic force composition different from that of its opponents. Aircraft carriers protected by lighter ships would comprise the main elements of the fleet, and battleships would be abolished.

This idea was suggested almost simultaneously in 1936 by three different sources. Capt. Takijiro Onishi, the Vice Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Air Force, was one of those who proposed it. The Yokosuka Naval Air Force was the nucleus of our naval air forces and was responsible for studies of naval air strategy and tactics, experiments for new air weapons and armaments, and guidance in the field of air training and education. (Captain Onishi was later promoted to Vice Admiral and Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. He committed suicide at the end of the war.) Several pilots assigned to the combined fleet also proposed this idea, and I, at the time a student at the Naval War College, did likewise.

The proposals of Captain Oonishi and the pilots of the fleet were to the effect that airpower was to be the fleet's main strength, but they did not specify how this was to accomplished. I made the proposal that battleships should be abolished and replaced by aircraft carriers, land-based air units, and submarines. Ships smaller than cruisers were to be kept as auxiliary forces.

I had two justifications for this suggestion. First, it had been proved in the annual naval exercise that battleship forces could be easily destroyed by aircraft alone and that the antiaircraft power of the fleet could not check the air attack. This was the result of increased skill in delivering bombing and torpedo attacks which had been acquired by the pilots of the combined fleet. Accordingly, if we could gain command of the air with our superior airpower, we would be able to destroy the enemy main force with air attack. I also reasoned that if we engaged the enemy with only light ships and aircraft, he would find no worthwhile targets for his 14- and 16-inch naval guns which formed the main battery of battleships and battle cruisers. Similarly, our own battleships would become useless targets when faced with major enemy air strength.

This proposal met with severe criticism from the War college. It was argued that air operations depend largely upon the weather and hence were unreliable. It was also asserted that both friendly and enemy air strength suffered great attrition in the initial stages of a conflict, and this weakened the ability of air forces to deliver a decisive blow. These alleviating factors so limited the value of airstrikes that they would remain of marginal importance, while the final decision would result from an engagement of capital ships.

I replied to the first of these arguments by pointing out that aircraft operations were not the only ones that were hindered by weather operations. When the weather was so unfavorable as to hinder air operations, the activities of surface ships were restricted also. They were, in fact, just floating pieces of wood and could not engage in effective action.

I was also not impressed by the claims that air action would be made ineffective by combat attrition. The idea of "mutual-kill" is applicable not only to aircraft but to any other type of weapon, including the battleship. If the efficiency of air operations was deemed to be threatened by combat losses, the proper action to take would be to increase the number of aircraft available, even though this might entail a reduction in the numbers of other ships. Thus there would still be sufficient planes to destroy the enemy main forces even after allowance had been made for the casualties inherent in gaining air superiority.

I also challenged the contention that the battleship remained central to the outcome of the "decisive battle." Since combat aircraft had a range far greater than that of 16-inch shells and since the speed of aircraft carriers was greater than that of battleships, the carrier forces would always have freedom of choice on whether to challenge or evade a battle. The battleship could not be decisive because its big guns would never come within range of the enemy.

These arguments were not accepted by the brains of the Navy Department, but did motivate the creation of a study committee on air effectiveness. This committee was authorized to investigate the effectiveness of air attack by using armed bombs and torpedoes. This was the sole fruit of the debate over our proposals, but it was an important one. The data of these experiments provided us with useful information that was later used in drafting the plan of attack against Pearl Harbor.

The training and study theme of the combined fleet in their 1939 and 1940

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exercises was established with the purpose of examining the effectiveness of coordinated air attack. These exercises involved simultaneous attacks with 80 to 100 aircraft in order to investigate the results of a concentrated attack. Dive bombers, torpedo planes, bombers, and combat air patrols were all evaluated in these exercises, and much was learned about attack methods.

During these exercises a problem became apparent. The Navy regarded it as common sense that aircraft carriers had to be dispersed when used, for they were quite vulnerable to enemy attack. Any concentration of these vessels was considered to be extremely dangerous. When this was done, however, it was difficult to rendezvous the various air groups in midocean in preparation for the coordinated attack. It was, of course, no problem to keep together the elements of one carrier's strike force, but when an attempt was made to rendezvous strike forces from several different carriers at a predetermined point in midocean, the results were often unfavorable. Since radio guidance was impossible due to radio silence, only dead reckoning could be used for air navigation. It was indeed a very difficult problem to make dispersal disposition of aircraft carriers compatible with a simultaneous and coordinated attack by many air squadrons.

When I returned to Japan from Britain in October of 1940, I was assigned to be a member of the staff of the First Carrier Squadron. The above problem was one of the most important difficulties for which I had to find a solution. For several weeks I was unable to arrive at any answer. Then, one day, while watching a newsreel, I saw four American aircraft carriers steaming in a column formation. This suggested to me the idea of concentric use of aircraft carriers. According to this method there, of course, would be no problem in the rendezvous of air squadrons launched from each aircraft carrier, but there still remained the possibility of each aircraft carrier being simultaneously exposed to attack by enemy aircraft. On the other hand, there was the advantage that combat air patrol and antiaircraft fire could be concentrated against attacking aircraft.

This concept was repeatedly tested in 1941 by the fleet and was put into practical use in such operations as Pearl Harbor, Indian Ocean, and Midway. If the general conduct of the war offered us the opportunity to utilize these new tactics, there was a good chance that we would be able to draw the enemy towards us and destroy him.

Thus, by the middle of 1941 the First Carrier Squadron had decided on two tactical principles in connection with basic use of its aircraft carrers:

1. In case of attacking land bases, all carriers should be concentrically used.
2. In case of the air-to-air battle between friendly and enemy carriers, the aircraft carriers of each squadron should be concentrated, but each carrier squadron should be dispersed and deployed in order to encircle the enemy force.

These two methods were employed with varying degrees of success during the early war years. Up to the time of the Midway operation, the first method was used exclusively due to the fact that our carriers were unchallenged by large enemy naval air forces. At Midway we should logically have used the second method, but due to faulty intelligence we had no knowledge of the proximity of the American carrier forces. When they were at last discovered, it was too late to shift to the second method. The second method was used, however, in the battles in the South Pacific and the Marianas.

During this period we put forth our utmost effort in training exercises in order that we might compensate to some degree for our inferior ratio of capital ships. While we were engaged in these training exercises, many new ideas

were conceived. The Fleet Air Force, especially, acquired increased skill and obtained excellent results. Just before the outbreak of the war, the pilots of the First Carrier Air Squadron, which later carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor, attained the following levels of proficiency:

Horizontal Bombing:
Altitude: 3,000 meters
Target: BB *Settsu* (old type battleship)
Target Speed: 16-18 knots (free evasive maneuver)
Target Acquisition: 50 percent (with a formation of five aircraft)
Percentage of Hits: 10 percent
Dive Bombing: Against a battleship with high speed and free evasive maneuver
Percentage of Hits: 40 percent
Torpedo Attack: Against a battleship with high speed and free evasive maneuver
Percentage of Hits: Daytime: more than 80 percent
Night: 70 percent

It is impossible to demonstrate with figures the level of skill of our fighter squadrons, but we were quite confident of their ability. Many of them had had actual fighting experience through the China incident, and they were flying our new Zero fighter of superb capability. They were especially proficient in fighter-versus-fighter combat. In the light of the lessons derived from the China incident, our fighters began to be concerned more and more with offensive operations. Up until this time fighters were used almost exclusively for the defense of shore installations or ships of the fleet, but it slowly became apparent that they could also be profitably employed as long-range escorts or in fighter sweeps. Thus our fighters moved away from a solely defensive role.

Our fighter forces, however, were not without their defects. This became apparent when they were called upon to combat the B-17. In these encounters our fighters were handicapped by several shortcomings, including insufficient defensive armor. These weaknesses were due to a great extent to our failure to incorporate the lessons learned from the air warfare in Europe.

Throughout the course of the Pacific War I learned many lessons, and the most important of these was that there are no miracles in war. Success in battle is due to careful planning and preparation. The psychological factor is an essential element of any operation, but it should never be regarded as the central element in military strategy. It is, on the contrary, a so-called "plus factor" alongside material preparation. The idea of covering material shortages with spiritual power should never be seriously considered by military planners.

Sun-tzu, a famous Chinese military writer, wrote in his book on strategy:

> The prospect of a war must be made prior to the start of a war. Victory or defeat depends upon its prospect. If one has [a] sure prospect for victory, he will win. If one has [an] uncertain prospect for it, he will have little chance of victory. If one does not even make [a] prospect, he will have much less chance of victory. Therefore, in [sic] so doing one can foretell the result of the war even without fighting.

This evaluation of war preparations is quite true. Our own navy had an accurate prospect of the Pacific War, but they failed to act upon it in good time. It was clearly understood before the outbreak of the war that the leading role in naval warfare had shifted from

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ship to airplane. The numerical results obtained from our war games and fleet exercises closely corresponded with actual battle results. The navy, however, was hesitant to carry out what was revealed by them.

A second lesson I learned during the war was the necessity of exhibiting boldness when favorable results appear possible. In deciding the policy of an entire nation, one must take into account the possibility of a temporary retreat or change in plans, for certainly the fate of a nation should not depend upon a game of chance. However, the first-line forces should be willing to take chances and even attack an enemy who outnumbers them if they see a reasonable prospect of victory. It is not always possible to win every battle, but by holding back one may miss an important chance of victory.

The idea of the "diminution operation" unfortunately had the effect of discouraging our units from participating in any naval engagement until the main forces were ready for the decisive battle. By failing to attack the enemy audaciously when he first appeared, the navy no doubt missed many opportunities. A military force which conforms to the traditional spirit and boldness can always make a contribution to the security and advancement of the nation in the long run.

My third lesson was that wars should always be short. By 1945 Japan had been at war for 14 years. Her armies had been in conflict from the Manchurian incident of 1931 until the final surrender, and they were physically and emotionally exhausted. The use of military forces over a long period of time detracts from their morale and their efficiency. When it is necessary from a standpoint of national policy to resort to arms, the force used must be used quickly and decisively, like an arrow shot from a strong bow.

Sun-tzu also wrote:

> A prolonged war never benefit[s] a country. Those who can not realize how harmful a war is do not know how to profit from war.
>
> . . . . .
>
> Remain composed like a big mountain when [you desire] not to move but move like lightning when [you desire] to move.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Gen. Minoru Genda is a graduate of the Japanese Imperial Naval Academy, class of 1924, and the Imperial Naval Staff College. Earlier in his career he served on the carriers *Adagi* and *Ryujo*, and from 1938 to 1940 he was Assistant Naval Attache for Air at the Japanese Embassy in London. As Air Operations Officer of the First Carrier Squadron and First Fleet he did the air planning for the Pearl Harbor strike. He later participated in the Coral Sea battle as Air Group Commander on the carrier *Zinkaku*, and from 1942 to 1944 he was assigned to Air Operations Section of the Naval General Staff and Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo. As a captain in the Imperial Navy, he was transferred to the reserve in 1945 but was recalled for duty with the Japanese Self-Defense Force in 1954 where he subsequently served as Commander of the First Fighter Wing, Commander of Japan's Air Defense Command, and Chief of Staff of the Self-Defense Force. General Genda retired from the Self-Defense Force in 1962 and is now serving his second 6-year term in Japan's upper legislation body, the House of Councilors.

OUR NAVIGABLE WATERS

— — POLLUTED AND OTHERWISE

The increase in recreational watercraft has aggravated the problem of water pollution in our coastal waters. In this article an officer of the U.S. Coast Guard examines the various aspects of the pollution problem and the measures that can be taken to control it—by wisely employing the measures of control we now have available, it should be possible to produce a noticeable improvement in our waterways in the immediate future.

An article prepared by

Lieutenant Commander Charles W. Koburger, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard

From the earliest colonial days, our navigable waters have served functions essential to the Nation's safety and economic well-being. Our bays and harbors, our Great Lakes, and our coastal and inland waterways are now used daily by thousands of commercial vessels, foreign and domestic, from ocean liners to tankers to barges to fishing boats. Naval vessels steam these waters, as do ships of the Coast Guard, the Corps of Engineers, and other public agencies. Recreational watercraft of all conceivable sizes also ply these waters—impressive evidence of our material prosperity.

As in other spheres of American life, the achievement of affluence has not been without expense to the quality of our natural environment. In and on the water, this cost is pollution. The threat to our navigable waters through pollution from vessels of all description is a formidable one.

Clean Water. The Water Quality Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-234), now part of the basic Federal water pollution control law, was enacted "to enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution." Congress unanimously passed the Water Quality Act and, under its provisions, for the first time, specific clean-water objectives became possible. Under it, the states were permitted to plan their own specific water quality goals and to set time schedules for cleaning up their waters. The new law was especially designed, in fact, to allow the many economic and social interests in the states to determine jointly how available waters could be shared to fulfill all their various legitimate needs: recreation and aesthetics, fish and wildlife, municipal water supply, industry, agriculture, and maritime navigation.

Once determined, the act calls for the states to submit their proposed standards, including criteria, plan and implementation, and enforcement, to the U.S. Department of the Interior—specifically, to its Federal Water

Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA)—for review and approval. Once approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the standards are legally enforceable by both State and Federal governments. Enforcement of standards by either authority applies only to *interstate* waterways, however. (Federal law offers a financial bonus grant incentive for treatment works discharging into waters for which standards have been set, whether *intra* or *interstate.*)

Water quality standards include three essentials:

1. **Water Uses.** As required by the law, the states held public hearings to determine water uses desired for and appropriate to each stretch of their interstate and coastal waters. In most cases, several desired uses applied to the same stretch of water. Standards were set so as to permit the highest agreed use, thus requiring other users to bring their waste treatment up to this standard. After the hearings, state pollution control officials made the final decision.

2. **Criteria.** Once uses were chosen, state authorities, in consultation with scientists, engineers, and other water experts, decided what substances and how much of each the waterway could absorb—and still be fit for the desired uses. These limits (in the act called "criteria") are expressed in terms of ranges or critical levels for such as suspended solids, heat biochemical oxygen demands, coliform count, toxic material, et cetera.

3. **Implementation Plan.** After deciding uses and scientific criteria, state pollution control officials and technical experts surveyed municipal, industrial, and other wastes flowing into the waters to decide what type of treatment these wastes required to protect or improve the receiving waters. Then the authorities developed specific, detailed plans to produce the desired water quality.

Municipal and Industrial Wastes. The most common means of pollution control consists of a system of sewers and waste water treatment plants. The sewers collect waste water from homes, businesses, and many industries and deliver it to treatment plants designed to make it fit for reuse or discharge into receiving streams. Man-made treatment processes may be mechanical, biological, or chemical in nature. In each case they speed up the natural processes by which water purifies itself.

Primary treatment, a mechanical process, removes solids which will float or settle out of water. Called clarification or sedimentation because it "clears" the water of some of its turbidity (cloudiness from suspended solids), primary treatment is the first step. If the waste water is then to be discharged directly to a receiving stream, the last step is chlorination to reduce the number of disease-causing bacteria in the water. Primary treatment removes only about 40 percent of the organic matter in waste water. The resulting effluent, if discharged to a stream, may still cause great harm. For example, the effluent may use up most or all of the stream's oxygen supply just to decompose the remaining waste.

Secondary treatment is a biological process which duplicates nature's purification method by using bacteria to decompose organic matter in the waste water. More bacteria are used, and conditions are controlled, however, to speed up treatment. Secondary treatment can remove an additional 40 to 50 percent of the original organic matter in the waste water, giving an 80 to 90 percent efficiency for a primary-secondary plant. The final step in secondary treatment also is effluent chlorination.

Tertiary treatment is necessary in large metropolitan and/or heavily industrialized areas. Tertiary treatment, essentially a chemical process, assumes the primary-secondary steps but goes

beyond them. It may include chemical treatment in the following sequence: coagulation-sedimentation for additional solids removal (and over 90 percent reduction of phosphate concentration); filtration to remove all remaining turbidity, and absorption to remove over 98 percent of the organic matter which resists normal biological treatment. If a reduction in dissolved salts is required, electrodialysis may be the final step. Electrodialysis is generally used only if the water will be reused for municipal or special industrial purposes. With complete treatment, these further steps can remove an additional 9 percent of the original organic matter remaining, bringing total efficiency of the combined methods to 99 percent.

Obviously, none of these three processes stand alone. They must be used in combinations designed to handle each particular pollution control situation.

Properly planned, these processes can produce any degree of pollution control desired. Water produced after full treatment is of a quality suitable for any desired reuse—including water for drinking.

Other Effluents. Thus far, we have dealt with measures directed primarily towards conventional wastes such as domestic sewage or pollutants generated by industrial processes. As these wastes come under control, the more diffuse sources will increase in relative significance. Water quality deterioration resulting from such sources as spills and wastes from ships and other vessels will become more noticeable. It is these nonpoint marine-related sources which are here referred to as other effluents.

There necessarily will be wide variations among other effluents in the time and manner in which their control will be required. In contrast to conventional forms of pollution for which standards require specific remedial actions within specified time periods (generally over a 5-year period), standards are less specific with regard to these nonpoint sources. The fundamental difficulty in developing water quality standards to cover other effluents is that to date there has been little effort to quantify the pollutional effects, the cures, and the prevention costs associated with such problems.

Wastes from Waterborne Vessels. In the light of the Nation's stated resolve to restore and enhance the quality of our water, we cannot afford to ignore the wastes which issue from our waterborne vessels. Indeed, logic alone demands that both efforts proceed in tandem. The ports, estuaries, straits, and channels which see heavy maritime traffic usually are located in areas of heavy population concentration. It makes little sense to expect cities and industries along these waters to clean up their own waste discharges only to have the water remain polluted by discharges from watercraft.

The problem is widespread. Vessels, mobile, may trigger local pollution at any point along their path. Tank and freight ships are larger than they used to be. So are barges. They carry more varied cargoes such as chlorine gas, crude oil and its refined products of gasoline or oils, organic chemicals and pesticides which, if spilled, persist for long periods of time to poison fish and change the whole ecology of a river, estuary, or lake. Many commercial fishing vessels are now designed as floating canneries; both canning wastes and crew sanitary wastes are discharged directly overboard wherever they operate.

A recent (1967) FWPCA study of the pollution resulting from watercraft in the navigable waters of the United States—the only one available—has produced the following findings:

1. Approximately 46,000 documented commercial vessels, 65,000 nondocumented commercial fishing vessels, 1,500 Federal vessels, and eight million recreational watercraft use the navigable waters of the United States. In addition,

about 40,000 foreign ship entrances are recorded each year for these waters.

2. The pollutants that are routinely discharged from vessels, and which degrade the waters to which they are discharged, include sewage, oils, litter, bilge water, ballast water, wash waters, and chemicals. There are also accidental cargo spills. Sewage may contain dangerous concentrations of pathogenic organisms that cause diseases such as dysentery, shigellosis, typhoid or paratyphoid fevers, gastroenteritis, and infectious hepatitis. Ballast waters may contain oils and may be grossly polluted, dangerous to public health, and highly objectionable in appearance and odor.

3. Vessel sewage is discharged to waters of the United States from commercial vessels, both United States and foreign, at an estimated rate (occupancy rate) equivalent to 199,000 persons; from federally operated watercraft, 144,000; and from the perhaps 1,300,000 recreational watercraft which are toilet equipped, 170,000. This estimated total waste discharged from all watercraft—which may be somewhat high—thus in any case approximates the wastes from a city of 500,000 people.

4. In most instances, untreated sewage is discharged from watercraft just as it has been since the beginning of navigation.

5. Watercraft pollution can thus be a serious economic and health threat to many water-use areas in the United States. Ships and boats may defile such critical areas as those used for body contact water sports, drinking water supplies, shellfish beds, and recreational lakes where organic wastes and nutrients foster algal nuisances and accelerate eutrophication. Such pollution can be grossly offensive and may adversely affect shoreline real estate and other property values.

6. Beyond these most flagrant on-the-scene abuses of the waters, pollution caused by vessels is often transient. Raw sewage and ballast water may be disgorged by a commercial vessel on the high seas today, only to foul the bathing beaches of Cape Cod, Miami, Galveston, or Big Sur tomorrow.

7. Some 279,000 persons serve aboard the 1,500 federally operated watercraft. Generally, these 1,500 watercraft do not have pollution control devices. As in the case of other sources of pollution, the Federal establishment has a special responsibility to show leadership by establishing effective programs to remedy this situation.

Local estimates of pollution by human wastes from all waterborne vessels range from 0.2 percent of the drainage basic population to as high as 1 to 5 percent in certain locations. But these are just averages. The threat from recreational watercraft, for instance, is concentrated on weekends, holidays, and at vacation periods. Thus, while the average pollution potential of just recreational watercraft is approximately equal only to that of a city of 170,000 people, the pollution potential on a foul winter's day during the middle of the week may be almost zero, and that on a fair holiday weekend during the summer may be many times greater. Pleasure craft congregating for a weekend's fun may suddenly impose a load of untreated wastes equivalent to that of a good-sized town, and this in one small area.

Harbors, lakes, and other heavily used navigable waters differ, of course, in their physical and hydrographic characteristics and, in turn, in their characteristics from the pollution control standpoint. A narrow-necked harbor, for example, may vary greatly from a relatively open bay or a wide estuary in terms of capacity to assimilate wastes without adverse consequence to other beneficial uses. In given areas, therefore, vessel pollution may assume critical importance at an early stage; on other areas vessel pollution may be hidden by other discharges or so dispersed by tide

and current that it appears to be less critical. But the problem remains.

Oil Pollution. The problem of water pollution from oil spills and its destructive potential was dramatized by the *Torrey Canyon* disaster in March 1967, when that tanker ran aground off the coast of England, spilling into the seas the 119,000 tons of crude oil she was carrying. Oil spills, as well as the careless or accidental release of other hazardous materials to streams or in coastal areas, have long been of concern to water pollution authorities. The results can be serious: fish kills and harm to other marine wildlife; major aesthetic (and economic) damage.

Oil pollution arises from many sources. Major sources include ships and other vessels, pipelines, shoreside facilities (terminals), and offshore oil rigs. Coping with these largely accidental pollution incidents requires an extensive surveillance program, alerting systems, reaction capability, and a contingency fund for cleanup purposes.

Cleaning up an oil-contaminated area is time consuming, difficult, and costly. The British Government, for example, reportedly is trying to recover $8 million from the owners of the *Torrey Canyon* for cleanup costs. This does not take into account the cleanup costs to local governments and private agencies. The eventual real cost may reach $25 million. The total direct costs of cleaning up and of preventing our own oil pollution problems have not been worked out, but an oil spill is enormously expensive. The indirect costs—whether commercial, recreational, or aesthetic—are difficult to estimate but they unquestionably are also tremendous.

Oil slicks move under the influence of wind and current. Wind is the dominant factor with fresh spills on open water. Such a slick usually moves at a speed of 2 to 4 percent of the wind velocity and, in the Northern Hemisphere, slightly to the right of the direction in which the wind is blowing. In the Southern Hemisphere, the movement is to the left of the wind direction. In the absence of wind, in places such as rivers, and perhaps for older, heavier spills, current will tend to exercise greater control of a slick's movement.

A rough estimate of the amount of heavy oil on the water can be made from the appearance of the slick. A barely discernible slick indicates 25 gallons per square mile (gpsm). A silvery sheen indicates about 50 gpsm. Faint colors in the slick indicate 100 gpsm. Bright bands of color indicate 200 gpsm. At a concentration of 600 gpsm a slick turns a dull brown. A dark-brown slick indicates 1,300 gpsm.

Large crude oil slicks sometimes combine with water to form a gelatinous emulsion called "chocolate mousse." The mixture may be as much as 70 percent water. Sea agitation of some types of crude oil will create this water-in-oil emulsion.

When "chocolate mousse" is deposited on a beach it tends, because of its sticky consistency, to stay on the surface of the sand. Oil, on the other hand, depending on its consistency, may penetrate the beach. In either case, cleanup usually involves physical removal—although the deeper the oil penetrates the sand the more difficult the cleanup problem becomes.

A short composite summary of the priority of attack on oil spills—actual or potential—runs as follows:

1. Salvage of the ship (if one is involved) or at least as much of her cargo as possible. Otherwise limit the spill at the source. After this, as necessary:

2. Containment of what has spilled by use of static and towable booms or other barriers.

3. Removal of the oil from the water surface by physically picking it up (skimming or pumping) or by sinking,

burning, or chemically dispersing it.

4. Shore cleanup, using straw, sawdust, polymers, or other sorbents; perhaps chemicals; and/or variety of engineer equipment to adsorb/absorb, wash, sandblast, burn, steam, and scrape.

An important factor in almost any oil spill is the potential fire hazard. Distilled petroleum products, such as gasoline, benzene, and naphtha are the most flammable. These lighter petroleum products spread quite rapidly on water and, because of their high volatility, evaporate quickly. In open water, where no fire hazard is involved, wind and water action usually result in reasonably fast dispersal and no cleanup action need be taken. Near a tanker, pier, terminal area, or other location where the fire danger is serious, spills of such products are usually contained and fire-preventive foam spread on the surface of the slick. Subsequent evaporation removes the slick. The foam returns to a liquid state and it dissipates. Alternatively, chemical oil dispersants may be applied, for safety.

Heavier oil products rarely present as serious a fire hazard since their higher ignition point makes them more difficult to set ablaze. After a short period on the water, crude oil is difficult to ignite and attempts to burn off crude slicks in the open sea are usually unsuccessful. The volatile fractions evaporate, leaving a heavy, sticky residue. This residue—gluey, persistent—is a prime pollution offender, however.

The Federal Effort. In September 1968, the five Federal agencies most concerned with oil pollution—Interior; Transportation; Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare: and the Office of Emergency Preparedness—published a jointly agreed to National Multi-agency Oil and Hazardous Materials Contingency Plan. Under this plan, all significant spills are monitored and reported. Where other Federal response actions are required—because no one else can or will take the proper measures—they will be taken.

A Federal spill response can be divided into five phases, elements of any of which can be concurrent:

1. Discovery of the spill, notification by whatever means, and classification.
2. Containment and countermeasures, as appropriate and when necessary.
3. Cleanup and disposal of the pollutant, avoiding further damage to the environment.
4. Long-term restoration of the environment, insofar as practicable.
5. Recovery of damages and law enforcement; costs will be recovered from the spiller and legal penalties will be imposed.

Under this plan, as amended, for most spills on our navigable waters except those caused by U.S. public vessels or federally-controlled facilities, the U.S. Coast Guard will provide an on-scene commander who initiates and directs all Federal response actions. (The exceptions—the Navy, for instance—provide their own on-scene commander.) In general, however, the spiller himself will be encouraged to

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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take the corrective action and actually carry out the cleanup, under supervision.

The Coast Guard as well as the Navy and other Federal maritime agencies are also already taking measures to clean up their own problems. Extensive research is being devoted toward the development of adequate onboard sewage disposal systems for all sizes of ships, large and small. At all shore facilities where required, i.e., where the facilities cannot be tied into regular municipal sewage systems, sewage treatment plants are being installed. Intensive education and training aimed at pollution prevention is being undertaken, especially in those areas involving the handling of oil. The rest is a matter of time, money, personnel, and authority.

Other Measures. Three areas of marine-related activity not yet touched on—all of them technical in character—have considerable potential for helping prevent, control, and/or abate further pollution of our waters; all are receiving attention:

1. **Ship design and construction.** Such factors as the location, dimensions, and structural protection of a vessel's oil compartments: the size, freeboard, speed, stability, and maneuverability of a vessel; and even the location of the wheelhouse are important to accident prevention and spill minimization. The larger the tanker, the greater the threat, for instance. Various features of ship construction are already subject to control by government, industry, and the insurance-connected classification societies.

2. **Ship movement.** The best of individual ship navigation practice by properly trained and licensed masters and crews; the exercise of more positive control over the movement of oil and hazardous cargoes; the development of new and the expansion of existing recommended ship traffic lanes, at least in congested areas; and the establishment of some form of shore-based maritime traffic guidance system would all work to increase ship safety.

3. **Cleanup capability.** The methods and hardware required for an adequate overall spill cleanup system have yet to be developed. Our spill cure capability is much better in quiet waters than in open sea, but both areas require improvement. Extensive research and development is underway by both Government and industry.

The Coast Guard thus plays a major role in the detection, investigation, and reporting of marine pollution violations, cleanup of oil spills when required, and surveillance both for enforcement and cleanup purposes. It establishes merchant vessel design safety standards, carries out merchant vessel safety inspections, documents and licenses merchant personnel. It establishes navigation procedures. It is responsible for research and development to prevent and "cure" offshore spills. It also helps formulate area contingency plans, organizing local responses to potential marine pollution incidents. For each of these tasks the Coast Guard is well qualified by its personnel, material resources, and experience.

Conclusion. The need to control the excessive and mostly unnecessary pollution of our navigable waters has been before the public for some years. Most of the means required to stop this degradation of our water and to begin enhancing this resource over the total range of beneficial public uses are now either in hand or can be secured through legislative and other measures. Much new legislation is in fact being enacted.

Marine-related pollution is just one of the sources of the problem, but nonetheless a significant one. Oil, sewage, litter, and other marine wastes will receive ever increasing pressure now and in the future. Spills will be avoided, or fought.

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This all means that our waterways should become gradually cleaner over the next 5 to 10 years, with improvements showing by 1972. It is not too soon.





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For several years prior to August of 1968, it appeared that Soviet foreign policy was undergoing a "mellowing" in its attitude toward the West. This viewpoint needs to be reexamined in the light of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. This act coupled with the Soviet's handling of its Eastern European relations confirm that the leadership in Moscow views its foreign affairs with a "Stalinist" syndrome and could manipulate tensions in international politics to compensate for its domestic rigidities.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AS REFLECTED IN THE HUNGARIAN AND CZECHOSLOVAK CRISES

A research paper prepared by

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INTRODUCTION

There exists voluminous documentation concerning the international relations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Communist reluctance to divulge matters considered even remotely related to state security has not hindered the many students of Soviet diplomacy. Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, in particular, have provided a wealth of unclassified material on socialism, Communist government, world communism, peaceful coexistence, et cetera. From these and other sources a deep and penetrating anaylsis of the modus operandi and the goals and interests of Soviet foreign policy can be made.

The Hungarian Revolution provided a fertile field for research. It was the crucible in which the ideological trappings of Soviet foreign policy could be stripped away and the essential ingredients of response to a very real and pressing crisis revealed. The haste with which Moscow was compelled to react to the events transpiring in Hungary did not allow lengthy Marxist/Leninist explanations. Czechoslovakia, however, attempted its humanizing liberalization under the aegis of fellow socialist states but gradually lost their support as summer waned. The ruling Soviet leaders were able to marshal ideological and military forces at each stage of the Dubcek reformation. By the time of the final failure to recant, the case for intervention was solid and explicit. The invasion, however, was not predicted by me or, to my knowledge, any other Western observer. We watched mesmerized as each successive power play to force Dubcek to reverse the direction of democratic socialism failed. Our optimism was based on the facts that it was 1968, and Stalin had been dead for 15 years. The West had come to believe that the Soviets had mellowed and grown more cautious during the intervening years. We had forgotten the lessons of history; Hungary, the Berlin Wall, and Cuba.

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I write this paper to call attention to the realities of Soviet foreign policy as I view them. The passing years, technological progress, and the growing number of aware youth to the contrary, this adversary is as dangerous as the one we recognized in Stalin. The erosion of ideological fervor and the diminution of world communism's legitimacy as well as its appeal are not matters for unrestrained optimism. The danger and threat of miscalculation in a domestic or foreign adventure embarked upon to relieve the pressure of internal dissension could well lead to a serious confrontation with the United States. In this thermonuclear environment, such a meeting could be catastrophic.

The implications of Soviet foreign policy as presented in this paper will hopefully be clear. Peaceful coexistence remains a vital necessity, but peace can only come under present conditions when one great power is deterred from adventuresome exploits by the credible power of the other. Some of the wishful thinking of the past must be recognized as illusory in the light of international relationships reflected by the Soviet Union in the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises.

I—AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

> What we are up against is the heavy swell of an unknown sea which we are just entering from behind the cape that protected us. . . . We are, at this very moment, passing through an age of transition.
>
> Teilhard de Chardin

Background. Faced with the imperative of delving into Soviet intentions, Winston Churchill was compelled to state that Soviet foreign policy was, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."[1] The task appears no easier after 20-odd years of delving. It may be safe to conjecture that the formulation of foreign policy in the light of contrary events is as onerous for the Soviet diplomat, political scientist, or ideological theorist, despite the long and frequent contemplative vigils before the altar of Marxism/Leninism, as it is for the current new administration in the United States. To add to the dimensions of the problem, there have been immense changes in the world since World War II.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suffered catastrophic disasters to population, commerce, and industry at the hands of the Nazi invader but has made a remarkable postwar recovery. Today her power is eclipsed only by the United States. Despite this lofty position, relative to friend and foe alike, the Soviet Union is beset by schism and heresy. Once respectful, grateful, and obedient fraternal neighbors have rejected the primacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and have impudently struck off on their own. Some have even dared open conflict. In the light of this paradox, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy from its meteoric rise from revolution and civil war to its present position as a great power beset by internal difficulties is in order.

Characteristics. What are the essential ingredients of Soviet diplomacy, and who makes the decisions? The U.S.S.R. is somewhat unique among sovereign states in that neither the Foreign Minister nor Defense Minister is a member of the policymaking body, the Politburo. Foreign policy is, of course, formulated on the advice of these professional experts, but the decisions are taken solely by the 11 Communist Party leaders without formal consultation or participation by these professionals.[2]

Malcolm Mackintosh has enunciated six characteristics of Soviet diplomacy. The first principle upon which decisions

are made is the survival of the Soviet Union as a state and superpower with some degree of parity with the United States. This is the sine qua non of both foreign policy and Communist ideology. Historically, the Soviet Union has come to bipolar terms with the world's strongest powers. This tactic is pursued to avoid miscalculation and military clash and to ensure her great power status. This status can be enhanced by the possibilities of great power deals and/or joint action to control mutually dangerous crises.

Secondly, a military-strategic confrontation with the United States is to be avoided. All that has been built in the past 50 years is jeopardized by such foolhardiness. Third, foreign commitments are to be sought only in those cases where the armed forces have the reasonable capability to fulfill them. Fourth, some degree of Communist ideology must be injected into diplomacy both to direct the world movement and to counter ideological threats from China, Albania, et cetera. The fifth major objective, the general increase in Soviet political influence and prestige throughout the world, must be consistent with the first two premises. In a clash between survival and ideology or prestige, survival always comes foremost. Peaceful coexistence can be viewed in this light as a temporary expedient to enhance survival at the relative expense of ideology, prestige, and time. Finally, the Soviet Union pursues an active role as a great power in the United Nations. As a permanent member of the Security Council, her rank and influence are preserved with the proviso that decisions which run counter to national or ideological interests will be rejected.[3]

Raymond Garthoff has found the pursuit of success the keynote of Soviet policymaking and her concept of the balance of power. "Success is especially important in Bolshevik policy, since there can be but one correct line at any time."[4] This pragmatic approach allows policymakers to adopt new courses of action and new sets of alternatives after the collapse and failure of original guidelines. Further, "the Marxian scientific character of the calculation of the relation of forces is quite limited to the degree of fallibility of the calculator . . ."[5] This theory explains the miscalculations of Trotsky, Stalin, Khrushchev, and perhaps even the collective leadership of today. Success is the epitome; failure creates new policies and policymakers.

Vernon Aspaturian claims that Soviet foreign policy, like that of any other country, is "not simply the sum total of its avowed intentions, no matter how sincerely and devotedly they are adhered to, but must depend upon the capacity, in the present or in the future, to carry out its intentions."[6] Stalin fully appreciated the ability to do what one attempted as the heart of the matter. "In order to transform the world it is necessary to have political power . . . as a lever of change."[7] When confronted with the threat of an opposing ideology, the Roman Catholic Church, he deprecatingly questioned the number of divisions the Pope had. Power was the key to success. Friend and foe alike understood its implications. Little could be obtained by bargaining or blustering without this prime ingredient. The voluntaristic and deterministic aspects of Soviet foreign policy are neither fixed nor stable, but in a state of continual and deliberate flux.[8] The application of power, be it economic or military, is a necessary component to be added or subtracted to maintain the balance. Albin Anderson considers power politics the quintessence of Soviet diplomacy.[9]

Foreign policy cannot be planned; it must be dynamic, flexible, purposive. It must never be static or rigid, for this would be the first sign of failure. Soviet foreign policy, like its ideological base, Marxism/Leninism, is "dialectics, mean-

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ing that it can always digest new contradictions."[10] There are various schools of thought regarding guidelines to analyze the barometer of apparently vacillating Soviet diplomacy. Some study it as the eclectics of pragmatic responses. Khrushchev himself, however, said "Politics cannot tolerate indulgence, it must be logical and consistent."[11] And he was believed the most pragmatic of all Soviet leaders. Events of the past 8 years tend to deal harshly with the pragmatic answer as perhaps oversimplistic and inconclusive.

Theories. William Glaser has analyzed all the multifaceted approaches to the study of Soviet foreign policy and has concluded that about a dozen theories have been expounded to explain Soviet behavior.[12] The first and perhaps the most simple of the theories is Communist ideology. Soviet politicians and diplomats never tire of demonstrating that Marxism/Leninism is the sole raison d'etre of their foreign policy. The philosophy of Marx and Engels, massaged by Lenin and Stalin, permeates all political treatises. In its modern context communism is indeed pragmatic in its acceptance of the real world—the status quo ante revolution—and the resultant necessity for peaceful coexistence between states of different social systems. It predicts class warfare, struggle, and the eventual dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx, however, did not envision the real world of 1969. He could not imagine capitalism and communism coexisting; the collapse of one and the concomitant growth of the other were essential and inevitable.

> The natural differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation on one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nations vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.[13]

Many regard the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, in the light of their actions and declarations, as part of the strategy of Communist world revolution. Marx had predicted struggle between the competing systems and the inevitable and irreversible victory of communism. Communism, therefore, was regarded as monolithic, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) an organic part but neither predominant over nor subordinate to the theme of world revolution. The CPSU was merely a primus inter pares in relation to other Communist Parties.

> The CPSU does not lead other parties. There are no superior and subordinate parties in the communist movement. All the communist parties are equal and independent, all are responsible for the destiny of the communist movement, for its setbacks and victories . . . The role of the Soviet Union does not lie in leading the other socialist countries, but in being the first to blaze the trail to socialism . . ..[14]

John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State in the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, suspected Soviet intentions under the banner of world

communism. He viewed Stalin and later Soviet leaders as directing the imposition of world revolution by means legal and illegal. Stalin and Khrushchev were embodiments of duplicity and disciples of subversion. This, too, was the view of Senator Joseph McCarthy in his Communist witch hunts and preoccupation with subversion. In its most current form this theme permeates the ultra-right wing factions in the United States, e.g. the John Birch Society. The tendency toward multipolarity, signified by the many centrifugal forces at work in the world during the sixties, has somewhat eroded this position.[15] The Sino-Soviet rift and the inclination to pursue socialism at one's own pace and by one's own inclination demonstrated by several East European countries are concrete examples of the decline of the monolithic view of world communism.

Vladimir I. Ulyanov, later known as V.I. Lenin, added to Marx the ingredients of foreign policy directives. Addressing the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920, he defined the aim of Soviet diplomacy as a struggle to create, "entirely different international relations, enabling all the oppressed nationalities to get rid of imperialist oppression."[16] Lenin viewed alliances among capitalist countries as political maneuverings prior to war or outgrowths of wars just concluded. These alliances provided breathing spaces separating conflicts and offered no hope for peace but only a peaceful struggle preparatory to new hostilities. "The striving for world supremacy, the highest degree of militarization, the gambling nature of foreign policy, the trampling upon the generally recognized standards of international law—all this is inherent in imperialism. . . ," he stated.[17] Lenin concluded with a plea for world revolution to finally rid mankind of these horrible wastes of talent and energy. He pledged Soviet support to all who would revolt, but his urgings fell on deaf ears. Instead, he was himself forced to seek a humiliating treaty with Germany and thereby laid the framework for later doctrines of "socialism in one country" and "peaceful coexistence." Unshaken by this temporary reversal he declared, "There is no doubt that the socialist revolution in Europe should come, and it will come. All our hopes for final victory of socialism are founded on this conviction and on this scientific prediction."[18] For this belief Lenin was willing to take a step backward to take two steps forward at a later date.

> Indeed it is obviously impossible to free oneself completely until world-wide capitalism has been overthrown. . . . In other words, the basic principle of our tactics is not now which of two imperialisms is it now more advantageous to help, but rather, how most surely and reliably to assure for the socialist revolution the possibility to consolidate itself or how to maintain itself in one country until other countries join it. But if the concrete state of affairs is such that the existence of the socialist republic is endangered at the given moment because of violation of the rights of self determination of several nations (Poland, Lithuania . . .), then, obviously the interests of the preservation of the socialist republic stand higher.[19]

Peaceful coexistence, according to Karl Radek, was regarded by Lenin as the lesser of two evils, a temporary expedient until a more favorable policy could be adopted. The Russo-German alliance at Rapallo (April 16, 1922) served the immediate needs of Russia to reenter the European balance of power against the victors of World War I, England and France. It also served the purpose of splitting world capitalism further apart, but Lenin's hoped-for revolution remained illusory.

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Ideology offers to the Soviets a foundation, a starting point, a source of inspiration. In a society which disdains religion and repudiates the spiritual, a substitute—a deus ex machina—must be provided to win over the masses. The ideology of communism is the cult, the bible, and the tradition. It must inspire to great deeds and sacrifice; it, too, must teach and reward. But in this world of transition "the ideological ingredient tends to compound and confuse the already hazardous task of interpreting Soviet foreign policy. Just as no explanation of Soviet policy can afford to ignore ideology, so would it be the height of naiveté to accept all ideological pronouncements at face value."[20]

Glaser's second school of thought considers the Soviet Union as an extension of traditional Russian national expansionism and imperialism. President Harry S. Truman, his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill tended to regard Soviet leaders, in particular Josef Stalin, as latter-day czars. "In terms of European memories, the menace of Russia under Communists has come to be seen rather like the menace of Russia under the czars—which is to say that it has come to be seen as a normal, rather than an extraordinary menace."[21] In Winston Churchill's statement regarding the riddle of Soviet foreign policy, he added in a not-so-often quoted passage, "But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." History has dealt kindly with this explanation of Soviet international activities.[22] Friedrich Engels—which possibly explains his subordinate role on the Soviet ideological totem—wrote in 1890,

> . . . the Russian Czarist empire forms the greatest fortress . . . because its mere passive existence already constitutes a threat and danger to us . . . it blocks and disturbs our normal development through its ceaseless intervention in Western affairs, intervention aimed moreover at conquering geographical positions which will secure it the mastery of Europe. . . .[23]

William G. Andrews continues the comparison of modern and prerevolution Russia to include the similarity of the degree of state intervention in the economy, the state-imposed limitations on the exercise of personal and political freedom, state secretiveness, suspicion of foreigners, controls exercised by the secret police, obsession with the need for industrialization, governmental centralization of agriculture by means of the collectivist mir and kolkhoz, state farms and crown lands, Communist messianism in place of pan-Slavic, Russian Orthodox messianism. Names change, but facts remain.[24]

Vaclav Benes highlights the traditional Russian anxiety for her western borders. This anxiety has been manifested over the years by Russia's efforts to prevent any potential enemy or strong political power from establishing itself in Eastern Europe and using the area as a springboard for attacks upon Mother Russia herself. Since the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Government has focused her security designs upon the Danubian-Balkan region which in earlier days the czars had exploited in competition with other European powers. The creation of the Warsaw Treaty and COMECON (or CEMA—the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, East Europe's Common Market) reflects the double intention of Soviet foreign policy to tie Eastern Europe securely to the U.S.S.R. by the skillful exploitation of economic resources and division of labor and revive the age-old ambition to secure militarily her exposed and vulnerable flanks.[25] This school gives new impetus to the Heartland theory of Mackinder.

Closely allied to "Great Russian Imperialism," but with a slightly different approach, is the view of the

U.S.S.R. as a conventional aggressive state, controlled by an oligarchy of militants. Milovan Djilas is a leading proponent of this conception. The deposed but still vocal Yugoslav former Communist states:

> . . . the ever broader and more ruthless orientation toward Great Russian nationalism . . . has a new, different character here—the character of a bureaucratic, imperialist expansion and domination by the bureaucracy of one nation over other nations . . . bureaucratic elements in the U.S.S.R. who have frozen their privileged position, are attempting to find the solution to the internal crisis in the outside world, that is to hush it temporarily by foreign successes, by exploitation and subordination of other socialist countries.[26]

The U.S. Senate further elaborated:

> As for its [U.S.S.R.] foreign policy there is no reason to believe that a process of evolution [toward] 'normalization' of Soviet relations with the world, is likely . . . on the contrary, it seems at least equally probable that the Soviet leaders . . . will be strengthened in the conviction that the Soviet commitment to the future will be validated.[27]

Max Beloff and Zbigniew Brzezinski affirm this same position.[28] Beloff states, ". . . it remained true that the Soviet government was not just the government of the territorial entity known as 'Russia', it was also a possible nucleus for a world federation of Soviet Socialist Republics." According to Brzezinski the bureaucratic elites will become increasingly bellicose in order to preserve their vested interests and their dogmatic commitment to "a utopian and universalist ideology derived from the 19th century notion that the industrial revolution would follow a uniform global pattern."[29] Hans J. Morgenthau places particular emphasis on the increasing impoverishment of Soviet communism and the decreasing legitimacy of its government. To maintain its position of predominance, the Soviet hierarchy will become more militant with the passing of time; their ideology has become bankrupt before the world; its appeal can no longer be assured. As this position deteriorates, only the success of foreign adventurism can save it from collapse from within. Despite a cautious attitude regarding confrontation with the United States in the past, the regime in the Kremlin may be compelled to accept these risks in the future.

Another view of Soviet foreign policy is espoused by Arnold Toynebee; it is the continuation of the historic conflict between the Byzantine/Orthodox civilization and all other alien cultures. Russian czars viewed themselves down through the ages as the centers of true Christendom and world culture. This thesis explained their messianic impulse to expand Russian influence beyond national boundaries both to increase their imperial domain and draw others into the fold.

Another school of thought holds that the U.S.S.R. in the international arena seeks merely self-preservation and peace; the pursuit of strategic frontiers is merely an exercise in self-defense. Russia has experienced serious threats to national survival too often in history not to consider the vulnerable western frontiers her national Achilles' heel. Robert Strausz-Hupé and John Fisher have analyzed domestic and foreign activities of the czars and Soviets and concluded that these are calculated and coordinated efforts in the strategy of protection.[30] Aid, military assistance, buffer states, and subversion; all are measures to prevent attack. Hitler's

Wehrmacht exposed for the last time the indefensible western border. Eastern Europe in the wrong hands is a dagger pointing at the heart of Russia.

All Soviet military writings stress the defensive nature of the armed forces. "Predatory and grasping purposes are foreign to the Soviet armed forces," states Marshal Sokolovskii. "Soviet military strategy prepares for war to defend the achievements of the workers and crush aggressors; Soviet military doctrine regards war as the inevitable product of imperialism and believes that it will finally disappear only when imperialism dies."[31] Marx long ago stated that "an alliance of workers of all countries will ultimately uproot all wars."[32] Lenin added, "The course of war depends on the workers of the advanced countries to such an extent that it cannot be waged against their will."[33] "Soviet military strategy is completely dependent on the policy of the state . . . national security demands Soviet defenses. In terms of internal conditions the Soviet Union needs no army."[34]

> We do not hold that well known maxim 'offense is the best defense.' It is a maxim that does not suit the Socialist states in principle, for they are peaceable by nature. Ours is different: the best form of defense is to warn the opponent of our strength and readiness to crush him at the very first attempt to commit an act of aggression.[35]

Lenin's bequest, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, is the essential outgrowth of the preoccupation with self-defense. "It is possible to avert a world war by the combined efforts of the mighty Socialist camp, the peace-loving non-Socialist countries, the international working class and all the forces championing peace."[36] Lenin believed the proper arena for the conflict between the different social systems was not war or even diplomacy but the competition of economics. "We need real trade relations, and not only diplomatic victories," peaceful economic competition with capitalism, "benefits us in every respect," he stressed.[37] War was the antithesis of all that communism stood for; a devastating war was totally unnecessary for the revolutionary transformation of the non-Socialist countries.

A sixth theory of Russia's international diplomacy also focuses upon geopolitics but emphasizes the oriental rather than the occidental character of its thrust. Incorporating much of Mackinder's Heartland theory, it raises the consideration of Eurasia as the natural focus of the Soviets. Foreign policy will stress this Drang nach Osten since the absence of physical barriers and the vast emptiness of the East beckon unmistakingly. Stalin himself, both in his manner of operation and administration, as well as his lust for conquest, revealed the ruthless character of an oriental absolute despot. He was well aware of Russia's indefensible west and the contribution "East of the Urals" made to the defeat of Hitler. Siberia was more than a wasteland for political unreliables; it was a pearl of great value that had to be rediscovered and cultivated.

Robert Kenner and several maritime-oriented political scientists compose another school which views Russia's historic urge to the sea, her perennial quest for warm weather ports and their protection, once obtained, as the natural inclination of a maturing great power. These scholars and diplomats see the Soviet threat of the future as one maritime in nature. This great power must exercise the prerogatives of its lofty place in the world on both land and sea; without credible seapower her mighty land armies remain landlocked and limited to the continents of Asia and Europe. The increasing importance

attached to the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean is the latest concrete example of Soviet sea-mindedness.

The often diverse psychological patterns exhibited by Soviet leaders have given the psychological school its impetus in the study of Soviet foreign policy. Certainly a study of Stalin can provide a Freudian holiday for a member of this school. Symptoms of paranoia, schizophrenia, the Oedipus complex, and xenophobia were present in varying degrees in that complex personality. The same qualities were present in a greater or lesser extent in the historic figures of the past and perhaps in the present collective leadership.

Others of the psychological school have adopted a broader frame of reference—the mass psychology or national character approach—in analyzing the Soviet leadership. The personal preferences, manner of administration, and peculiar personalities of each leader have provided the empirical data to substantiate their conclusions. They have analyzed and compared diplomatic gestures and actions of the Soviet bureaucracy and have determined that these activities are the reflections of subconscious needs arising from their peculiar national character. Basically, they act the way they do because they are Russian.

The remaining schools of thought are either combinations of those already presented or are not widely held. Several define Soviet foreign policy in a remote and specialized manner such as Hitler's belief that communism was a part of a world Jewish plot. Such efforts are dismissed as improbable or outside the scope of this paper.

Having hastily, and in some cases superficially, dealt with the varied approaches to the study of Soviet foreign policy both as the Soviets themselves view it and as seen by various students of Soviet international behavior, an analysis of specific instances which may have embodied these principles may well be in order. Two events, perhaps more than all others during the postwar period, have dramatized the expressed and implied tenets of Soviet foreign policy. These events tested the theory and the practice of their diplomacy. The events were the interventions by armed forces into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

II—THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS

> But if the concrete state of affairs is such that the existence of the socialist republic is endangered at the given moment because of violation of the rights of self-determination of several nations . . . then, obviously, the interests of the preservation of the socialist republic stand higher.[1]

Background. World events of 1956 shook the resolve, confidence, and optimism of the Soviet Union to its very core. What began as a year of great hope following Khrushchev's attack on the superman of communism, Josef Stalin, and a feeling that perhaps the cold war was about to thaw climaxed in a bitter face-to-face confrontation of giants. Europe and the Middle East became the arenas of world tensions, fears, and frustrations.

The new year arrived in a Hungary in trouble. The existing Communist government of Matyas Rakosi was tottering on the brink of collapse, beset by economic stagnation, student and intellectual unrest, and growing confusion since the public defrocking of world communism's patron saint by the new Soviet leaders. In a desperate effort to restore normalcy and respond to the mounting cries for liberalism, Rakosi embarked on a path of concessions. In February and March amnesties were granted to Archbishop Groesz and a

number of priests aligned with the still imprisoned Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Mindszenty. In May 100 anti-Communists were released from prison, and Archbishop Groesz was given a full pardon. But the clamor for more concessions grew louder. Ex-Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk, admitted espionage agent, pawn of Tito, and deviationist who had been executed in 1949, was retried and found innocent of all charges.[2] In a wave of nationalist sentiment, over 200,000 Hungarians processed past his flag-draped coffin in the center of Budapest. And still the attacks upon the government continued.

Initially, Moscow viewed the dilemma as part of the inherent conflicts on the road to communism. *Pravda* encouraged Budapest's conciliation with the former heretic, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.[3] Ill tidings were soon delivered to the Kremlin, however. In the Budapest May Day Parade, few Russian flags were flown; in fact, the United States Stars and Stripes were in greater evidence. In addition, the usual denouncements of the United States and imperialism were played in very low key. The Hungarian Army announced the removal of barriers on the Austrian border, adding to the general feeling of approaching freedom.

In a final gesture to obtain popular support, Rakosi publicly admitted his previous mistakes but attempted to shift some of the blame to the widely detested secret police chief, Gabor Peter. The Soviets were becoming concerned and dispatched Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov to Budapest to judge the extent of the liberalization program and ascertain the amount of control the government still exercised. He found pressures of explosive proportions. Attacks by university students and intellectuals—especially members of the Petofi Club, named after the 1848 revolutionary poet, Sandor Petofi—were being made almost daily. Rakosi finally acknowledged defeat and resigned as Party First Secretary and Politburo member in July. Deputy Premier Erno Gero assumed the leadership and immediately announced new programs in the hope that the wave of liberalization would soon crest and begin to recede. He proclaimed a cut in the size of the armed forces by 15,000 and a new 5-year program of economic goals—stressing heavy industry at Soviet insistence. Anastas Mikoyan was dispatched by Moscow and arrived unannounced in Budapest to witness new amnesties and pardons—22,000 political prisoners were freed in June alone—and freedom of travel for foreign envoys being proclaimed by the shaky new government.

> Magyars, rise, your country calls you! Meet this hour, whate'er befalls you! Shall we free men be, or slaves? Choose the lot your spirit craves!
>
> Sandor Petofi

Revolt: The New October Revolution. By October the demand for liberalization threatened the very nature of the government, but there were no visible signs yet of an attack on the Communist Party. University students threatened to demonstrate if their demands for a free press, an end to the death penalty, free travel to and from the West, import of Western literature, the abolition of compulsory Marxist/Leninist courses, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops were not met. In contempt of the Gero regime they further demanded the return to power of former Premier Imre Nagy, deposed in 1955 for political leniency. Gero refused, and on 23 October the students demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. Police and students clashed, and soon a full-blown riot was in progress. Gero hastily asked the Soviet troops garrisoned in the city to assist in putting down the uprising. This served to add fuel to the fire; riots spread throughout

the city during the night. Workers preparing for their day's activities witnessed the courageous students battling with the fully armed troops and rushed to their aid. The riot had now become revolution. Carrying the national flag, devoid of Communist emblem, they paraded through the streets, tearing down Communist banners and loudly proclaimed their rights and grievances. In a moment of fury they toppled the huge statue of Stalin from its pedestal in downtown Budapest. They demanded the immediate return to office of Nagy as government radios broadcasted to the world that counterrevolutionaries and bandits were inciting riot throughout Hungary.

Nagy assumed the leadership of government from Andras Hegedus later the same day, but events had moved too quickly for the rioters to cease. Word of the initial success in the capital spread throughout the countryside. All communications from Hungary ceased on the 25th as citizenry and Soviet soldiers fought in hand-to-hand combat in the streets. Hungarian troops refused orders to fire on their countrymen, and, in fact, many joined the ranks of the rioters. Soviet troops too, confused by orders to fire on fellow Communists, refused, and, in fact, many surrendered their weapons and vehicles. The situation was becoming desperate. Soviet tanks and armored vehicles were ordered into the cities to suppress the rioters. Seeing no other choice available, Nagy was forced to rely on these measures and the dreaded Hungarian secret police (A.V.H.) to crush the uprising and restore order to the nation being torn asunder by civil war and rebellion.

President Eisenhower on 24 October denounced the Soviet resort to force to quell the Hungarian uprising but pledged no U.S. intervention. For the United States the revolt came at the worst possible time; NATO forces were in no position to aid the beleaguered Hungarians. In addition, the Middle East was about ready to explode into open conflict. Alarmed by the fast-moving pace of the Hungarian Revolution and Moscow's armed intervention, the United States, France, and Great Britain consulted on the 27th on bringing the matter to the attention of the United Nations Security Council.

Meanwhile the Communist Party of Poland, headed by the then liberal Wladyslaw Gomulka, courageously sided with the rebels in their pursuit of freedom of choice but denounced the counterrevolutionaries who were seemingly gaining control of the revolt. Rumania broke with the U.S.S.R. for the first time and publicly supported the rebels. The Council of Captive European Nations picketed the U.N. in New York demanding action to halt the Soviet intervention and use of force. In Hungary the army voiced for the first time its desire to quit the Warsaw Pact. Thousands left the ranks to join the rebels when no answer was made to their request. Most towns and villages were in open revolt and rapidly falling under rebel control. Nagy's reliance on the Soviets and his secret police was proving to be a disastrous mistake.

> I call revolution the conversion of all hearts and the raising of all hands in behalf of the honour of man.
>
> Karl Marx

A Frustrated United Nations. On 28 October the United States, France, and Great Britain requested the Security Council to meet on the "foreign intervention" by the U.S.S.R. Moscow immediately attacked the Western resolution proposal through its U.N. Ambassador Arkady Sobolev and blamed the West for attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary and inciting the rebellion. Reports of defecting Russian soldiers surrendering weapons and removing their red stars began to reach

the outside world. Matters were becoming critical for both the U.S.S.R. and Hungary.

Nagy invited former political outlaws to join his government and requested all rebels to surrender with guarantees of amnesty to the remaining active Hungarian troops rather than to the Russians or the secret police. Tasting victory and relying on outside assistance to arrive at any moment, the rebels continued to fight despite the Soviet reinforcements rumored pouring into the country. Some seven divisions were thought to be inside Hungary at this time; these divisions were busily engaged in street fighting with the Soviet-trained rebels.

At the U.N. Security Council the resolution calling for the immediate cessation of the Soviet intervention was vetoed; Ambassador Sobolev continued to insist that the matter was of domestic consideration and none of the U.N.'s business. The United States, France, and Great Britain countered by proposing a resolution sending the entire matter to the General Assembly for study. This resolution was approved by a vote of 9 to 1, Yugoslavia abstaining.[4] Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld cabled all member governments to meet on 1 November, but preoccupation with the rapidly escalating events in the Middle East were to prevent his plan for an early consideration of the Hungarian crisis.

In Budapest, Hungarian citizens pleaded in front of the U.S. legation for help in their pursuit of freedom. Propaganda balloons and Radio Free Europe had raised hopes that the United States was eager to assist once their desire for freedom from Soviet domination had been proven.[5] The Republican Party platform of 1952 was eagerly recalled, "The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of the end." John Foster Dulles, in his first public address on 27 January 1953, pledged, "To all those suffering under Communist slavery . . . let us say, you can count on us." Congress, too, resolved on 3 August 1953, "that the Congress commends and encourages the valiant struggle of those captive peoples for freedom."[6]

By the end of the month most of Hungary was in rebel hands. Nagy told his countrymen that the Russians were soon to leave and, in an apparent display of good faith, Russian troops marched out of the capital. This ruse was quickly discarded as reinforcements arrived, and tanks and troops again invaded the city. On 30 October, Nagy decided to cast his lot with the rebels and announced his plans for neutrality. He pledged free elections and an end to the one-party dictatorship as soon as help arrived and peace was restored. As a token of sincerity he released the national hero, Cardinal Mindszenty. Troops of the U.S.S.R. were once more requested to leave the country. The Soviets ignored these requests and forced Nagy to declare Hungary's neutrality and denunciation of the Warsaw Pact. On 1 and 2 November he cabled the U.N. and the Secretary General requesting aid and that Hungary's case be placed on the General Assembly's agenda. The U.S.S.R. responded with a new invasion from the east.

During the first 3 days of November, critical to neutral Hungary, the U.N. debated the events of the Middle East and the invasion of the Suez Canal by Great Britain and France. Israeli troops were by this time well within Egyptian territory and approaching the canal from the east. On 4 November, Nagy reported to the world that Soviet troops were pouring into his country and totaled at least eight divisions—this in total disregard for Hungary's avowed neutrality and break with the Warsaw

Pact.[7] Ambassador Sobolev, in New York, rejected these charges, claiming there were no new troops entering Hungary and that those Soviet troops already inside the country were there solely to remove civilians from the riot areas and assist the many wounded. As he was speaking, Soviet armored units were making futile attempts to seal off all borders to prevent the flight of refugees from the battle zones and Western help from slipping into the country.

The U.N., temporarily freed of the Middle East problem, voted to censure the U.S.S.R. on 4 November by a vote of 9 to 1, Yugoslavia again abstaining. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge proposed an emergency session of the General Assembly to consider Nagy's request for help. Almost at the same time, Nagy made his last desperate appeal for assistance. The General Assembly, called into emergency special session by vote of the Security Council, adopted the original United States, France, and Great Britain resolution requesting the Soviet Union to desist from its armed intervention. The U.S.S.R. paid no attention to the resolution, persisting in its case that the matter was not of concern to the U.N.

Soviet troops completely occupied Budapest on the afternoon of the 4th and attempted to arrest the Nagy government. Radio Budapest sent its last desperate messages for Western assistance and became silent. Cardinal Mindszenty fled to the U.S. Legation and received asylum. Soviet planes bombed the remaining rebel strongholds in the capital, and artillery pounded these same pockets of resistance from well-prepared positions in the suburbs. *Pravda* ended the day with an attack on Nagy as a rebel accomplice and accused him of betrayal of the Hungarian people.

Secretary General Hammarskjöld reported on 5 November that he had just received a cable from the new head of the Hungarian Government, Janos Kadar, stating that the requests from the Nagy regime were invalid and had no legal force. Kadar reaffirmed Hungary's allegiance to the Warsaw Pact and again asked the U.S.S.R. to help quell the disturbances. On the same day, reports of refugees fleeing into Austria made headlines in world newspapers. The Soviets were finding border sealing to be overextending their troops; rebels continued to fight in almost every region despite the superiority of Soviet weaponry. On 6 November, Ambassador Lodge attacked the U.S.S.R. intervention as a "butchery." *Pravda* replied with Party Secretary Suslov's speech on 7 November stating that the effort to unseat socialism in Hungary had failed and that the entire Communist world had closed its ranks. However, in Hungary the rebels bravely and effectively continued the struggle in spite of overwhelming odds and the reluctance of the U.N. and United States to aid them.

Complete pacification of Hungary was not achieved until the final days of the year. It has been estimated that over 20,000 Hungarians were killed in the valiant 2-month quest for freedom. Over 3,000 Soviet soldiers lost their lives. Refugees numbered in the 170,000's; 16,000 deportees were confirmed but were unable to be assisted.[8] The Soviet Union either rejected or disregarded the U.N. recommendations. For her actions, the U.S.S.R. was condemned on 12 December 1956 but even this condemnation appeared to be only provisional since the term "aggressor" was never used.

The Soviet Union employed armed force across an internationally recognized frontier without the authorization of the U.N. Was this aggression, or was the action justified by individual or collective self-defense or by the consent or request of the invaded state? The Kremlin never ceased its claim that the matter was a domestic one and that her actions were sanctioned by the

provisions of the Warsaw Pact Treaty of 14 May 1955—and further approved by request of the Hungarian Government. The Soviet Union never attempted to justify intervention as necessary for self-defense in any of its forms. Despite requests for assistance by both the Gero and Nagy governments and later by the Kadar regime, it cannot be supposed that the entire Hungarian Government at all times supported this request. Nagy, in fact, claimed there was no legality in the Gero request of which he had no part and that he himself on 31 October renounced all Soviet interference and requested their withdrawal. The denial of admission to the U.N. observers also tends to support the allegation of aggression.[9] "... the following may not be used as justification for attack upon another state; the internal position of any state, as for example, any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, disorder or strikes; the establishment or maintenance in any state of any political, economic or social system."[10]

The International Commission of Jurists at The Hague consulted the Soviet Constitution and concluded that the "Soviet intervention in Hungary is direct and indirect aggression according to its own definition of aggression."[11] Condemned for intervention and aggression, the U.S.S.R. nevertheless achieved its purposes. The failure of the United States to confront her on the issue assured its success despite the temporary setback of adverse world opinion and the stigma of United Nations censure.

> Our party ... [bases] its policy in the national question on the right of nations to self-determination, the right of peoples to independent state existence. The party recognized this inalienable right of nations from the moment it came in to being, at its first congress [in 1898] ... a.) emphatic repudiation of every form of coercion in relation to nationalities; b.) recognition of the equality and sovereignty of peoples in determining their destinies; c.) recognition of the principle that a durable union on peoples can be achieved only on the basis of cooperation and voluntary consent; ...[12]

> ... the very existence and progress of the Soviet State and the other Socialist countries [is] the true content of the Leninist plan for remaking international relations, for transforming them by demonstrating a positive example, exposing by words and deeds the immoral and inhuman nature and futility of relations based on violence, falsehood and aggression. ...[13]

> It stands to reason that in the process of socialist and communist construction new forms and methods emerge, which yield good results in the achievement of the great socialist aims. Inasmuch as in the socialist countries conditions differ from country to country, it is only natural that each communist party applies Marxist/Leninist theory in keeping with the conditions obtaining in that country. For this reason we must show understanding for this urge of the fraternal parties, who know better the conditions and features of their countries.[14]

Conclusion. Khrushchev's acceptance of a "goulash communism," the renunciation of force, and the "inalienable right of nations" seems to contradict all that transpired in Hungary during the fall of 1956. However, the Soviets were forced by the pressure of events to act quickly and convincingly to turn the tide. These were no longer the acts of responsible Communists or the results of the inherent conflicts on the path of

socialism; this was counterrevolution by capitalists and traitors. Janos Kadar himself had fallen under the spell of this heretical contagion. He too had advocated the return of the multiparty system and thus had abandoned a basic tenet, the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kadar later repudiated this error but shifted the blame for the revolution on enemies of the state who had proclaimed the slogans "democratic socialism" and "pure democracy," void of class content, to mask their real intention, to restore capitalism.[15] Their true designs only became evident during the final week of October. Even he had been duped by these false prophets in those eventful days.

In retrospect, it appears that intervention was actively supported from the very beginning by three of the Presidium's old-time Stalinists, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Georgi Malenkov. Presumably, Kliment Voroshilov and Nikolai Bulganin, two ex-marshals who could be expected to espouse the military solution, sided with the Stalinists to employ the armed forces to quell the revolt. Nikita Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan, and probably Mikhail Suslov, were originally opposed to this means but acquiesced when reports from Budapest proved conclusively that Hungary had declared neutrality and withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact.[16] These were the final acts of defiance and could not be tolerated.

Without the benefit of time to negotiate, cajole, or threaten with the veiled suggestion of a Warsaw Pact exercise, the Kremlin was compelled to respond immediately with the armed forces stationed in and around Hungary. The specter of a hostile Germany aligning itself with neutral Hungary and once again knocking on the door of the Russian Ukraine was vividly projected. This eventuality would have nullified the hard-won gains of World War II. Her protective buffer would have been torn asunder and an inviting avenue of approach once more exposed. Vital national interests and ideology complemented each other, dictating the use of armed might to quell the rebellion and restore the status quo. Assured of U.S. nonopposition, the way was relatively clear to enter. World opinion, even world communism to the contrary—Rumania and Poland at best had assumed extremely ambivalent positions—Hungary had to be returned to the fold despite the cost in lives, theory, or prestige. Time has a way of healing old wounds, and indeed Hungary was soon to be forgotten.

III—THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

> What we are trying to do here is to find a form of communism that is relevant to advanced, technological societies where people have to be given the latitude to think for themselves. This is the only kind of communism that is ever going to have any appeal to Western Europe. . . . But I'm afraid the Russians aren't ready to understand what we are doing. They see it as a threat to their own system . . . our 'heresy' of free speech and non-communist political groups might infect their own citizens.[1]
>
> Anonymous reformer prior to intervention

> We shall never agree to have imperialism, using ways peaceful and nonpeaceful, making a gap from the inside or from the outside in the Socialist system and changing in imperialism's favor the correlation of forces in Europe.[2]
>
> Warsaw Letter

Background. As in Hungary 12 years earlier, the seeds of Czechoslovak dissension were first sown in the Kremlin

by Nikita S. Khrushchev's attack on the image of Josef Stalin. For 12 years the Stalinist leaders of Czechoslovakia tried to accommodate themselves to this new brand of party discipline. But times changed and passed them by. Democratic centralism became less and less effective in the hands of recalcitrant hard liners. To exacerbate matters, the economy spiraled downward, production decreased, and inflation ran rampant. New challenges arose in the form of an educated vocal minority seeking redress of grievances. New party leaders rose through the ranks unawed by the aging bureaucracy and eager to apply new rules to the government, party, and economy.

The first visible sign of divergence between government and populace occurred during the Arab-Israeli 6-day war in June 1967.[3] Despite pro-Arab statements in the government and party press, *Rude Pravo*, the people largely supported "little Israel" even with lingering anti-Semitism still prevalent in the country. They found vicarious identification with the beleaguered Middle East nation surrounded by enemies. Had not Czechoslovakia herself been encompassed and harassed by an overwhelming host of enemies since 1938? It was a new blow for nationalism to recall and denounce 30 years of international perfidy from Munich, through Jan Masaryk, to Soviet overbearing dominance, and then gleefully view "Big Brother's protege" being soundly beaten.

The dike had ruptured; new cracks quickly accumulated. The Ministry of Culture attacked and subsequently dismissed from the party the writers Vaculik, Liehm, and Klima. It then assumed control of the rebellious Writer's Association Weekly, *Literarni Noviny*, and almost immediately circulation decreased from 140,000 to 70,000. But even worse, the populace actively sided with the purged writers and collected money for them. By October the political climate, especially in the cities, was seething. A student demonstration against frequent power failures in their sector of Strahov turned into an attack on government controls on freedom of speech. The police struck back brutally and were bitterly denounced by Prague lawyers and writers.

Antonin Novotny, the Stalinist party chief, chose this inauspicious moment to make a fatal political faux pas. Smoldering national enmities between Czechs and Slovaks erupted after his denunciation of the Slovak party chief Alexander Dubcek as a "bourgeois nationalist." All the old hatreds, supposedly long buried, were resurrected—the mock trials and executions of Slovaks by Moscow-trained Czechs in 1950 and 1952. Moscow soon learned of the party infighting, and Leonid Brezhnev suddenly arrived in Prague on 8 December. Thus began the winter stage of the crisis.

> We want a voluntary alliance of nations, an alliance that will not allow any violence on the part of one nation against another, an alliance that will be based on complete trust, on a clear awareness of fraternal unity, an entirely voluntary concord. Such an alliance cannot be achieved all at once; we must work our way toward it with the greatest patience and care, so as not to make a mess of things, so as not to arouse mistrust . . ..[4]

The Winter Stage; Freedom Set in Motion. It has been rumored that Brezhnev preferred Novotny and unknowingly gave him the kiss of death. Reformers chose Dubcek, the fast-rising but unproven Slovak moderate, to replace Novotny and compelled the Russian leader to acquiesce. For Brezhnev, however, this second choice bore no ill portents. Dubcek, though a reformer, had been schooled in Moscow and knew

the party line. On 5 January, the formalities of Soviet approval assured, Dubcek was elected by the majority to replace Novotny. He flew to Moscow on 29 January to present his new credentials, render thanks, and give assurances to the collective troika of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny that his reforms were intended only to update Czechoslovakia within the existing Communist framework. No change of system or challenge to Soviet hegemony was even considered. With their fondest blessings and wishes of good fortune, Dubcek returned to Prague and initiated the first liberalizing program, the dismissal of several old-line Stalinists and the release of over 30,000 political prisoners. For the first time, too, the Soviet Union was openly linked with these old injustices. Moscow began to have second thoughts about their compromise candidate; these actions bore a remarkable similarity to Hungary in 1956.

To add to Moscow's woes, word soon reached the Kremlin that a high-ranking Czechoslovak military leader, Major General Sejna, had defected to the West. With him went important Warsaw Pact secrets. In the wake of the investigation of Sejna's flight, another army general, Janko, committed suicide. Moscow demanded that the Czechoslovak military get its house in order and began to agitate for Warsaw Pact exercises to determine the capabilities of this increasingly suspect link in her chain of defenses.

In mid-February aroused citizens viewed an unrehearsed, unedited television debate on government and politics. They watched in amazement and disbelief the first time no stereotyped formulae, no ambiguous circumlocutions, no codes, no trite party-dictated alibis were expressed on a public media. The nation was shaken to its democratic core by the honest criticisms of party apparatus and government personalities. The first real step had been taken; there was no turning back once the floodgates had been opened.

At the Budapest Party Congress, which opened on 27 February, Soviet party theoretician Mikhail Suslov denounced "dangerous nationalistic tendencies (which have) appeared in separate links of the communist movement." The goal of the congress was to strike, "a serious blow at the anti-communist reaction that is trying to use the ideology of nationalism to split our ranks."[5] Czechoslovakia's representative, Vladimir Koucky, displayed obvious reticence at seconding Moscow's line which was interpreted by observers as protection for an as yet inchoate Czechoslovak internationalist position. The reforming Czechoslovak Communist exhibited the same deviationist tendencies reminiscent of Tito in 1948; to compound the issue, the reformer gained a sympathetic ear from many of the other congress participants.[6]

During March, liberal reformers began to enunciate publicly the philosophy of "democratic socialism." Alexander Kliment wrote in *Literarni Listy*, the liberal literary journal, on 1 March, "Only a free and proud nation can also have an international, in our case, European mission."[7] Hanus Hajek, analyzing the Czechoslovak experiment, wrote, "At the heart of Czechoslovakia's troubles is the country's orientation toward the Soviet Union. Ideologically motivated, the faith in the Soviets was soon revealed as an extremely costly and tragic error . . . the country is spiritually, politically, and economically geared toward the West, not the East."[8] The age-old Czechoslovak national and international avocation had reemerged from the doldrums of Communist restraints.

To play her rightful role in the world body politic, freedom was a necessity; her cultural heritage was her power. Freedom was impossible without a subjugation of the party apparatus. Vaclav Havel published on 4 April the first

attack on the Communist Party, and Ivan Svitak, philosophy lecturer at Charles University and a leader of the rebellious students, followed with his treatise on 10 April denouncing the Czechoslovak system as "totalitarian dictatorship."

> Workers and intellectuals have a common enemy—the bureaucratic dictatorship of the apparatus . . . in the interests of socialist democracy we have to strengthen the unity of those working with their hands and those working with their brains against the apparatus of the elite, which has been, is, and remains the main obstacle to the unique experiment of our nation with socialist democracy.[9]

These writers were joined by members of Klub 231 (named after the penal code number under which victims of Stalinist repression were imprisoned), the Club on Non-Party Members, and the Association of Resistance Fighters (persecuted Catholics led by Bishop Dr. Tomasek) in proclaiming freedom of speech, the abolition of censorship, investigation of former political condemnations, and the advocacy of free parties.[10] These grievances startled even Dubcek, and licenses for the clubs' continued legal operation were refused.

On 23 March a "comradely talk" was held with Dubcek in the hostile environment of Dresden, East Germany. The "Frightened Five;" Ulbricht, Gomulka, Kadar, Zhivkov, and Brezhnev interrogated the wayward disciple and suggested June Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia to prove his good faith. The hastily prepared April Command Post Staff Exercise was postponed at the last minute and rescheduled for June with participating combat troops. Dubcek, visibly shaken by this lack of confidence, returned home and appointed former Gen. Ludwig Svoboda, a Russian favorite, to replace Novotny as President. Liberals in the government were displeased by this concession to the Soviets; their choice had been Cestmir Cisar, an intellectual and liberal reformer who, oddly enough, had been a favorite of the Soviets in earlier days and had even written articles in Soviet political science reviews.[11] Winter had ushered in new criticism and attacks; another "Hundred Flowers" were about to bloom.

> First came the dream: a society that could be both communist and free—That was all they wanted—the Czechs and the Slovaks who last January overturned the Novotny dictatorship. They had no intention of reinstating capitalism, of leaving the Warsaw Pact, of conspiring with 'revanchists', or even threatening the Communist Party's political monopoly. Their goal was to humanize a system that had become economically inefficient and bureaucratized.[12]

The Spring State; New Polemics. To relieve the economic pressures constricting his regime, Dubcek journeyed to Moscow on 4 May to obtain a 400-million ruble loan. His request coincided with press attacks on the Soviet Union for involvement in the death of Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak postwar President, and was refused. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* replied angrily to these attacks; almost daily polemics were set in motion. Soviet Army Gen. Alexei Yepishev, political overseer of the Armed Forces, was quoted by *Le Monde* on 6 May saying that the Soviet Army would be ready to "safeguard socialism" in Czechoslovakia, if requested. *Literarni Listy* interviewed Soviet Army Gen. Alexei Zhadov, First Deputy to the Chief Inspector, Ministry of Defense, on 30 May during his visit to the Czechoslovak Army garrison at Litomerice, and

he was reported to have stated, "the good communists in the country have no reason to be afraid because a single call will suffice—the entire Soviet Army as well as the armies of the friendly nations will be ready." Instead of cries of terror, Czechoslovaks were indignant and taunted the Soviets for their lack of faith in the activities of their fraternal neighbors.

Alexei Kosygin visited Prague on 17 May, ostensibly to partake of the health cures at nearby Karlovy Vary but in reality to urge Dubcek to agree to pact maneuvers. Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko followed on Kosygin's heels, impressing upon the reluctant Czechoslovak leader the value of agreement and the dangers posed by the militant clique of NATO/West Germany. Finally, on 24 May, Dubcek succumbed to their entreaties, much to the dismay of the liberal faction. Pact troops arrived, the strangest of exercises was played, and the lengthy removal of troops and war of nerves began. Undismayed by the presence of not quite so friendly armed forces, Dubcek expelled Novotny from the Communist Party on 1 June and lifted all travel restrictions to and from Czechoslovakia. This latter action, in effect, obviated the Berlin Wall; East German citizens could now flee westward through Czechoslovakia. Walter Ulbricht angrily denounced this action as a direct attack on East German communism.[13] A long, hot summer had begun.

> Recently there has been great apprehension that foreign forces may interfere with our internal development. Faced with their superior strength, the only thing we can do is humbly hold our own and not start trouble. We assure the government that we will back it, if necessary even with weapons as long as the government does what we mandate. . . .[14]

Summer Heat and Frustration. Ludwik Vaculik precipitated the third phase of the Czechoslovak crisis with a vicious attack on the party apparatus in the 27 June issue of *Literarni Listy* entitled "2,000 Words: A Statement of Democratization." He stated:

> The communist party betrayed the great trust the people put in it after the war. It preferred the glories of office, until it had those and nothing more. The disappointment was great among communists as well as noncommunists. The leadership of the party changed it from a political and ideological group into a power-hungry organization, attracting egotists, cowards and crooks.[15]

It was unheard of to criticize so blatantly the lawfully constituted government; and a Communist government at that. Vaculik made the unwarranted assumption that the government actually represented the people and was obliged to respect its mandate when, in fact, a Communist government must in large measure be controlled from without and administered from within by a small bureaucratic elite. On one hand he pledged armed assistance to the Dubcek reformers, and on the other he threatened the Stalinists and conservatives if the liberalization should fail.

> We must find ways to induce them (those who have abused their power . . . harmed public property . . . acted dishonestly and cruelly) to leave. Such steps include public criticism, resolutions, demonstrations, collecting funds for their retirement, strikes and boycotts. . . . But we must reject methods which are illegitimate, indecent or gross, since they might prejudice Alexander Dubcek.[16]

Vaculik was loudly applauded in Prague but viciously attacked in Moscow. To the Soviets the threats themselves were "illegitimate, indecent and gross" and could not be tolerated. Czechoslovakia's fate may well have been sealed with the publication of this document. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* daily denounced "2,000 Words" but the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPC) rejected these arguments and insisted that the liberalization was a necessary adjustment within the system. "The CPC is trying to show that it is capable of a different political leadership and management than discredited bureaucratic police methods, mainly on the strength of its Marxist/Leninist ideas, by the strength of its program and by its just policy which is supported by all the people."[17]

Many signs had appeared during the early months of the Dubcek regime which linked the current crisis with that of Hungary in 1956. Students' demands, the intellectuals' revolt, party and economic reforms were all too reminiscent of the precrisis days in Budapest. Jan Masaryk had again become a public national hero as had Laszlo Rajk. Osvald Machatka resurrected Imre Nagy, the Hungarian hero of democratic and national socialism, and compared his fate to events transpiring in Czechoslovakia.[18]

In a speech filled with warnings to the Czechoslovaks, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko addressed the Supreme Soviet on 27 June—ironically enough, the same day "2,000 Words" was being read in Prague.

> Comrade Deputies, for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and the Soviet Government, for the Soviet people, there is nothing more sacred in the field of foreign policy than the consolidation of the community of socialist countries. The defense of the gains and of the cohesion of socialist states is our sacred duty, to which our country will be loyal despite all trials. . . . But those who hope to break even a single link in the socialist community are planning in vain. The socialist community will not permit this.[19]

Soviet troops continued to delay their exit from Czechoslovakia, although ostensibly the pact exercise had terminated in mid-June. Critics loudly protested Soviet perfidy while government spokesmen nervously repeated Soviet promises to withdraw. What they had originally reported to the populace as a "tiny and ordinary exercise of staffs" soon escalated to include signal troops, "then in rapid succession so-called security units and marking units were added, then tanks and aircraft until the whole glittering cast was on stage."[20] And still they tarried along the country roads in Bohemia and Slovakia. Czechoslovak Chief of Military Affairs, General Prchlik, on 15 July called for a revision of the Warsaw Pact to give partners equal say and thereby prevent the pact's use for political ends. The obvious slur on Soviet manipulation of exercises to force Czechoslovak deceleration of liberalization did not go unnoticed by the Russian Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, Marshal Ivan Yakubovskiy. *Red Star*, the Soviet Armed Forces weekly, rebuked Prchlik on 23 July and forced the CPC to remove him from office 2 days later.

Demands for a summit conference by the pact allies while troops still remained fell on deaf ears, although the Czechoslovak Presidium agreed to confer bilaterally with any ally at any time. Pact leaders, again excluding the Rumanians, met in Warsaw on 18 July and drafted the infamous "Warsaw Letter" demanding a halt to the dangerous liberalization program.

> The development of events in your country evokes deep anxiety in us. It is our deep conviction that the offensives of the reactionary forces, backed by imperialism, against your party and the foundations of the socialist system in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic threatens to push your country off the road of socialism and that it thus jeopardizes the interests of the entire socialist system.... This is something more than your cause. It is the common cause of all the communist and workers' parties and states united by alliance, cooperation and friendship. This is the common cause of our countries, which have joined in the Warsaw Treaty....[21]

The ultimatum concluded with the threat to unleash a campaign against counterrevolutionary forces if matters were not quickly righted.

The letter failed to achieve its goal. Czechoslovaks rallied to the defense of their government and berated the Soviets as the "worst enemies of freedom." The CPC in emergency session formally rejected the contents of the letter and sent its reply to all pact capitals on the 19th. *Rude Pravo* and the university papers *Student* in Prague, and *Echo* in Bratislava, loudly proclaimed the rights and grievances of all citizens against this latest tyranny. Students, intellectuals, workers, Communists and non-Communists, were driven together by pact heavyhandedness. The Czechoslovak brand of communism, largely discredited by Novotny but saved by Dubcek, was not appreciated by Moscow. "What everyone is asking, including the Kremlin, of course, is what sort of communism Czechoslovakia has been saved for."[22] Moscow finally announced the termination of the Warsaw Pact exercise on 12 July, but Czechoslovak media refused to acknowledge this report until the 24th, when the last Soviet troops left the country.

Little Czechoslovakia, the epicenter of an ideological maelstrom, received support for her experiment, as Hungary had previously, from Yugoslavia and Rumania. Even Janos Kadar, who could recall the same tensions in Hungary, appeared constrained by outside pressures in his halfhearted criticism of his northern neighbor. Faced with this ever-widening dichotomy in East European communism, the Soviets requested another meeting with Dubcek and the entire Czechoslovak Presidium with Moscow, Kiev, or Lvov as the suggested meeting site. Dubcek agreed but only on the conditions that the meeting take place on Czechoslovak soil and selected members of the Presidium be present. He probably recalled the fate of other government leaders who had journeyed to Moscow for friendly talks and had never been heard of again. He also knew that not all members of the government could be relied upon for support under Soviet pressure.

Dubcek appeared on television on 27 July promising to adhere to democratization, "firmly based on the international communist movement." Two days later representatives of the C.S.R. Presidium met in Cierna and Tison, just inside the Czechoslovak/U.S.S.R. border with the entire Soviet Politburo. The seriousness of the meeting was highlighted by this first occasion in history that the entire Russian hierarchy had left the country at the same time. On 1 August this strange and foreboding summit was concluded with the announcement of continued conferences to be held in the Slovak capital of Bratislava on the 3d. If the Soviets had been assured that all was well, the other pact allies had to be persuaded. This second summit lasted but one day; the communique at its conclusion was crisp and innocuous. To reassure both the people of Czechoslovakia that no deals had

been made and the Warsaw Pact that their fears had been groundless, Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik reasserted allegiance to the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. "We cannot be neutral," he stated on the 4th. Kremlin doves seemed satisfied at the conclusion of the week's activities and hastened to their Black Sea dachas for vacations.

Tito arrived in Prague on 9 August and received a hero's welcome. On the following day the CPC published its latest far-reaching reforms, which again caused dismay in neighboring capitals. Walter Ulbricht, now firmly unconvinced by the rhetoric of Bratislava, followed Tito to Czechoslovakia and demanded positive proof from Dubcek that the Czechoslovak contagion would be restricted from East Germany. The meeting was extremely cool and did little to ameliorate matters for the frightened East German leader. President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania visited Prague on 15 August, praising the reform but cautioning a less precipitous pursuit of its goals. Sobered somewhat by these warnings, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister Martin Dzur pledged his allegiance to the Warsaw Pact and again disavowed Prchlik in an effort to calm Soviet apprehension. Dubcek himself warned of too much freedom in a public address on 16 August, declaring "alliance with Russia is the alpha and omega of Czechoslovak foreign policy."[23] President Svoboda followed with an appeal for press restraint on the 17th.

The Kremlin leaders, however, became convinced that these rather feeble declarations by the Czechoslovak bureaucracy were the final indications of lost control. Brezhnev and Kosygin hastily returned to the Kremlin on 20 August for an emergency meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee. The collective decision was reached; the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact already massed along the Czechoslovak borders were ordered to invade.

> . . . party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have requested the Soviet Union and other allied states to give the fraternal Czechoslovak people immediate assistance . . . including armed forces. The reason for this appeal is the threat posed to the socialist system . . . and to the constitutionally established state system by counterrevolutionary forces that have entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism.[24]

> The Czechoslovak government declares that neither the government nor any other constitutional body in the country ever agreed to the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. The forcible occupation of Czechoslovakia is a violation of the United Nations' charter, the Warsaw Pact and the basic principles of international law.[25]

"How could they do this to me? I have served the cause of the Soviet Union and communism all my life."[26]

Finale? Prior to armed intervention on 20 August, many Western and East European analysts had recognized the threat of Soviet attack but perhaps overoptimistically concluded that the Soviet leadership was hopelessly deadlocked and unable to reach a decision.[27] Prompted by the obvious Soviet hesitancy and repeated feints and delays as they regarded each successive power threat fail, several Kremlinologists concluded that the act of intervention followed a secret plot by the "hawk" faction. According to one theory, at the conclusion of the Bratislava talks, when the Politburo members went on their Black Sea vacations, Kiril Mazurov of

Byelorussia and Andrei Kirilenko of the Ukraine—both of the hawk group—remained in the Kremlin.[28] Reports of Tito's and Ceausescu's triumphal visits to Prague and Ulbricht's angry telephone call after his fruitless talk with Dubcek prompted these hard liners to solicit further support among the hawks for intervention.

Time was running short. The Czechoslovak extraordinary Party Congress was to take place on 9 September and promised to solidify all of the liberalization program thus far enacted and purge the remaining old Stalinists left in the party. Under pressure by Mazurov and Kirilenko, Aleksandr Shelepin and Pyotr Shelest joined the hawks, leaving Nicolai Podgorny, Andrei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov outnumbered. Leonid Brezhnev, who was in the dove camp until the final days and who had wept to Dubcek that another Hungary was unthinkable between fraternal Communists, finally sided with the hawks. His 11th hour postponement at Bratislava had proven a failure; he had no other choice but to vote for armed intervention.

Other "Kremlin watchers" downgrade the plot theory. They believe the decision to invade was collectively taken, feeding on the natural anxieties of the military leaders responsible for national security and the traditional buffer system in East Europe. Flexibility had obviously failed; more positive action had to be taken. Two theories have been advanced on the manner in which they were to silence this threat to national security. The Soviets may never have considered any other solution to the Czechoslovak problem, given the failure of earlier lenient measures. The Cierna and Bratislava conferences were mere rituals, possibly engineered to surface and aid any rebellious group of Czechoslovaks to oppose Dubcek. Finding none, the massed troops provided their ace in the hole. Secondly, perhaps Cierna and Bratislava were the final efforts of the more moderate elements in the Kremlin to win the day. Dubcek's refusal or inability to deliver on their demands obviated further leniency.[29]

It appears that from the Soviet point of view armed intervention was indeed a last resort. The Kremlin tried to decelerate the Dubcek express throughout the 8-month "Prague spring" by sending its highest leaders to Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev, Suslov, Kosygin, and a host of the highest ranking military rotated to the recalcitrant capital but returned with little more for their efforts than Dubcek assurances that all was indeed well. Warsaw Pact exercises, a lengthy lingering of forces, and finally a massing of troops along the entire Czechoslovak northern, southern, and eastern frontiers met with the same response. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* grew daily more bellicose—several days after the invasion Dubcek was actually referred to as a traitor—and the press of East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria in particular echoed Moscow's threats. Cierna and Bratislava were the last chance for Dubcek to recant; when he and Svoboda failed to halt the damaging excesses, the die was cast.

In the Soviet mind the Czechoslovak experiment would have sooner or later proven fatal to the system so carefully constructed since World War II. Freedom of speech and press, open criticism from within and without the party, and verbal assaults on the cradle of communism, Moscow, threatened to undermine and eventually topple East European and perhaps even Soviet communism. To the Soviets this was a far more direct challenge than any matter of orthodox ideology or different paths to socialism.[30] The presaged failure of Czechoslovak communism meant the inevitable resurrection of capitalism, alignment with NATO, and another dagger pointed at Russia's heart.[31] The longer the procrastination, the stronger the contagion grew; even in Russia the youth and intellectuals were electrified at the spectacle of Czechoslovak reform. Their

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goal of humanizing a system that had become bankrupt and bureaucratized had proven too dangerous for Moscow to tolerate any longer. In a single night the illusion of friendship and equality for fraternal Czechs and Slovaks was dashed by the Soviets who had been called their best friends and most loyal allies.

IV—CONCLUSIONS

> I am deeply convinced that our action in Czechoslovakia is a tragic mistake and bitter blow against Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship and the world communist movement. It lowers our prestige in the world and in our own eyes. It is a setback for all progressive forces, for peace in the world, and for humanity's dreams of future brotherhood.[1]

> It is a sad commentary on the communist mind that a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a fundamental threat to the security of the Soviet system.[2]

Aftermath. After the initial shock of invasion had been absorbed by the world, Leonid Brezhnev admitted that the use of armed force in Czechoslovakia was, "an extraordinary step dictated by necessity." He went on to enunciate the famous doctrine that now bears his name, ". . . but when internal and external forces hostile to socialism are threatening to turn a socialist country back to capitalism, this becomes a common problem and a concern of all socialist countries."[3] Yugoslavia indignantly and pejoratively referred to this Soviet claim to the right of intervention as the "theory of limited sovereignty." The Brezhnev doctrine is a warning to socialist friends that the Soviet Union will tolerate only a certain amount of liberalization. It is a proclamation to the West that only a certain amount of bridgebuilding can be accepted. For friend and foe the determination of how much liberalization and bridgebuilding is acceptable is a precarious undertaking. In summary, the Brezhnev doctrine does little to further the lessening of cold war tensions or make the analysis of Soviet foreign policy easier.

Reasons. Despite almost daily articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* during the summer and fall denouncing revisionism, counterrevolution, the influence of West German revanchism, and even the not so subtle hand of foreign intelligence agencies, many friends and foes alike concluded that pact action was predicated upon what the Soviets perceived as their vital national interests. Yet, ideologically, the resurrection of non-Communists in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary would have eventually led in both cases to the collapse of Marxism/Leninism. The next logical step would have been alignment with the anti-Communist West. For the Soviet Union this situation threatens national security and survival itself. President John F. Kennedy once said, "National interests are more important than ideology," and I suspect the same is true for the Soviet Communist who publicly places ideology in prime position. When national interests and ideology both are threatened, however, the courses of action are narrowed. If the grievance persists, a great power must eventually bring its strength to bear to terminate the danger.

Theories. R. Strausz Hupé and John Erickson reaffirmed their contention that theSoviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia because of the historic Russian preoccupation with defense. Professor Erickson maintains that since the "October Storm" Warsaw Pact maneuvers in 1966, the Soviet General Staff had suspected that the Czechoslovak Armed Forces were incapable of holding

their sector against a NATO attack.[4] Moscow raised the question of stationing troops on Czechoslovak soil but was rebuffed until actual intervention compelled the signing of the 19 October treaty between the C.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. Other military factors proposed by R.R. Gill were defense budget cuts and possible reduction in the number of divisions opposite West Germany advocated by Dubcek.[5] Both measures were clearly untimely and unacceptable to the defense-minded Soviets.

In the light of possible U.S. and NATO response, world opinion, and the effect of such action within the world Communist movement, the Soviet decisions to intervene in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were most difficult. To the enemies of the Soviet Union such displays of power would be severely criticized and denounced. A reinvigorated NATO awareness might well emerge from these acts. To the uncommitted, the brutal use of force would be condemned, and future overtures of friendship placed in serious doubt. To friends and allies, the employment of the Warsaw Pact would call into question the very raison d'etre of the treaty. It would appear that the pact threatens no one but its signatories; it is not so much a military alliance as an internal police union to arrest or decelerate the processes of change and modernization within its jurisdiction.[6]

After due consideration of the positive and negative factors involved, the Soviets, nevertheless, chose to invade. Whereas Hungary in 1956 was a sudden break with the Warsaw Pact and an unconcealed attack upon Soviet presence and influence, thus obviating many alternative tactics, Czechoslovakia presented complications. While no less serious in Soviet eyes, the events in Czechoslovakia always promised a successful conclusion as a result of the steady application of power in all its myriad forms. The C.S.R. paid its allegiance to the Soviet Union and pledged its continued fraternal friendship within the framework of the socialist system. Dubcek was convinced that democratic socialism posed no counterweight to communism. As a devoted servant all his life he fully expected and demanded Soviet indulgence. He carefully avoided presenting Moscow with a clear-cut excuse to employ its might and on several occasions chided Brezhnev and Kosygin on the folly of creating "another Hungary."

Dubcek and the other liberal reformers, Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Svoboda, failed to estimate correctly the consequences their actions had unleashed in Eastern Europe. The already delicate and precarious state of intersatellite relations was exacerbated by the near hysterical warnings of Zhivkov, Gomulka, and Ulbricht. Their weak and fragile regimes were undergoing intolerable pressures created by the Czechoslovak experiment. They could derive little comfort from the growing West German political and economic influence among the bloc. Rumania had been wooed by the new German colossus; Bonn was officially recognized and trade arrangements successfully concluded. Czechoslovakia seemed eager to follow the same path.

The apprehension of January 1968 had, by August, become outright fear. Czechoslovakia's dream of a gradual, natural process of moving by stages toward freedom of speech and economics had rung the alarm bell of "spontaneity" in Leninist ears.[7] The freedom to criticize the present restrictions and the freedom to accept the bridgebuilding offers of trade and travel from revanchist Germany were totally anathema. Dubcek had been threatened, chastised, and coerced repeatedly but had failed to accede to demands. Moscow viewed this recalcitrance as the unwillingness or inability of the reformers to control the events transpiring in Czechoslovakia. The waiting game had been played, and the dangers had

increased rather than abated. For Moscow and her willing accomplices the experiment raised possibilities which would have nullified all the bitter, hard-won gains of World War II and subsequent cold war.

Djilas, Brzezinski, Morgenthau, and others viewed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as merely their latest manifestation of aggressiveness.[8] In addition, it was inconceivable that any country in the Soviet orbit could presume to enjoy freedoms denied to the people of the U.S.S.R.[9] There is considerable evidence that the Soviets have enough internal dissension without compounding the issue with envy or possible emulation of the satellite countries. Morgenthau claims that the use of military might to crush the Czechoslovak experiment was determined by the weakness of the political system which spawned it. The Soviet Union has discredited its ideological foundation and hence the legitimacy of communism as a political movement and as a prime mover behind the government. It is just another state, but one capable of enforcing its will upon its neighbors in pursuit of vital interests and self-defense. "Hungary was a single act of defiance, Czechoslovakia conjured up the spectre of slow erosion which, given the weakness of communist legitimacy everywhere, could spread throughout the communist world, destroying the monopoly of political power of the Soviet Communist Party itself."[10] In daily warnings to the Czechoslovak reformers, Soviet news media repeated the familiar dictum, "There can be only one kind of socialism and that is Soviet socialism, which is the supreme form of democracy."[11]

There are those who view the Soviet Union as posing no more threat to the West than it did prior to intervention. The Soviets are neither more aggressive nor more pacific; they simply want to retain the empire it took so long to build.[12] Others view the new forward posture of Soviet military might with great alarm. Senators Henry Jackson and Frank Moss have called attention to the imbalance of power created by the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia.[13] "The Soviet Union is a dangerous and unpredictable adversary. We cannot be confident that a Soviet Union . . . will not use military force in pursuing its objectives in other situations, when it believes this can be done without incurring unacceptable risks," Senator Jackson warned Congress after the invasion. Both Senators have been staunch advocates of renewed NATO awareness and strengthening to offset the increasing aggressive posture of Soviet forces in Europe.[14] My own position is somewhere between these two extremes.

Implications. The New threat posed by Moscow is not one of immediate aggression against NATO or the United States; it is one of a Great Power becoming overly reliant upon the use of armed might to crush disagreement at home and abroad. Having twice thwarted movements inimical to her supposed vital interests, the U.S.S.R. may, in the future, not hesitate to employ force again. Wherein lies the real threat. The use of her huge land army and her growing naval presence as a substitute for diplomacy must, in time, lead to confrontation with NATO and the United States whether it be over Yugoslavia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. The comparative success and ease in which the military aspects of the interventions were accomplished are certainly not deterring factors for the future utilization of the armed forces in crisis situations.

The Brezhnev doctrine implies the continued resort to force to achieve the aims of foreign policy. Moscow's right to intervene at its discretion places Yugoslavia and Rumania in extremely anomalous positions. Tito can rely on no outside assistance; there is no treaty committing any nation to its defense.

Soviet attempts to achieve a foothold in the Adriatic area by force, however, might easily escalate to a tragic confrontation with NATO and the United States. For Rumania, those committed to its defense paradoxically, are the likely aggressors. Outside assistance, under any circumstance, is remote. Ceausescu can be little consoled by the defense provisions of the Warsaw Pact, especially by the last two instances of its use—against two signatories, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet ruling clique has, throughout its 50-year history, been harsh in its dealings with minority dissatisfaction, from the dispersal of the All Russian Constituent Assembly in 1918 to the interventions in the neighboring allied states of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the final analysis of these acts it has shown a disregard for moral and juridical condemnations. For the Soviets, the maintenance of the status quo ante and spheres of influence are absolute prerequisites for national security and outweigh world opinion and judgments. It is not surprising, with only a hasty perusal of Soviet history, to find the military solution basic in the pursuit of national interests. The traditional buffer states of Eastern Europe were preserved for communism by armed forces occupation. The surprising aspect of the Czechoslovak intervention, as compared to Hungary, was the manner in which it was accomplished.

Western observers and, indeed, the Dubcek regime itself knew full well the capabilities of the Soviet troops massed along the Czechoslovak borders long in advance of the actual invasion. As early as the March conference between Dubcek and the "frightened five"—Ulbricht, Gomulka, Zhivkov, Kadar, and Brezhnev—the threat of Warsaw Pact forces entering Czechoslovakia was a harsh reality. The Soviets tightened the military noose slowly; in April they canceled the previously scheduled staff exercise, in May they forced a larger exercise on the Czechoslovaks, and in June they entered the country. Pact troops lingered through July, finally moving to preplanned positions on the Czechoslovak periphery to maintain constant pressure. There was no such element of time during the Hungarian crisis. Troops had to be rushed into Hungary to prevent communism's demise. Elaborate exercises along the Czechoslovak frontiers and a massive callup of reserves for an announced logistics exercise within the U.S.S.R. western border districts provided ample time to apply pressure and eventually employ these forces to halt the contagion of liberalization. But the entire world believed that the crisis had been resolved by the accords of Cierna and Bratislava.

Is it possible then that Soviet actions can no longer be predicted as Senator Jackson has stated? Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia after the usual diplomatic procedure of negotiation and compromise agreements. What does the future hold for a world in a thermonuclear environment if one of the greatest powers appears no longer to act rationally and predictably? International relations and peace itself are predicated upon the reasoned approach of diplomacy and negotiation.

The Soviet hierarchy seems at present to be more capricious than

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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former regimes. In the international arena the actions and words of a Stalin could be studied and probes made based on analyses of intentions. Instead of the anticipated mellowing of communism and the erosion of despotism presaged by Ambassador George F. Kennan, a certain hardening and rigidity permeate the new leading elite. Theories of convergence—that communism and capitalism were on a course bringing them inevitably together—and the softening of communism were dealt a harsh blow by the events of August 1968.[15] Many other dubiously hopeful cliches of the day have been since discarded. The peculiar charm of the boisterous, flamboyant, country bumpkin, Nikita Khrushchev, had made analysis of the leadership's true bent difficult. His attack on Stalin deluded many into accepting Kennan's predictions. Today's Kremlin troika, however, appears to be following a path diametrically opposed to conservatism and caution.[16]

The Hungarian episode can be understood from the Soviet point of view as a necessary though regrettable intervention. The Soviet Union had been provoked and abandoned by an ally in the short space of 10 days. Czechoslovakia, however, was a blatant, raw use of violence to smash an internal disagreement after a negotiated accord had apparently satisfied all parties. This is the crux of the matter. Reliance on the use of force to achieve the goals of foreign policy—especially if that force has twice been used in the past 12 years against fraternal neighbors and allies—bodes ill for the future. Soviet foreign policy can no longer be characterized as cautious but may well be termed adventuresome.

The Soviet state is beset by enormous difficulties, internally and externally, which tend to increase the need for a foreign adventure to relieve tensions. Within is a seething unrest born of decades of unfulfilled promises. On the western frontier is the enigma of the East European satellites. First Yugoslavia, then East Germany, Albania, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia have strayed in varying degrees from the true fold. Beyond the dubiously reliable pact allies is NATO, with the nemesis of a revitalized and belligerent West Germany. In the East are the Chinese; inscrutable as ever and now doubly dangerous with nuclear might. Around and within are nationalistic stirrings which must be suppressed by the presence of Soviet armed forces or the Internal Security Troops (MOOP) and KGB. Stalin's harsh rule, devoid of mass terror and paranoic extremes, must remain more than a memory; it must be constant and ubiquitous, though somewhat tempered by time.

Those writers of William Glaser's third school of Soviet foreign policy analysis—Beloff, Brzezinski, Morgenthau, Djilas, Shub—appear to me to have presented the most useful interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. It is perhaps not too presumptuous to state that Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny may be characterized in ability, leadership, and charisma as mediocre at best. The leadership has suffered the erosion of its revolutionary fervor and ideology almost to the point of equality with traditional Russian, xenophobic rulers. World communism stands in ill repute; its allure has been tainted by rift, revisionism, and factionalism. The preservation of the status quo seems to be the preoccupation of this ruling generation of politicians. New concepts have been largely discredited as counterrevolutionary, leaving a stagnated mentality to lead the international Communist movement and Soviet state.

The free world must be wary of this increasingly unpredictable adversary. Soviet diplomacy of the summer of 1968 was not reassuring as we proceed towards talks on the limitation of arms and the easing of tensions in the Middle East. For the United States it may be well to realize that technology, time,

and youth are not the panacea for détente between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are vivid proofs that libertarian aspirations can result in harsh Stalinist repression and not softening, mellowing, or the erosion of despotism. The resurgence of police power, a dictatorship of the militariat, a new Stalin can just as easily emerge in a Communist state obsessed with the preservation of its own bankrupt bureaucracy. Each successive dependence upon force to coerce a dissenter or maintain one's own destitute legitimacy is a diminution of a great power's credibility and a threat to world peace and security. This is the real danger of Soviet foreign policy as reflected in the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises.

FOOTNOTES

I—AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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Ψ

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.

Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C. The Art of War, iii



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The description of courses which follows indicates Naval Reserve retirement-point evaluations. The satisfactory completion of each installment is creditable.

The correspondence course program is designed so that the student may proceed in an orderly manner from subject to subject. Prerequisites are not required nor is it mandatory that the recommended pattern be followed. However, based on experience, it has been determined that an officer benefits more by progressing in the following general manner, moving from Group 1 toward Group 4:

Group 1: Military Planning and National and International Security Organization.

Group 2: Naval Operations, Command Logistics, and Military Management.

Group 3: International Relations and Counterinsurgency.

Group 4: Strategic Planning and International Law.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION, NWC 14. 2 Installments--28 Points total--14 Points per installment. A study of the National Security Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Headquarters of the Military Departments; Unified, Joint, and Combined Organizations; International

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Security Organizations; and Foreign Aid Programs.

COMMAND LOGISTICS, NWC 15. 3 Installments--39 Points total--13 Points per installment. A study of basic logistic considerations, logistic elements and functions; interrelationships of strategy, tactics, and the basic elements and functions of logistics; the impact of future developments and trends of warfare upon the field of logistics; and the impact of future developments in the field of logistics upon the concept of warfare from the command viewpoint.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, NWC 16. 6 Installments--102 Points total--17 Points per installment. This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of principles of international law having to do with the organization of the world community with emphasis on areas of naval interest and with specific application of these principles to the naval officer's profession.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NWC 17. 6 Installments--96 Points total--16 Points per installment. This course is designed to furnish students with a disciplined study of international relations. It is organized so as to provide basic definitions, concepts, and functions of organizations which facilitate the conduct of world affairs. As international relations greatly influences policies of national security and subsequent national strategy, serious students of this course will significantly enhance their professional qualifications.

MILITARY PLANNING, NWC 18. 2 Installments--30 Points total--15 Points per installment. A study of the systematic techniques of logical analysis as applied to military planning using a problem situation; and an introduction to staff organization, functions, staff studies, and planning directives.

NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWC 19. 2 Installments--34 Points total--17 Points per installment. A course comprising a study of the characteristics of four major weapons systems and considerations for their employment; submarine, antisubmarine, attack carrier, and amphibious forces. The student need select and complete only two of the four installments; however, a combination of the submarine and antisubmarine installments may not be selected.

STRATEGIC PLANNING, NWC 20. 2 Installments--44 Points total--22 Points per installment. A National Security Council level study of national objectives, interests, and policies and their relation to national strategy; and strategic planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COUNTERINSURGENCY, NWC 21. 4 Installments--60 Points total--15 Points per installment. This course provides a means for the student to prepare himself for positions of responsibility which involve the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency programs and to acquire an understanding of the possible contributions of all governmental departments and the need to integrate their available capabilities into effective programs to attain our national objectives.

MILITARY MANAGEMENT, NWC 22. 3 Installments--39 Points total--13 Points per installment. This course will provide the student an opportunity to further his appreciation for the principles, processes, concepts, applications, and techniques inherent in sound military management. It is structured to highlight the following areas of interest: the functions of management; the history and background of managerial thought; interdisciplinary foundations for management; defense as an economic problem; scientific aids to decisionmaking; the role of computers; Navy planning, programming, and bud-

SUMMARY OF CORRESPONDENCE COURSE OFFERINGS AND BENEFITS

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES		GROUPS (Recm order of taking)	NC&S level	NW level	No. of Install.	EARN Retirement Points	Documents
(CS Code)	(ABBR)					Reserve Off only	
71 Nat & Intemat Sec Org	(NISO)	1	x		2	@14 ea.= 28	Ltr for Selection Jacket & Certificate for Course
72 Military Planning	(MP)	1	x		2	@15 ea.= 30	"
72 Naval Operations	(NO)	2	x		2	@17 ea.= 34	"
72 Command Logistics	(CL)	2	x		3	@13 ea.= 39	"
72 Military Management	(MM)	2	x		3	@13 ea.= 39	"
ALL FIVE COURSES ABOVE -- Graduate of "The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff"							Special Diploma & Ltr for Selection Jacket
72 Int Relations	(IR)	3		x	6	@16 ea.= 96	Ltr for Selection Jacket & Certificate for Course
71 Counterinsurgency	(CI)	3		x	4	@15 ea.= 60	"
73 International Law	(IL)	3		x	6	@17 ea.=102	"
72 Strategic Planning	(SP)	4		x	2	@22 ea.= 44	"
ALL NINE COURSES ABOVE – Graduate of "The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare"							Special Diploma & Ltr for Selection Jacket

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geting; the management of resources; and future trends in military management.

* * * * *

Successful completion of individual courses is recognized by the award of a certificate and the issuance of a letter of completion. Notification of successful course completion is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel, or other appropriate authority, for inclusion in the student's selection jacket.

* * * * *

The President of the Naval War College will award diplomas to those students completing selected groups of correspondence courses which closely parallel the studies offered at the resident schools of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare. These diplomas certify that the designee is a graduate of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff or the Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of five correspondence courses: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, Command Logistics, and Military Management.

The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff plus four additional courses: Counterinsurgency, International Relations, International Law, and Strategic Planning.

Ψ

Remember, gentlemen, an order that can be misunderstood will be misunderstood.

Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder"), 1800-1891



PROFESSIONAL READING

Uhlig, Frank, Jr., ed. *1969 Naval Review.* Annapolis Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1969. 478p.

The 1969 edition of the *Naval Review,* published annually by the United States Naval Institute, compiles many essays written by highly qualified men on innumerable topics germane to naval affairs. Each article is self-contained, in and of itself, though naturally many are related to each other by virtue of their common ground, maritime and naval affairs.

Categorizing these essays and articles, the breakdown of subjects falls into the following topical areas: geographic maritime areas; merchant marine; oceanography; in-depth study of specific type ships or aircraft; counterinsurgency; and general naval affairs.

Geographic maritime areas. Three areas are specifically addressed—the Baltic and Danish Straits; the Mediterranean; and Vietnam and its surrounding waters. The article on the Baltic and Danish Straits, written by Rear Adm. Edward Wegener, FGN (Ret.) formerly Commander NATO Naval Forces Baltic, discusses the area from the standpoint of its strategic significance and role in Soviet and NATO strategies. Capt. Stephen W. Roskill, RN, (Ret.) analyzes the Mediterranean, with particular attention on how each of the littoral Mediterranean countries influences Mediterranean strategies.

Vietnam is the subject of several articles, each with a different perspective. Capt. W.C. Wells, USN, who commanded the first Riverine Assault Force during its first year in combat, authors an article on river and riverine warfare in Vietnam, with special attention to the Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force—its origin and operations. The machinations of the Naval Support Activity, Saigon, its growth and operations, 1966-68, are discussed by Capt. Herbert T. King, USN, first commander of the activity. The operations of the Marine Corps in Vietnam during 1967 are handled in great detail, battle by battle, by Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, USMC. Chronological and statistical data on Vietnam is to be found in two other articles, "U.S. Naval Operations Against North Vietnam, August 1964-November 1968" and "1967 Seventh Fleet Summary."

Merchant Marine. The sometimes overlooked arm of seapower, the merchant marine, is treated specifically by two articles. Ran Hettena, Vice President of Maritime Overseas Corporation, writes of the U.S. tanker industry, its structure and performance. Also, the *Review* has reprinted in toto the Maritime Administration's pamphlet, "The Soviet Merchant Marine" (1967), one of the most valuable current ready references on the Soviet fleet, and a well developed analysis of the implications of this burgeoning fleet for U.S. maritime policy.

Oceanography. The place of oceanography in today's navy; why it is

important today; its current programs and projects (including the Deep Submergence Systems Projects; oceanographic ships, equipment, and personnel are the topics of an article by the Oceanographer of the Navy, Rear Adm. O.D. Waters, Jr., USN. Another article, by Capt. George Bond, MC, USN delves into the Man-in-the-Sea Program, its mission, structure, manpower, and associated hardware.

In-depth study of specific type of ships or aircraft. Under this heading there are two essays. Comdr. Keith B. Schumacher, USCG, writes of the role of the icebreaker in seapower today; his essay includes discussion of past and present engineering studies regarding U.S. icebreakers and the expanding need for this type of ship. The developments and problems in carrier-based attack aircraft are discussed by Capt. C.O. Holmquist, USN. Captain Holmquist traces the history of these aircraft from the days of the general purpose attack planes (Martin AM-1 Mauler, Douglas AD-1 Skyraider) to the jet light attack aircraft (A-4, A-6). He warns the reader that "... Unless we reverse the trend toward increasingly complex and expensive aircraft, we might well price ourselves out of business in attack aviation."

Counterinsurgency. The above-mentioned article on riverine warfare as well as one on the Indonesian confrontation by Maj. General J.L. Moulton, Royal Marines, (Ret.), describe some of the problem areas relating to counterinsurgency from the maritime point of view.

General naval affairs. A chronological tabling of all the significant naval and maritime events from 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968 and a general study of maritime affairs in the 1956-67 decade are submitted by Lt. Harold S. Torrance, USN, and Rear Adm. John D. Hayes, USN, (Ret.), respectively. The Hayes article looks at these years with an historical and geographical perspective and includes what appears to be a real sense of personal concern about the future of U.S. maritime affairs. Also to be included under this heading is a reprint of Secretary of Defense McNamara's "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1969-70 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget."

The 1969 *Review* is similar to past editions in that it is a fine contribution to the literature pertaining to naval affairs and presents a compendium of reference material in this field. The wide variety of subjects under discussion, most of which are written with imagination, scholarship, and personal experience, should be most worthy of reading by the student of naval matters.

B.F. COYE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

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